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BONNEVILLE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CVl0--18-7400
Dale Kelly, Nancy Kelly
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRC Fabrication, LLC
Defendant.

§
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Location: Bonneville County District
Court
Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr
Filed on: 12/20/2018

Bonds
Cash Bond $100.00
Posted Cash
12/19/2019
Counts: l

Case Type: AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and Hl)
Case 12/19/2019 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal
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BONNEVILLE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CVl0-18-7400
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CVl0-18-7400
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BONNEVILLE CO
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CVl0-18-7400
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BONNEVILLE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CVl0-18-7400
and All Requested Attorneys' Fees
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12/23/2019
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Electronically Filed
12/20/2018 1:02 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: John Frey, Deputy Clerk

Watkins, Dane H., Jr

Brent 0. Roche (ISB#2627)
Rachel A. Miller (ISB#8991)
RACINE OLSON, PLLP
P. 0. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83 204-13 91
Telephone: (208) 232-610 I
Fax: (208) 232-6109
bor@racinelaw.net

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV10-18-7400

COMPLAINT and DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

v.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC,
an Idaho Limited Liability Co.
Defendant.

Plaintiffs, Dale Kelly and Nancy Kelly, through counsel and in support of their causes of
action against Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC, state and allege as follows:

PARTIES
I.

Plaintiffs Dale Kelly and Nancy Kelly ("Plaintiffs") are married and reside in

Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho.
2.

Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC ("TRC"), is an Idaho Limited Liability

Company, headquartered in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho.

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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JURISDICTION NENUE
3.

Every cause of action alleged against the defendant arise out of an incident that

occurred at TRC's facility in Bonneville County, Idaho on January 22, 2018 that seriously
injured Mr. Kelly.
4.

At all times material to this action TRC s principal place of business has been

located in Bonneville County, Idaho.
5.

The monetary damages ought by Plaintiff: exce d the minimum jurisdictional

threshold for the District Court.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIO S
6.

Dale Kelly is a profe sional truck dri er. H owns and operates a emi-tractor

and flat bed trailer ( semi-truck ) used to transport cargo throughout th western
At all times material to thi

nit d States.

action Mr. K lly contract d with Jay Transport Inc. ("Jay

Transport'), based in Rigby Idaho.

nder this arrangem nt Mr. Kelly operated hi

emi-truck

as an independent contractor, o ner-op rator for Jay Tran port which pro ided Mr. Kelly with
his work assignments.
7.

In January 2018 TRC purchased more than 43 000 pound of metal tubing from

Brown Strauss Steel Co. ( 'Brown Strau s ) in Fontana, California. Brown Strau s then arranged
for Jay Transport to haul the metal tubing from Fontana California to TRC's facility in Idaho
Falls.
8.

Dale Kelly was assigned by Jay Transport to transport the shipment of metal

tubing from Brown Strauss to TRC's facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
9.

Mr. Kelly arrived at Brown Strauss in Fontana, California on January 19, 2018.

He oversaw the loading of steel tubing on his trailer. The 10-inch square tubing was placed in a

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2

Page 10

single layer on top of 5X6 hardwood dunnage. The remaining steel tubing was placed in a
second single layer on top of the first layer using 4X4 dunnage. After properly securing the load
Mr. Kelly transported the shipment to TRC's facility in Idaho Fall

Idaho.

He arrived on

January 22, 2018.
10.

Upon his arrival at TRC's facility Mr. Kelly topped with his trailer adjacent to

the materials yard. He then gave the Bill of Lading to the yard for man. After determining that
the shipment was properly destined for TRC s facility in Idaho Fall

Idaho the yard foreman

returned the bill of lading to Mr. Kelly and directed him to the unloading ar a.
11.

At the unloading area Mr. Kelly was met by another employ e of TRC who was

operating a Gehl telehandler, aka a large forklift. Mr. Kelly th n ga e th billing of lading to the
operator, who reviewed and signed the bill of lading.
12.

TRC s operator whose identifi d is curr ntly unknown then commenced the

process of unloading the metal tubing from the right ide of the trailer. H first remo

d the

entire top layer at once.
13.

When TRC s operator backed away the telehandler from the trailer Mr. Kelly

stepped alongside the right side of the trailer to b gin remo ing the 4X4 dunnage.
14.

Suddenly and without warning TRC's fork lift operator lo t control of the entire

load. When Mr. Kelly heard the steel tubing hitting the pavement, he turned and saw the steel
tubing sliding on the pavement towards the trailer. H tried to jump up and over the steel tubes
but the tubes violently struck Mr. Kelly's right leg, ankle and foot, inflicting severe personal
injures, including but not limited to, a right distal tibial intra-articular pilon fracture that was
comminuted and displaced, as well as a right distal comminuted fibula fracture.

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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15.

Mr. Kelly was removed from the fallen metal tubing and taken by ambulance to

the Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center in Idaho Falls Idaho where he underwent the first of
three surgeries and remained hospitalized until January 23, 2018.
Count I.
Negligence

16.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-15 as if fully set

forth herein.
17.

At all times pertinent TRC owed a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety

of its business invitees, such as Mr. Kelly, including, but not limited to, when the driver's truck
is being unloaded by TRC's personnel.
18.

At all times pertinent TRC's lift operator had a duty to use reasonable care when

unloading the shipment of metal tubing from Mr. Kelly's semi-truck, including, but not limited
to, determining how much of the shipment of metal tubing he could safely lift and control at a
time given the lift's capacity and establishing a plan with Mr. Kelly for the safe removal of the
dunnage as TRC's operator unloaded the metal tubing from the flatbed trailer.
19.

At all times pertinent the lift operator was acting within the course and scope of

his employment with TRC, making TRC liable for the operator's negligence under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.
20.

TRC and its lift operator negligently breached their duties of care owing to Mr.

Kelly. Said negligence includes, but is not limited to, failing to implement or enforce safety
procedures requiring all truck drivers making deliveries to their facility to remain in the cabs of
their trucks or in TRC's breakroorn while their trailers were unloaded, overloading the capacity
of the lift by 1.5 times when beginning to unload the trailer, failing to maintain its unloading area
so that its lift operators have a smooth flat surface on which to back away the lift from the
COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
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trailers being unloaded, losing control of those metal tubes being moved, failing to devise and
implement a plan with Mr. Kelly for the safe removal of the dunnage.
21.

TRC and its lift operator also owed a duty of care to Dale Kelly to comply with

pertinent OSHA safety regulations designed for the protection of persons such as Dale Kelly.
TRC and its lift operator breached such duty by failing to comply with pertinent OSHA safety
regulations, including, but not limited to, 29 CFR 1910.178(0)(1) which requires a lift operator to
only handle stable loads and 29 CFR 1910.178(0)(2) which mandates that a lift operator handle
only loads within the rated capacity of the lift vehicle, such as the involved Gehl telehandler. As
a result of such violations of pertinent safety regulations TRC and its lift operator are negligent
per se.
22.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of TRC and its lift operator,

Mr. Kelly sustained severe personal injuries, including but not limited to, fractures of both bones
in his right lower leg, at the ankle joint, necessitating three surgeries to date, and related
hospitalizations and physical therapy, pain and suffering, past and future, emotional distress, past
and future, inability to pursue usual activities, past and future, all to his general damage in the
amounts to be proven at trial.
23.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of TRC and its lift operator,

Mr. Kelly has sustained economic damages, past and future, which include, but are not limited
to, medical expenses which exceed $145,000, and lost earnings and decreased earning capacity,
in the amounts to be proven at trial.
Count IL
Loss of Consortium

24.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 as if fully set

forth herein.
COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5
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25.

As a direct and proximate result of the fault of TRC Fabrication and its lift

operator, and the resulting severe and permanent injuries suffered by her husband, Nancy Kelly
has suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of consortium, all to her general damage in the
amount to be proven at trial.

Claim for Attorneys' Fees
26.

The negligence of TRC and its fork lift operator have necessitated Plaintiffs

retaining counsel to bring this action. Pursuant to LC. §12-121, Plaintiffs should receive an
award of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting this action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request entry of judgment against Defendant, as follows:
A.

For an award of general damages, past and future, sustained by Mr. Kelly in the

amounts proved at trial;
B.

For an award of economic damages incurred and to be incurred by Plaintiffs in the

amounts proved at trial;
C.

For an award of general damages, past and future, sustained by Nancy Kelly in

the amounts proved at trial;
D.

For an award of costs incurred in prosecuting this action;

E.

For an award ofreasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to LC. §12-121; and

F.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable.

DATED this

.!..l day of December, 2018.
RACINE OLSON, PLLP
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs request a trial by

a 12-person jury on all issues.
DATED this _L!lday of December, 2018.
RACINE OLSON, PLLP

By:_61- _~-~-BRENT 0. ROCHE
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Electronically Filed
1/16/2019 4:45 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Maria Padilla, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 233-2001
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150
Email: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com
Austin T. Strobel (ISB# 9803)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
2010 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 529-3005
Facsimile: (208) 529-3065
Email: astrobel@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CVl0-18-7400
ANSWER

vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Co.
Defendant.

Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC (''TRC") by and through counsel of record, Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, hereby submits its Answer to Plaintiffs Dale Kelly and Nancy
Kelly's ("Plaintiffs") Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (the "Complaint") as follows:
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FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
TRC denies each and every allegation contained in the Complaint that is not expressly
and specifically admitted hereinafter.

THIRD DEFENSE
With respect to the specific allegations contained in the Complaint, TRC responds as
follows:

PARTIES
1.

Responding to paragraph 1 of the Complaint, TRC lacks sufficient information

with which either to admit or deny the allegations of said paragraph.
2.

Responding to paragraph 2 of the Complaint, TRC admits the same.

JURISDICTIONNENUE
3.

Responding to paragraph 3 of the Complaint, TRC admits that the circumstances

set forth in the Complaint appear to have occurred at a TRC facility in Bonneville County, Idaho
on January 22, 2018. TRC denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 3.

4.

Responding to paragraph 4 of the Complaint, TRC admits the same.

5.

Responding to paragraph 5 of the Complaint, TRC admits that jurisdiction is

proper in the district court based on the amount alleged to be in controversy.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
6.

Responding to paragraph 6 of the Complaint, TRC admits that Dale Kelly

operates a semi-truck and is somehow affiliated with Jay Transport, Inc. TRC lacks sufficient
information with which either to admit or deny the remaining allegations of paragraph 6.

ANSWER PAGE-2
47820,0034, 11620038, 1
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7.

Responding to paragraph 7 of the Complaint, TRC admits the same.

8.

Responding to paragraph 8 of the Complaint, TRC admits the same.

9.

Responding to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of the Complaint, TRC

admits that Mr. Kelly arrived at TRC's facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho with the load of metal
tubing on January 22, 2018.

TRC lacks sufficient information with which either to admit or

deny the remaining allegations of said paragraphs.
COUNT I.
NEGLIGENCE
10.

Responding to paragraph 16 of the Complaint, TRC incorporates its responses to

paragraphs 1 through 15 as if fully set forth herein.
11.

Responding to paragraphs 17, 18, and 19 of the Complaint, TRC denies the

allegations of these paragraphs to the extent they call for legal conclusions. TRC lacks sufficient
information with which either to admit or deny the remaining allegations of said paragraphs.
12.

Responding to paragraph 20 of the Complaint, TRC denies the same.

13.

Responding to paragraph 21 of the Complaint, TRC denie.s the allegations of

these paragraphs to the extent it calls for legal conclusions. TRC lacks sufficient information
with which either to admit or deny the remaining allegations of said paragraphs.
14.

Responding to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Complaint, TRC denies the

allegations to the extent they call for legal conclusions as to causation. TRC further responds
that it lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations of said paragraphs.

ANSWER PAGE-3
47820,0034, 11620038.1
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COUNT II.
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

15.

Responding to paragraph 24 of the Complaint, TRC incorporates its responses to

paragraphs 1 through 23 as if fully set forth herein.
16.

Responding to paragraph 25 of the Complaint, TRC denies the allegations to the

extent they call for a legal conclusion as to causation. TRC lacks sufficient information with
which either to admit or deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

17.

Responding to paragraph 26 of the Complaint, TRC denies the same.

18.

To the extent a response is required to the contents of Plaintiffs' prayer for relief,

TRC denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

The primary, non-delegable duties of load securement owed by a carrier and its

driver under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and applicable case law operate to
preclude or reduce any recovery by Plaintiffs.
2.

Under the borrowed servant doctrine, Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is through

Idaho's workers compensation.
3.

Alternatively, Plaintiffs have failed to join indispensable parties - Jay Transport,

Inc. and Brown-Strauss Steel CoBoth the carrier (Jay Transport, Inc.) and the shipper (BrownStrauss Steel Co.) must be named parties so their comparative fault, if any, may be considered
and apportioned by the jury.
4.

Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused by Plaintiffs'

own negligence or fault, which negligence is equal to or greater than the negligence or fault, if

ANSWER PAGE-4
47820,0034, 11620038, 1
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any, of TRC, and under Idaho's comparative negligence statute, that negligence or fault bars or
reduces any claim Plaintiffs may have against TRC. By alleging this defense, TRC does not
admit negligence in any degree but, to the contrary, specifically denies any negligence.
5.

Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused by the

negligence or fault of other persons or entities, for whose negligence or fault TRC is not
responsible or liable. The negligence or fault of all person or entities, whether or not parties
hereto, must be compared pursuant to the State of Idaho's comparative negligence laws. The
negligence or fault of persons or entities other than TRC precludes or reduces any claims
Plaintiffs may have against TRC.
6.

Plaintiffs have failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages, if any, and to

protect themselves from avoidable consequences, and their right to recovery, if any, is reduced or
barred.
7.

Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in

part, by a pre-existing injury or condition of Plaintiffs, or the progression thereof, for which TRC
is not responsible.
8.

Plaintiffs' claimed damages, if any, may have been the result of superseding,

intervening, omissions, circumstances, conditions, or actions for which TRC is not responsible.
9.

To the extent that Plaintiffs have received compensation from collateral sources

for the damages of which they complain, they are barred from recovery of such sums under
Idaho Code Section 6-1606 or other law. TRC is entitled to a set-off against Plaintiffs' damages,
if any, for the amount Plaintiffs have been compensated by any other person, entity, corporation,
insurance fund, or governmental program, as a result of the payments for Plaintiffs' care,
treatment, or other injuries or alleged damages.

ANSWER PAGE~5
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10.

Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are limited by the provisions of Idaho Code

Section 6-1603, regarding the limitation on non-economic damages.

ATTORNEY'S FEES
TRC has been required to employ legal counsel to defend these claims and, pursuant to
Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121, is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred in said defense.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
TRC demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable in accordance with Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 38.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, TRC prays for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows:
1.
That the Complaint against them be dismissed with prejudice and that Plaintiffs
take nothing;
2.

For TRC's reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and

3.

For such other relief as may seem just and equitable.

,+/...
DATED this//, day of January, 2019.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ y of January, 2019, I filed the foregoing
electronically through the iCourt e-file system, which caused the following parties or counsel to
be served by electronic means, as more fully reflect on the Notice of Electronic filing:
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John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 233-2001
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150
Email: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs,

Case No.: CVl0-18-7400
DEFENDANT TRC
FABRICATION, LLC'S
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING

TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Co.
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Defendant TRC Fabrication LLC., by and through its attorney ofrecord
and hereby gives notice to the Court that, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
Defendant TRC Fabrication LLC's Response to Request for Trial Setting.
In response to Plaintiffs request, Defendant indicates below.
(A) This is a personal injury case. Agreed.
(B) A jury trial has been demanded. Agreed.
(C) Referral or mediation would be beneficial. Agreed.
(D) Plaintiffs estimate that five to seven days for trial would be adequate. Defendant
estimates four to five days for trial would be adequate.
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(E) John A. Bailey and Austin Strobel will appear as counsel at trial on behalf of
Defendant TRC Fabrication LLC.
(F) The parties have exchanged initial discovery requests and responses and are now in
the process of addressing concerns about the adequacy of each other's responses and
scheduling depositions. Plaintiffs understand that Mr. Kelly's surgeon will not be
able to determine whether he will need hardware removal surgery, which may result
in additional medical expenses and additional loss of earnings, until about December
2019. For those reasons Plaintiffs request the trial be set on or after May 12, 2020.
Plaintiff's and their attorneys are unavailable from September 21, 2020 through
October 23, 2020.

The Defendant does not agree with the delay as it appears that time is available
on the schedules of counsel and the plaintiff is at medical stability and has
returned to work, so should be no need to further delay the trial. John A.
Bailey's unavailable dates are as follows:
2019
April -All of April
May 7-17
June 17-25
September 9- 13

2020
January 7-31
February 4-13
March 2-5
May 14-28

DATED this 3rd day of April, 2019.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

Isl John A. Bailey Jr.
JOHN A. BAILEY JR.
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Filed:05/24/201911:19:31
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Corona, Tawnya

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

DALE KELLY, et. al.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVl0-18-7400
ORDER SETTING TRIAL AND
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the following pre-trial schedule
shall govern all proceedings in this case:

I. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 1 :
1.

A pre-trial conference shall be held at 8:30 A.M., on April 16, 2020.

2.

Jury trial shall commence at 10:00 A.M., on May 11, 2020.

3.

No later than one hundred and twenty (120) days before the date set for trial,
plaintiffs counsel shall disclose the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
expert witnesses that may be called to testify at trial.

4.

No later than ninety (90) days before the date set for trial, defense counsel shall
disclose the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of expert witnesses that may
be called to testify at trial.

5.

All discovery shall be completed seventy (70) days prior to trial.2

6.

All Motions for Summary Judgment must be filed ninety (90) days prior to trial in

1

The disclosure cut-off date, discovery completion date and motion dates are for the benefit of the Court in
managing this case. They will be enforced at the Court's discretion. The disclosure date should not be relied on by
the parties for discovery purposes. The disclosure, discovery and motion dates will not be modified by the Court
without a hearing and assurance from the parties that the modification will not necessitate continuance of the trial.
2

Discovery requests must be served so that timely responses will be due prior to the discovery cutoff date.
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conformance with Rule 56(a), I.R.C.P.
7.

All Motions for Summary Judgment must be heard at least sixty (60) days prior to
trial.

II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall, no later than fourteen ( 14) days

before trial:
1.

Submit a list of names to the court of persons who may be called to testify.

2.

Submit a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered into evidence to the
court indicating which exhibits counsel have agreed will be received in evidence
without objection and those to which objections will be made, including the basis
upon which each objection will be made.

3.

Submit a brief to the court citing legal authorities upon which the party relies as to
each issue of law to be litigated.

4.

If this is a jury trial, counsel shall submit proposed jury instructions to all parties to

the action and the court. All requested instructions submitted to the court shall be in
duplicate form as set out in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 5l(a)(l).
5.

Submit that counsel have in good faith tried to settle this action.

6.

State whether liability is disputed.

III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall no later than seven (7) days

before trial:
1.

Submit any objections to the jury instructions requested by an opponent specifying
the instruction and the grounds for the objection.

2.

Deposit with the clerk of the court all exhibits to be introduced, except those for
impeachment. The clerk shall mark plaintiffs exhibits in numerical sequence as
requested by plaintiff and shall mark all defendant's exhibits in alphabetical sequence
as requested by defendant.

3.

A duplicate set of all exhibits to be introduced, except those for impeachment, shall
be placed in binders, indexed, and deposited with the clerk of the court.

IV. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
1.

Any exhibits or witnesses discovered after the last required disclosure shall
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immediately be disclosed to the court and opposing counsel by filing and service
stating the date upon which the same was discovered.
2.

No exhibits shall be admitted into evidence at trial other than those disclosed, listed
and submitted to the clerk of the court in accordance with this order, except when
offered for impeachment purposes or unless they were discovered after the last
required disclosure.

3.

This order shall control the course of this action unless modified for good cause
shown to prevent manifest injustice.

4.

The court may impose appropriate sanctions for violation of this order.

V.

ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned
to this case intends to utilize the provisions ofl.C.R. 35(a)(6). Notice is given that if
there are multiple parties, any Disqualification pursuant to I.C.R. 25(b) & (c) is
subject to a prior determination under I.C.R. 24(c). The panel of alternate judges
consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been disqualified in this
action: Richard St. Clair, Gregory S. Anderson, William Woodland, Jon J.
Shindurling, Darren B. Simpson, Alan C. Stephens, Joel E. Tingey, Darla
Williamson, David Nye, Bruce L. Pickett.

VI. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties proceed to mediation under I.R.C.P.
16(k) in a good faith effort to attempt to resolve this case.
DATED this _ _ day of May, 2019.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I did send a true and correct copy of the aforementioned Order upon
the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be
hand delivered.

Brent Roche
John Bailey
PENNY MANNING
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho
Signed: 5/24/2019 11 :19 AM

Deputy Clerk
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Electronically Filed
10/16/2019 4:47 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Angelica Linares, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 233-2001
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150
Email: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No.: CVl0-18-7400
DEFENDANT TRC
FABRICATION, LLC'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,
Defendant.

Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC ("TRC"), by and through its attorney of record,
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, hereby moves, pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 56, for an
order granting TRC summary judgment as to all claims alleged by Plaintiffs.
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum and Declaration(s) filed concurrently
herewith, and by the record before the Court.
Oral argument is requested.

DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAGE-1
47820.0034.12173137, 1

Page 0

DATED this /b-t;;; ofOcr ober, 2019.

HAWL EY TROX ELL ENNIS & HAWL EY LLP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J/L__

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of October, 2019, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Brent 0. Roche
Rachel A. Miller
Racine Olson, PLLP
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
□ Hand Delivered
0 iCourt
□ E-mail: bor(a),racinelaw.net
□ Fax: 208.232.6109

DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAGE-3
47820.0034.12173137.1

Page 2

Electronically Filed
10/16/2019 4:47 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Angelica Linares, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 233-2001
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150
Email: jbailey(a),hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,

Case No.: CVl0-18-7400

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION,
LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Defendant.

Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC ("TRC"), by and through its attorney of record,
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, hereby submits its Memorandum in Support of Defendant
TRC Fabrication, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

1.

In January 2018, TRC purchased more than 43,000 pounds of metal tubing from

Brown Strauss Steel Co. ("Brown Strauss") in Fontana, California. Compl. at 2,

1 7.

Bro\\-11

Strauss contracted with Jay Transport to haul the metal tubing from Fontana, California to TRC's

facility in Idaho Falls. Id.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAGE~l

Page 3

2.

In January 2018, Dale Kelly was operating under the d/6/a of "Dale Kelly

Trucking." Deposition of Dale Kelly ("Kelly Depo.") at 9:23-11 :9 (attache-d as Exhibit A to the
Declaration of Counsel filed herewith). Dale Kelly Trucking was an exclusive contractor for Jay
Transport, which provided him with all of his work assignments. Compl. at 2, ,r 6; Kelly Depo. at
13:3-5. Pursuant to the exclusive contract with Jay Transport, Dale- Kelly Trucking was required

to and did obtain various types of insurance coverage, including workers compensation coverage.
Kelly Depo. at 57:10-58:14. Workers compensation coverage for Dale Kelly Trucking was paid
by Dale Kelly Trucking company funds. Id. at 58:12-14.
3.

Jay Transport contracted with Dale Kelly Trucking to transport the shipment of

metal tubing from Brown Strauss to TRC's facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Compl. at 2, ,r 8. While
the tubing was being unloaded at TRC' s facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho, the load fell, hit the
ground, and rolled into Dale Kelly's leg, allegedly causing personal injuries to Dale Kelly.
Compl. at 3,

11

10-15. Through the workers compensation coverage obtained by Dale Kelly

Trucking, Dale Kelly applied for and received workers compensation benefits (wage, medical,
and disability) for the injuries he sustained. Kelly Depo. at 100: 1-22.
4.

On December 20, 2018, Dale and Nancy Kelly filed the instant lawsuit based on

the events described above. See Compl. The claims included a negligence claim (Count I)
brought by Dale Kelly, and a loss of consortium claim (Count II) brought by Nancy Kelly. Id. at
4, 5.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
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the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to
the nonmoving party. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). In order
to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show that there is a triable
issue. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991).
"[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." McGilvray v, Farmers New World Life Ins. Co.,
136 Idaho 39, 42, 28 P.3d 380,383 (2001) (quoting Celotex v, Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986).
The non-moving party's case must be anchored in something more than speculation; a mere
scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co.,
112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986).
UL
ARGUMENT
This Motion seeks summary judgment in favor of TRC as to all claims brought by
Plaintiffs Dale and Nancy Kelly pursuant to the exclusive remedy rule set forth in Idaho's
workers compensation law. As set forth more fully below, the exclusive remedy rule applies to
bar Dale Kelly's claims against this defendant because TRC is Kelly's statutory employer.
Following from that, the exclusive remedy rule similarly bars Nancy Kelly's claims, because her
claims are wholly-derivative of, and parasitic to, Dale Kelly's claims.

As a result, TRC

respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting summary judgment in favor of TRC
as to all claims alleged by Dale and Nancy Kelly.

A.

TRC is a Category 1 statutory employer of Dale Kelly, meaning that TRC is entitled
to immunity pursuant to the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho's workers
compensation law.
With the worker's compensation law, the Legislature removed-with few exceptions-all

workplace injuries from "private controversy." LC. § 72-201. To that end, the Legislature

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
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crafted a system whereby "sure and certain relief' would be provided to injured workers
regardless of fault. Id. This "sure and certain relief' is provided "to the exclusion of every other
remedy, proceeding, or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in the worker's
compensation scheme." Id.; see also I.C. § 72-209(1); LC.§ 72-211.
The exception is found at LC. § 72-223, which allows an injured worker to sue a socalled "third party" who may be liable for damages stemming from the injury. LC. § 72-223(1),
(2). However, individuals or entities that meet the statutory definition of employer (so-called
"statutory employers") are not "third parties" within the meaning of LC. § 72-223, and,
therefore, are immune from suit just like a claimant's direct employer.

Idaho Code § 72-

102(13)(a) describes two categories of statutory employers - Category 1 statutory employers
(contractors and subcontractors of a claimant's direct employer) and Category 2 statutory
employers (the virtual proprietor of the premises):
"Employer" means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted
the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It includes
the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor
or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being
an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of
the workers there employed. It also includes, for purposes of section 72-438(12)
and (14), Idaho Code, a municipality, village, county or fire district that utilizes
the services of volunteer firefighters. If the employer is secured, it means his
surety so far as applicable.
Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a).
The relevant portion of § 72-102(13)(a) defines a Category 1 11 employer 11 as "any
person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the services of another. It includes

contractors and subcontractors." (Emphasis added). Idaho law is clear that, in the event
that a direct employer does not provide workers' compensation benefits to an injured
employee, ALL of the direct employer's upstream contractors may be liable for the payment of
those benefits. See, Idaho Code § 72-216(1); Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 203 P.3d 1246
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
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(2009) (contractor that expressly contracts the services of a subcontractor is liable for workers 1
compensation benefits if the subcontractor does not provide them)).

In exchange for the imposition of this potential liability, ALL of the upstream
contractors are also entitled to "stand in the shoes" of the direct employer and claim complete
immunity from any legal claim brought by the injured employee in the event workers 1
compensation benefits are actually paid by the direct employer and/or one of the lower tier
contractors. J.C. § 72-216(2), 72-223; Blake, 146 Idaho at 847 (holding that upstream
contractor that is liable for workers 1 compensation benefits is a statutory employer entitled to
employer immunity). This is known as the 11 Grand Bargain."
Here, TRC was part of the upstream chain of contractors from Dale Kelly Trucking,
and therefore, entitled to immunity under the exclusive remedy rule as a Category 1 statutory
employer. TRC contracted with Brown Strauss for the delivery of metal tubes to TRC's Idaho
Falls facility. Brown Strauss contracted with Jay Transport to pick up and deliver the metal
tubes. Jay Transport contracted with Dale Kelly Trucking to transport the metal tubes from
Fontana, California to TRC in Idaho Falls, Idaho. In diagram form, the chain of contracts is as
follows:
TRC

Brown Strauss

Jay Transport

Dale Kelly Trucking

Dale Kelly

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
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Dale Kelly actually received workers compensation benefits under the policy paid for
by Dale Kelly Trucking company funds. As a result, because Dale Kelly received workers
compensation benefits through Dale Kelly Trucking and because TRC is an upstream
contractor of Dale Kelly Trucking, TRC is a statutory employer of Dale Kelly and entitled to
the immunity of the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho's workers compensation law.

1

Summary

judgment should therefore be entered in favor of TRC on Dale Kelly's negligence claim
(Count I).
Summary judgment has been granted in similar circumstances in numerous Idaho
courts, most notably in the Seventh District courts. In Snow v. lntermountain Erectors, lnc.
Bonneville County Case No. CV-2008-2231 (Idaho

ih Dist., November

1

13, 2009), the court

under very similar facts held that Intermountain was the statutory employer of Snow, who was
injured when he was delivering a load of steel and was assisting in the unloading process.
(See, decision attached to affidavit of counsel). In that case Intermountain contracted with
K&T Steel to fabricate steel products for delivery to and use by Intermountain in a building
project. K&T hired Snow, a truck driver, to deliver the steel products to Intermountain. While
unloading the steel, Snow was struck by a steel beam and injured. The Court concluded that
the Idaho "definition of an employer includes a person and/or entity that hires another person

1

In Idaho, "employment as the owner of a sole proprietorship" is exempt from the application of
Idaho's workers compensation law '"unless coverage thereof' is elected. See Idaho Code §§ 72212 and 72-213. Here, it is undisputed that Dale Kelly Trucking was required to and did "optin" to Idaho's workers compensation law under it's contract with Jay Transport. As a result,
Dale Kelly's "employment as the owner of a sole proprietorship" (e.g. Dale Kelly True.king) is
deemed to be an employment relationship subject to all provision's of Idaho's workers
compensation law, including statutory employer immunity. Any other interpretation would
violate the "Grand Bargain" of Idaho's workers compensation law and allow for a double
recovery for Dale Kelly, who has already received workers compensation benefits arising out of
the injury at issue in this lawsuit.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
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to deliver materials to a job site .... " Kelly is in precisely the same position as Snow, as he
was hired by the fabricator to assist the delivery of the steel to TRC, and like Intermountain
and Snow, TRC is the statutory employer of Kelly. See also Gonzales v. Lamb Weston! Inc.!
142 Idaho 120 (2005) (here, Lamb Weston contracted with PSI Waste Systems to haul waste
to a transfer station. PSI hired the claimant to drive truck. The claimant was injured while
delivering a load to the transfer station. The Court found Lamb Weston to be a statutory
employer); see also Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245 (2005) (Sorrento
contracted with 3-C Trucking to haul wastewater from the plant to a local farm, Plaintiff was
employed by 3-C and was injured while delivering the load to the farm). Both decisions
involved truck drivers who were injured while delivering loads while acting as independent
contractors for the principal. In both cases, similarly to this case, the claimant was employed
by a trucking company who contracted with the statutory employer to deliver products for the
benefit of the statutory employer. The same result should follow here and TRC should be
immune from a third party daim.
As was explained by the Court in Kolar v, Cassia County! 142 Idaho 962 (2005), Kolar
was the direct employee of JUB engineering when he was injured. JUB had contracted with the
Burley Highway District, who in tum contracted with Cassia County to perform the work Kolar
was doing when he was injured. The Court held that if JUB had not complied with I.C. 72-301
and had not provided workers compensation coverage, then Cassia County would not have been
able to avoid providing that workers compensation by virtue of the direct contractual
arrangements, and therefore, was an employer under LC, 72-216.
The same result applies here as Kelly was performing work as a direct employee of Dale

Kelly Trucking, and Dale Kelly Trucking contracted with Jay Transport and Brown Strauss to

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
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deliver the steel necessary to complete Brown Strauss's contract with TRC.

If Dale Kelly

Trucking had not provided workers compensation coverage, TRC would not have been able to
avoid providing that coverage, and so is immune from this suit as TRC is also a Category I
statutory employer of Plaintiff.
B.

TRC is also a Category 2 Statutory Employer of Dale Kelly and is entitled to
immunity.

Idaho Code 72-223(1) describes the immunity granted to a Category 2 statutory employer
as follows:
The right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact that
the injury, occupational disease or death is caused under circumstances creating
in some person other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages therefor,
such person so liable being referred to as the third party. Such third party shall
not include ... the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually.
the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on but who, by reason of
there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct
employer of the workmen there employed. (Emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court further clarified the test of a Category 2 statutory employer
stating:
"Generally, to find a business or person to be a statutory employer, the work
being carried out by the independent contractor on the owner or proprietor' s
premises must have been the type that could have been carried out by employee.s
of the owner or proprietor in the course of its usual trade or business. 11 Id. In
short, if a person is normally equipped with manpower and tools to do a job and
nevertheless contracts it to another employer, he is a statutory employer of the
second employer's employees. r,

Robison v. Bateman-Hall Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212, 76 P.3d 951, 956 (2003) (quoting Harpole v.
State, 131 Idaho 437,440,958 P.2d 594,597 (1998)).
In this case, Kelly stepped in to perform part of the task of unloading the steel at TRC.
Not only was the task of unloading the steel the type of work that could have been carried out by
TRC employees, but it was, in fact, a TRC employee who was in the process of unloading the
steel at the time Kelly intervened and was injured. It is undisputed that TRC was in the business

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
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of handling and fabricating large steel building components like those involved in this incident.
As the Court in Bateman-Hall, supra, held, the owner of the premises is the virtual proprietor or
operator of the business there carried on, if the work being done pertains to the business, trade,
or occupation of the owner or proprietor and if such business is being carried on by it for
pecuniary gain. The record is clear that TRC is in the business of handling and fabricating steel
materials, and therefore, is a Category 2 statutory employer of Kelly. As the result, TRC is
immune from Plaintiffs claim under I.C. 72-223(1).
C.

Nancy Kelly's loss of consortium claim is derivative of, and parasitic to, the
negligence claim by Dale Kelly, and is barred by the exclusive remedy rule of
Idaho's workers compensation law.
Nancy Kelly has alleged a loss of consortium claim. In Idaho, "[t]he claim for loss of

consortium is a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a third party's tortious injury
to a spouse." Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop Inc., 131 Idaho 242, 249, 953 P.2d 992, 999
1

(1998) (citing Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 394, 690 P.2d 324, 329
(1984)). A loss of consortium claim must be "pursued together with, and in conjunction to, the
injured spouse's claim against the third party tortfeasor."

Zaleha v, Rosholt, Robertson &

Tucker! Chtd., 131 Idaho 254, 256, 953 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1998). "This is because the extent of
the injury to the injured spouse will determine the scope of the loss of consortium." Id.
Idaho is one of many jurisdictions that adheres to the rule that "the recovery of the spouse
... will be defeated or diminished by defenses which would bar or diminish that of the injured
spouse .... " W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 125 at 937 (5th ed. 1984).

In Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d 1162

(Ct. App. 1994), the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the district court properly dismissed
the plaintiffs' (husband and wife) action for personal injury and loss of consortium against the
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City of Montpelier because their notice of tort claim had not been filed within the 180 day time
limit set forth in Idaho Code § 6-906. Fourteen years following Runcorn, the Idaho Supreme
Court went further and held that a consortium claim, due to its derivative nature, had to be
pursued with and in conjunction with the injured spouse's claim against a third party tortfeasor.
The Idaho Supreme Court explained "[a] loss of consortium claim is necessarily dependent upon
the injured spouse's success or failure in the underlying claim against the third party." Zaleha,
131 Idaho at 256, 953 P.2d at 1365 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court also explained
that a "loss of consortium [claim] springs from only one injury - the injury to the injured spouse.

Id. (citing Thompson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 802, 803, 702 P.2d 840, 841
(1985) (grouping loss of consortium claim with claim of injured spouse as one claim for
applying per person liability policy limits)).
Most importantly for present purposes, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Coddington v.

City of Lewiston, 96 Idaho 135, 525 P.2d 330 (1974) that a spouse's claim for loss of consortium
against an employer, because of its derivative nature, was barred where the working spouse's
claim was barred by the exclusive remedy rule in the workmen's compensation statutes. Under

Coddington, because Dale Kelly's negligence claim is barred by the exclusive remedy rule of
Idaho's workers compensation law, Nancy Kelly's derivative loss of consortium claim (Count II)
is similarly barred.

IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, TRC respectfully requests that the Court find that Dale and
Nancy Kelly's claims are barred by the exclusive remedy rule ofldaho's workers compensation
law, and therefore, enter and order granting summary judgment to TRC.
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DATED this

/IL

day of October, 2019.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

CERTIFICA'Jf;.;!F SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of October, 2019, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Brent O. Roche
Rachel A. Miller
Racine Olson, PLLP
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

□

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
□ Hand Delivered
0 iCourt
□ E-mail: bor(a:;racinelaw.net
□ Fax: 208.232.6109
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John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 233-2001
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150
Email: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys/or Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,

Case No.: CVl0-18-7400

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. BAILEY,
JR. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT
TRC FABRICATION, LLC'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant.

STATEOF IDAHO )
: ss
County of Bannock )
I, JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, am counsel of

record for the Defendant herein and make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" are true and correct copies of excerpts from the

Dale Kelly deposition transcript taken on June 18, 2019.
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3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the contract between

Dale Kelly Trucking and Jay Transport which was produced in the discovery of this matter and
utilized as Exhibit 1 during Dale Kelly's deposition.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of invoice number

39979 from Jay Transport, Inc. to Brown Strauss Steel for load number 31191 delivered to Idaho
which was produced in the discovery of this matter and included as a part.of Exhibit 4 to Dale
Kelly's deposition.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of Snow v.

Intermountain Erectors, Inc., Bonneville County Case No. CV-2008-2231 (Idaho

?1h Dist.,

November 13, 2009), Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Summary Judgment.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANTNAUGHT.
DATED this /b~ay of October, 2019.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

I

(p ~ay of October, 2019.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this/

~~~15
(SEAL)

N0TARY~
OIC
DARO
Residing at· My Commission xpires: ~ ,d){)

t../
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Rachel A. Miller
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P.O. Box 1391
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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□
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BONNEVILLE

3

4

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,

5

Plaint;ffs,
vs.

6

) Case No. CV~10-18-7400

7

TRC FABRICAT!ON, LLC, an Idaho

8

Limited Liability Co,,
Defendant.

9

10
11
12

13

DEPOS!TION OF DALE KELLY
TAKEN JUNE 18, 2019

14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

REPORTED BY:

22

23

MARY (RAINEY) STOCKTON, CSR No. 746

24

25

Notary Public

Page 10

1 started.
2
Q. What is the -- that is -- sometimes a term of
3 art for us lawyers. Is Dale Kelly Trucking incorporated
4 or is it just a d/b/a?
5
A lt 1s doing business as Dale Kelly Trucking.
6 It's a sole proprietorship.
7
Q. Okay. Back to the history here, the history
8 lesson.
9
A. Okay.
1O
Q. After you started leasing to Cedar Point and
11 that five years, which I'm guessing puts you -- plus the
12 few months where you were working for them directly -13 at about 2001 or thereabouts.
14
What were you doing then after that?
15
A. I got my own authority and started doing my
16 own thing, getting my own loads.
17
Q. Okay. You're serving as your own broker and
i 18 your own jobber?
19
A. Yeah. I had to go through brokers. Or in
20 some cases, I hauled direct for, like, Wada Farms, some
21 of the other spud places up here, potato houses. I'd
22 haul direct for them going east, and then I'd use
23 brokers to come home.
24
Q. Did you operate under a business name at that
25 time in 2001 or thereabouts?

Page 9

Page 11

Q. Okay.

2
A. No. I was a company driver. I worked for
3 Doug Andrus.
4
Q. And after Doug Andrus in roughly '96, where
5 did you go to work?
6
A I bought my first truck at the end of 196. I
7 went to work for Cedar Point for about three months
8 while I was trying to get my truck financed. I bought
9 my first truck from Cedar Point.
1O
Q. Okay. And then who did you work for when you
11 began?
12
A. I leased on to Cedar Point as a leaser for
13 five years.
14
Q. Leasing your truck and yourself?
15
A. To them, correct, under their authority.
16
Q. Did you have any other employees working for

A. Same one.
2

Q. Dale Kelly Trucking?

3

A. Yes.

4

Q. That was the beginning of Dale Kelly?

5

A. Correct.

6

Q. Okay. And have you operated continuously

7 since 2001 or thereabouts - I understand it's an
8 estimate - as Dale Kelly Trucking?
9

A. Correct.

10

Q. You haven't worked for any other businesses?

11

A. No, other than November of last year when I

12 hit an elk and my truck went down for five weeks. I
13 employed at Jay Transport for five weeks,
14

Q. Okay. We'll talk about that. Who have --

15 beginning in 2001, when you're, l understand, picking up
16 loads here and then and using brokers to come back at
17 the beginning of the Dale Kelly Trucking business, who

17 you at that time?
18
A. No, never have.
19
Q. Just you?
A Just me.
20

20

21

Q. Never had any employees?

21 was the broker to bring me home.

22

A No.

22

Q. I was going to ask you about your current
24 business, Dale Kelly Trucking. No employees ever?
25
A Never. Been a sole proprietary ever since I

23

Kelly, Dale

18 were the brokers you'd work with or who was the
19 companies that you would work with?

A. The main one I used was C.H. Robinson. That
Q. Okay. And who at C.H. Robinson would you work

23 with?
24

A. Oh, they have agents throughout the country.

25 So, the one I used -- l don't even know what town he was

Pages 1, 9, 10, 11
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A. No, because when I went to Jay Transport -2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

when I contract to them, I just use them only.
Q. You were exclusive with Jay Transport
beginning in 2012?
A. Correct.
Q. Have been ever since?
A. Correct. I still get e-mails from some of the
other brokers wanting me to haul their freights, but I
don1t.
Q. Okay. No other side jobs, no other side
trips?
A. No.
Q, Since 2012?
A. Nope.
Q. Okay. In the compensation with Jay Transport 1
looking at those contracts is, to me, just a little bit
vague. Maybe it's because l don't understand it.
1
Tell me how it is you re compensated by Jay
beginning in 2012 and on to today.
A. Very simple. I get 10 percent of whatever
he's getting paid for the load.
MR. ROCHE: I think you misspoke there.
THE WITNESS: Did I?
MR. ROCHE: You said 10 percent.
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry, I get 90 percent.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DK Trucking?
A. They're all mine.
Q. And who pays the premiums for the work comp,
for example?
A. I do.
Q. And how were they paid? Did you pay them
directly yourself, or were they taken out of the gross
amount of loads that are run through Jay?
A. I pay everything myself.
Q. Okay. So you write the check after the -A. Every quarter.
Q. Okay. After the net is disbursed to you, you
write that out of your own company funds?
A. Correct.
Q. Under this agreement, you guaranteed that your
vehicles would be compatible with the loading and
unloading equipment at the origin and at the
designation, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You agree to provide personnel for the
transport of the steel that were fully qualified and
trained and licensed in compliance with all rules and
regs?
A. Correct.
Q. What qualifications or training did you obtain
I

Page 57

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. That is correct.
Q. Signed as Dale Kelly Trucking, not you
individually?
A. Well, it would be me individually because I'm
a sole proprietor.
Q. That's the way you interpret it anyway.
A. That 1s the only way I know how to interpret
that.
Q. Okay. Fair enough.
It required you to obtain various types of
insurance. I want to visit with you a little bit about
that. It talks about all risk cargo insurance, auto
1
liability, general liability, workman s comp, all of
those things.
Did you obtain all of that insurance?
A. I do.
Q. How did you do that with Jay -- when you're
working with Jay Transport?
A. I do it through Hub Financial, which is Great
West Insurance; and then all my workman's comp is
straight through the State.
Q. Do you do that through Jay's policies or in
association with policies that Jay Transport had?
A. No, sir.
Q. These are all yours individually or yours as

Kelly, Dale

Page 100

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

!

:
left and the fracture to the bones of your leg on the
right, any other injuries from this incident?
A. No, sir.
Q. And you did receive work comp benefits,
correct?
A. I did.
Q. And you provided that policy, as you testified
before?
A. Correct.
Q. What benefits did you receive from comp?
A. It was $490 every two weeks, if I remember
right.
Q. $490 in wages?
A. From workman's comp, yeah. Yes.
Q. They paid all your medicals?
A. Paid all my medicals.
Q. They paid you a disability amount?
A. They're paying that still, yeah.
Q. Pay it over time, correct?
A. Correct.
1
Q. But you ve been getting the monthly payments?
A. Right. Correct.
Q. Anything else the comp carrier took care of?
A. I think just all the medical, ambulance. They
covered it all.
Pages 13, 57, 58, 100
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
I, MARY (RAINEY) STOCKTON, CSR No. 746,
3

Certified Shorthand Reporter, certify:

That the

4

foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time

5

and place therein set forth, at which time the witness

6

was put under oath by me;

7

That the testimony and all objections made were

8

recorded stenographically by me and transcribed by me or

9

under my direction;

10
11
12

That the foregoing is a true and correct record
of all testimony given, to the best of my ability;
I further certify that I am not a relative or

13

employee of any attorney or party, nor am I financially

14

interested in the action.

15
16

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand and seal this
9th day of July, 2019.

17
18
19
20

21

MARY (RAINEY) STOCKTON, CSR

22

Notary Public

23

P.O. Box 2636

24

Boise, Idaho

25j

83701-2636

My commission expires February 3, 2024
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CONTRACT DOCUMENTS

DALE KELLY TRUCKING

AND

JAY TRANSPORT

Pae 2

Jay Transport .!-folding LLC

Jay Transport Inc.
PO Box 509
Ucon, ID 83454

Telephone: 208-523-5134 Fax: 208-523 ..4299

tRANSPORTATlON AGREEMENT

~a I ~12j

This agreement) qatedl£ /i{
is m.adc between Jay Transport Holdings, LLC.
m1/()r Jny Tran:;;;;;:i Inc. ~f ~cop, r9aho (hereafter
to "9"y;iker).
,

re;7?cd J5

at
, f ?LI f? ~ ,'
(hereaftet're.c
rred
to
as
HMotor
Carrle"r1')
,_,,,.

ru ·/:..N-

v>

~!19

_,, ./.)

,1

The purpose ofthis agreement is to set-out the working relationship of the parties to this
ngreemc.nt and the conditions and ob-ligations incumbenl upon the Motor Carrier related to the
consideration of Motor Carrier s acceptance. of freight being dispatc·hed through Broker from rind to
any point(s),
1

It is agreed between the parties that:
I.. The above named Motor Carrier agrees to maintain and keep all vehicles used to transport
shipments :for Broker in good repair ur1d running order and in compliance-with all safe.ty
regulations t>fthe Federal Department of Transportation. Mo:tor Carrier further agrees to
pay and bear all operation expei1ses1 i11<;:luding but not Hmited to foel, taxes 1 driver 1 s wages,
i.nsuranccs~ damages and any expenses related to operation of his vehicles while transpl1rting
shtprucnts for Broke-r.
-

2. Motor CatTier and the drivers of Mot.or Carrier~s vehicle shall at no time be considered un
employee of Broker. Motor Carder's drivers must hnve a current CDL. rvJotor Carder shall
be conclusively deemed to be in exclusive contwl of said vehicle(s) and equipment untU all
merchandise has been unloaded a~ the designated destination to consignee.

3. Any a'nd all clahns against any shipments because of damage in transit or .shortage 'Nill b~
Mor or Carriers full responsibility and wii ! pay for any and all costs assoc.iated with any
losses~ dam~ge or claims.

4. As n condHion of contracting and working_·with Broker, Motor Canier agrees to execute n.
norHompctition daus~ in a form attached hereto.
5. Motor Caer-ier fu.riher ag:t'ees to support. Broker's position regarding their business
retutfonshi.p with shippers and consignees and will refrain from doing business with or
solicitation of shippers and/or customers who are introduced to Motor Carrier througt,
13roker s ·business.
1

Kelly_00234
Pae 3

6, Motor Card et gives the right of billing any customer1shipper or receiver pertaini.n~ to any
and all lo-ads hauled under contract to Broker. ivtotor Carrier is giving Br(Jker the right to net
on his/her bchaff conceming all billing. An.d relinquishes the right to pursue payment from
any other means unless a signed waver by the Broker·abtained.
7. Broker agrees lo con1pensnte Motor Carrier us follow:

Broker's commission w-ill be based on the grnss revenue rrctually ,received by Broker.
The percentage rate ofBroker"s commission may v~ry according to competition1
desirability of load, demand foclors and other trade customs.
Payme:f1t to Motor Carrier will be make no later than forty-five (45) days after afl
o.rigi_na1 bills of lading, proofof delivery t signed delivery receipt.5 1 COD checks ot1
damage-free loads, and other required and necessary paperwork related to the
tnmsport ,ire received.by Broker,
Motor Cctrri.er~s gross earning$ reportab'Je to ta.x authorities shall be the gross revenue
actuaUy received by Broker, less commission. Motor Carrier's net pay to be paid by
Broker wil1 be after all dedLicUons to Motor Ctlrrief s account for all reimbursable
charges and advances expended by Broker on Motor Carrier's behalf have been
adjusted. These deductions-shall include any charge thai has been expended directly
by Broker fo.r or on behalf of Motor Carrier,
lt is so agreed,
...._
\

(

/

J

~~,c.._--sL~c....: ;..;...,..;.........l. /~,((_"Md:~/

f

7

__,,.1

Kelly_00235
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i,,_

l'
J,i.,;{

•,~~ V,._ t't'·ft,1.. ;
,,,,:,t Jt,,·
•~, 593 M 406;2. E.
''t"'v. , •)!

tJ

,

. •':

~ ~ {4 fl

Rtgb!f,, IP 93442
Phone: 208-523-5134

Fax: 208-545-7883

BrowV1. Strauss Steer
PO 13ox

Oestinatlori

;L~4SO

Sa.it l-ake City) UT 84.'.1.1-6-o4SO

CA,, FONTANA

Vv\OU W ~ \ryJ-.

Need the originals

t }Ii,\! 0 I(: 1:~

Truck
;/j.::

39979

IDJ IDAHO FALLS

vr·

TJc1·t;e,

DKT.. 1 CT

1/22/2018

Load Date

Billing & Reference Numbers

Terms

1/J 9/2018

L0/\0# :s:1..::1- q :I-

Net 10

WT/MI/QU

TRUCK

J

DKT-1

RATE

DESCRIPTION
T/L PRODU~T CA TO ID

L,850.00

AMOUNT

1,850.00

1tle (,,~~pt'eCltnf~s !/()Ur/,j"rOM,y:,,l /'l?l!:Jl nt-://lt-.
1

It l:f

a

l-"·/ei.1sti·1:r.(:

1;,,l.:?l

tA/t)t·/<;

r,i,,./1,.~!.1 !lOu,

I

f?i~:4_l

fl f2
F 'fa
',
· --r~,·
,,,, ,, I i,%1'

1-:-,:11"::~

X.lf,,1(3

$1,850.00

15?'
;

~.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENfH JUplCIAI., DlSTRIQT OF THBB-r~ OF
n ,. I J PJ.J
IDAHO, rN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
ltH 1.q~

DALE SNOW and JENNIFER AUSTIN
SNOW,
. Plaintiffs,

vs.

)

Coo,,~ll.jo 'I'

)
)

Case No. ey ..2QQS ..2231

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
.MOTION FQ~ SUMMARY

INTERMOUNTAIN ERECTORS INC. 1 and )
)
JOHN DOES I-ID,
Defendants.

11 ~• ':'I

'vO
601,d!.J•fa.,.
••ff ,:.,o,,.•, Coull
•l·lf" n,s 11 r
//J

JU.nGM'ENT

l

, •
■

~

'
•

,__

~

-1-

t

•

I•
II

II-

...

i': :,: ._:: ·,:': . '

'

)
)

L FACTUAL.A.ND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 18, 2008, Dale Snow (Snow) and Jennifer Austin Sn.ow filed a complaint
against Intermountain Erectors, lllc., (lntermountain) alleging that on uthe 15th day of May,
2006, the plaintiff Dale Snow was an employee of K& T Steel, .. On said @te, while acting in
the course and scope of bis duti6S, the plaintiff Dale Snow was struck ~ya b~am which c.a.used
injuries to the plaintiff Dale Snow, The crane and the beam were under the oontrol of an

employee of defendant Interm.ountain Erectors, Inc." Complaint at 1--i. Snow argues that his
injury was oaus~ by the negligence of lntennowitain Erectors, Inc. ~4 asks for damages.

Intermounfain fLl.ed a motion for summary judgment on September 15, 2009.
Intennountain argues: "The undisputed material facts show that Inter.rnou.nta.b:l &ectors is

entitled to jud~e11t 8$ a matter of law. Thi relationship betw~n Inwmioun.WP Erectors and
Snow falls within the me.aning of an employer.. employee relationshlp ·as defin~d in the Idaho
Workets Compensation Act ("'Act,.). Therefore, Snow's remedies are limited to those provided
in the Act and he is precluded from maintaining a tort action against lntermountain Erectors, his
statutory employer.•. The Idaho Worker's Compensation Act (Act) provides employees a

:MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION POR SUM1-1.ARY .TUBGMENT .. 1

I
~age 8

(

definite remedy for injuries arising out of and in. the course of employment." Defend ant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for SuIDIIlary Judgment (Intermountain Memo) at 4.

II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION
A motion for summary judgment '~shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadingsl

depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." LR.C.P, S6(c). See Grover v, Smith, 137 ldaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v,

Grabow, 13 6 Idaho 63 7, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times, on the moving party to
demonstrate th~ absence of a genui11e issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21
P.3d 908 (2001).
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct.

2548 (1986), stated:

Of CO-qt$e, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the in_itial
respons.U,ility of infonning the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifyhig those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admis~ions on filei together with the affidavits, if any:' whioh
it bQlieves deiuonmat~ the absence of a genuine issue of material fac4 But 'Unillce
the CQurt of Appeals, we find no express or im.pliec;l requirement in Rule 56 that
the movbig party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponerit~s claim. On thy contrary, Rule 56(c). which refers to "the
affidavits~ if any' (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard. such
doubt is clearly r~oved by 'Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and
defendants, respectively, may move for SUilil11ary judgment nwuh or without
supportinr ·aflidavits\1, (emphasis· added).·.!Fhe--import• of these--subsectfons ..is ,that~ -. ~ .,.• , . ,.
reg~dless of whether the moving party accompames its sUllllllary judgment
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as
whatever is before the di&m(}t··oourt 4emon·strates that the stand~d for the entry of
summary judgi.nent, as set forth in Rule S6(c), is $atisfi~. One of the principal
purposes of the summary j u4gm.ent rule is to ·isolate and dispose of f'aotually
unsupported claims or defep.s~t and we think it should be interprewd in a wa.y
that ellows it to accompli$h this prupose.

Id.

at 323,

106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alteratioos in original),
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When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally

construed in favor oftbe non..moving party. Dodge ..Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co,,
137 ldalm 8381 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002), In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a
court is not permitted.to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v.

Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 993 P.2d 609 (2000), Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the nonmoving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of1he non..
moving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 Idaho 237,999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madridv. Roth, 134
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000).

"If the action will be tried by the court without ajury.,. an exception to this rule applies.
In Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,650 P.2d 657 (1982), our Supreme

Court held that a judge is not required to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion
for summary judgment." Katifman v. Fairchild, 119 Idaho 8S9, 860, 810 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Ct.
App. 1991), 11Wbere the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury
will be the trier of fac~ summary judgment is appropria,teJ despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving th~ conflict between those

inferences," Riverside, 103 Idaho at 519, 650 P.2d at 661."Conflicting evidentiary facts,
however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party.'' Banner Lift Ins. Co, v. Mark

Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117,124,206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009),

., .... Th~ ia~~·;pj;;ii~t~ ~~~ have~ roiiowed tiie United states supreme 'couiPs decision in'·
Celotex, which stated:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regard~d not as a disfavored procedural
shorten~ but rather as an .integral part of the Federal Rules as a whol~ which are
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive detemrlnation of every
action/' •,.Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
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those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by Ule
Rule~ prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis,

Id. at 327,106 s.a. at2555 (citations ontltted)i seo WtnofMichfgan1 Inc, v. Yreka Unite~ Inc.,
13 7 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 33 0 (2002); Thom.son v, City ofLe.wiston; 13 7 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488
(2002),

A party against whom a summary judgment is so.ught cannot merely rest on his pleadings _
bu¼ when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way
of affidav'it, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material ·
issues of fa.ct, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment Anderson v. Hollingsworth,
136 ldaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000), The
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough 'lo create a genuine issue of f®t, Wait v. Leavell Cattle,
Jnc. 1 136 Idaho 792. 41 P.3d 220 (2001).

The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc,

11•

State, Dept. ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307

(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "materia1" facts when the plaintiff faUs to e$1ablish a prima
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such a
-· ·· ·- situation; there· can be no genuine- issue of materiaHac.t; since a complete failure of.proof..

-~~ .. , ..

.

concerning an essenti1'1 element ofth~ non..movblg party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial. Id.

Ill. DISCUSION
Intennountain asserts that:
lvffiMORANDUMDECISION RB: MOTION FOR SUlvlMARY JUDG10:;BNT .. 4
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This is a persop..al injury action arising out of an on..the-job accident
wherein the flam~ Dale Snow... claims he was injured . , , . Snow filed swt
against µitermountain Erectors. alleging that it breached its duty of care to Snow
and negligently caused him to sustain personal injuries and other damages ....

Intermountain continues:
. . . Intermo'Ulltain--Erectors moves for surnrnary judgment dismissal of· Snow'
claims as there is no genuine issue of fact for trial on its alleged liability.
Intermountain Erectors is exempt from liability under Idaho Code § 72 ..209 (3)
where the facts show that the alleged accident, a.11d Snow' resulting injuries and
damages, were sustained, if at all, during the course and scope of bis employment
for Intermou.p.tain Erectors.

Intermountain Memo at 1..2.
· Snow argues that ·
• , . [C]ontrary to what defendant' ~gues in the Introductlon section of bis
brief K&T Steel was fiever a "subcontractor'. K&T Steel was a vendor of steel
and Dale Snow was responsible for delivering the steel to the job site. Dale Snow
did not participate in any of 1he building activities that were defendant's
responsibility at the job site.

The issue to be determined is whether or not the worker's compensation
definition of "employer» includes a person who delivers materials to a job site,
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Def~dant s Summary Judgment Motion at 1..2.
1

Intermountain responds as follows:
Plaintiff's suggested interpretatio~ and application of the Act is contrary to·
existing Idaho case law and inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. Moreover,
K&T Sieel not only- performed a delivery. service that In1ermountain Erectors
.....ofte.n ,performs .thrPJJ.gh,,i't$_g_wn empJ9yees~. but also fabricated 11!e steel ~sed b1.
Intermountaln Erectors, and therefore would satisfy even Plaintiff's suggested
rule,

Intermountain Memo at 2.
The Supreme Court ofldaho discussed the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act in Blake v.

Starr, 146 Idaho 847 849.. SO, 203 P.3d 1246, 1248-49 (2009)> stating:
1
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Did district court err in holding Starr exempt from liabllity under I.C, § 72 ..
209(3)?

A. Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy of
employees against employers for injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment.
The Idaho Worker's Compensation Act (Act) provides employees a
definite remedy for injuries arising out t;,f and in the course of employment I.C. §
72-201; Robison v, Bateman-Hall, lnc.J 139 Idaho 207, 209, 76 P.3d 951, 953
(2003), In Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 (2005)J
this Court repeated that, with few exceptions, the Idaho legislature has removed
all workpl~ce injuries from "private controversy, u by crafting a $Y~ whereby
11
sure and certain relief 1 ·would be provided to injured workers rQga,.-(P_e,ss'offault
Id at 351, 127 P.3d at 967; see also Venters v. Sorrento, 141 Idaho 245, 248-49,
108 P.3d 392, 395 ...96 (2005), This relief is provided "to the excl~ion of evei:y
other remedy, proceeding, or compensation> except as is otherwise prqvided in the
workerts compensation schenie. 11 Ko]tllj 142 Idaho at 351-52, 127 P.3d at 967.. 68,
See also I.C, § 72--209(1); I.Q. § 72-211.
It is undisputed that Blake and Starr were working within the nonnal,
course and scope of their employment This case con~s the proper
interpretation of the limited exception of third party tort liability set forth in the
Act.

B. Idaho $and and Gravel is a category one statutory employer c,f Traffic
Products & Services emp]oyeest and therefore protected from tort Sllit by the
exclusive remedy ru]e.

,The Act p:rovides a limited exception to the exclusiv~ re.m1;1dy rule,
allowing au mjl.lred worker who is eligible for workers compensatioQ. be.P~fits to
bring a civil action for damages against certain third parties. Venters, 141 ldAAo at
249, 108 P.3d at 396. Idaho Code§ 72-223(1) provid~:
"The right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact
tllat the injury, occupational disea$e or dea.tb is pays.~ under
' circumstances_ creating. in. s.om~ ,pen~.n..Q:th.~r '1hJw.J.Q_~ "~mpJsixer .E':.J~gi&_ ,., . . "
·
liability to pay damages thereforet such person so liable beini :r~ferred to
as the third party, Such third party shall not inclu4e thQS,e ~piployers
described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them C9ntt~tors or
subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisiQ~.$ of section .
72-301, Idaho Co4e: nor include the owner or lessee of prem,.i~e,$J or other
person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the bw.~s there
canied on, but who> by t'e8Son of there being an independent COijtractor or
for any o1her reason, is not the direct employer of the workn;len there
employed. u ·

· ·
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. The Act "speciiloally excludes certain employers from third party
liability.'' Fuhriman v, State, Dept. o/Transp,, 143 Idaho 800, 804, 153 P.3d 480i
484 (2007). The plain language of J.C. § 72 ..223 refers to the term "employer"
which has a specific definition under the Act. The previously emblished statutory
definition of "employer' is found in I.C. § 72 .. t02(13)(a). A$ pr~ented by this
Court~ Fuhriman, that definition has two categories. Id Under the first category,
a statutory employer 'fmeaus any person who has expressly or implied.ly hired or
contracted the services of another. It includes contractors a.Qd ~ubvQ1.1tractors,'• Id

Tm$ Court al$o explained in Gomalez v. Lamb W~~ton, Inc., 142 Irumo
120, 122, 124 P.3d 996, 998 (2005), that the tenn °em.ployer' b more broadly
defined under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Laws than wtl~r the common
law. ,iAn employee may have more than one employer: the employer who directly
bi.red th.e en,iployee and a person or entity who, by statute, is ~::io h('ld to be the
employer for the ptnposes of workers compensation." Id The 0Co.l)rt clarified the
legal position of statutory employers by stating that while they 0~ be held liable
for workers compensation benefits, they· also enjoy hnmunity from liability for
common law torts," Id
In Robison, this Court held that a statutory employer w_a...~ pp.yone who, by
contractipg or $Ubcontractlng out services, is liable to pay wwter's compensation
ben~fits if the direot empJoyer does not pay those benefits'. RoktSQ/1, 139 Idaho ath
210-11, 76 P,3d at 954-55. m. Fuhriman, this Court review~d 1,Q¥ prop~ approac
t9 Idaho
to eva.luatmg wbe.ther a party qualifies as a statutory employ~~ :t¢hilion
at
Cocle §§ n-102(13)(a), 72-223(1) and 72..216. FuhrimanJ 14.3 l4@o 804 ..QS,
153 P,3d at484 .. 85. "In ordert9 qualify as a category one stamtocy employer, the
eniploye.r by contracting or subcontracting out servioes1 m~t 0b~ liable to pay·
wodc.ers compensation benefits if the direct employer does u¢t. Id at 805, 153
P.3d at 485. (citing Venters, 141 Idaho at 249, 108 P.3d at 396), ~The Co\ll't has
g
summarized the LC, § 72..223 category one protection for employer~ as includin
"Id
ees.'
employ
'employers who make use of a contractor's er subcontractots
The Supreme Court ofldaho discussed an issue similar to the one rai~ed by Snow

in

Spencer v, Allpress Logg,'ng, I~., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000). In Spencer. Steve
I

,t,,

~•••-~ ◄ ,i-

...

.,•r,r-,i,-"!"'9""1~ :1-

•

,,i,.i,p-••lllo~

t....,_. • ._,~,....,,_, _ _,._

the
Schilling purchased forested property in August of 1992. Prlor to closing escrow on

aeuser.
purchase, he contracted to sell a portion oftbe timber located on the property to Weyerh
Under the contract, Schilling was required to harvest the timber and deliver it to

Weyerhaeuser's

mill. Schilling contracted with James Allpress of Allpress Logging to cut and deliver

the timber

During
to Weyerhaeuser. The logging operation began in October or November of 1992,

the
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logging operation, Justin Spencer, one of Alipress's employees and the clrumant, was severely

injured. At the time, neither Allpress nor Schilling had worker's compensation insurance
coverage for Spencer. Spencer filed a worker's compensation claim on December 6, 1993.
Holding that Weyerhaeuser was a statutory employei· of Spencer at the time of the acciden¼

the

Supreme Court ofldaho stated:
of statutory employer
The Idaho Code sections dealing with the concept
liability under the workmen's

are designed to piev®t an en;iployer from avoiding
compensation statu..tes by sub.. contracting the work to others," Acfam v, Titan
Equip. Supply Corp., 93 Idaho 644, 646, 470 P.2d 409, 411 (1970). Furthennore,
"[t]his Court has recogp,ized that th~ statutory demution of employer is an
expanded definition d~igned to prevent an employer from avoiding liability
under the workmen'~ compensation statutes by sq.bcontractlng the work to others
who may be irrespof!S,lbli; ·and not insure their employees." Harpole v. State, 131
Idaho 437,440,958 P.2d 594,597 (1998) (internal.quotations omitted),
0

Section 72-216 of the Idaho Code provides:

this law shall be liable for
ractor under him who has
subcont
or
or
compensation to a.n ~ploy ~ of a contract
in any ca.,e where such
72-301
not complied with the provi~ions of section
employer would have been liable for compensation if such employee had been
working directly fot such employer.
An employer sul;,je~t t<;> the provisions of

I.C. §72--216.
Spencer claims that Weyerhaeuser is liable because Weyer~user is the
employer who conmct~ with Schilling and who also subcontracted with Allpress
who hired Spencer, There has been little legal analysis of this section of the Idaho
Code, The closest ca.$e on point is Findley v. Flanigan, 84 Idaho 473, 373 P.2d
551 (1962), wherein this Court considered the application of the predecessor of
J.C. § 72-216.
t1

I

Ill . . r t t1~ I

I

I ■

I ..

11

1

111"

1

~!1

.... ~

111 L

ltl

I

I..

>

·-

■

HP' tlrlt•4

""'Iii-•~--· -~ ..

In the pte$ent ~1186; Weyerhaeuser attempts to distingutsb FindleJ, on the
bas1s that in Ftndl1y the.mill pwchased standing tl'ees and then hired the logger to
harvest them, whe~ ~~re, Weyerhaeuser b1i>ughi the trees from Schilling who

was responsible for the harvesting of the timber. Weyerbaeus~r ar~es that the
mill in Findley contracted with claimant's employer, McCoy, for a service, unlike
the present case where Weyerhaeuser only contracted with Schilling for the
purchase of timber, not of Schilling's services.
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMlvfARY JUDGMENT .. 8
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While there may pe a difference in these cases, it is not as critical as
. Weyerhaeuser maintains. In the presenl case, Weyerhaeuser contracted with
Schilling for the purchase of the timber, and Weyerhaeuser contracted to pay
Schilling for the price of hmesting, In their agreement, part of the value of each
load delivered was paid against Schillings $100,000 advance. but part of the
price was also im:luded as part of tm cost for delivery, While Weyerhaeuser did
not care who djd the harvesting, it paid the costs of logguig the pine, Th1,ts,
W~erhaeuser was contracting with Schilling for logging the.pine on the property.
Thus, we hold in keeping with the objectives of the Worker~
Compensqtion Act, that Weyerha.euser is liable to Spencer because Weyerhaeuser
hired a contractor who hired a subcontractor who had not complied with the
worker's compensation provisions, Having detennin.ed that the Industrial
Commission erred in holdh)g that Weyerhaeuser was not liable for Sp~P.cer1s
worker's compensation benefits, we need not consider the remainder of Spenoer's
issues on appeal.
Id. at 860-61> 11 P.3d at 479...go (emphasis added).

COMPARISON OF SPENCER AND SNOW
Weyerhaeuser operated a lumber mill.
It purchased lumber from Schilling
for use in the lumber mill.

Inteonountain was constructing a center for
for the arts in Jackson, Wyoming, It
purchased steel from K&T Steel for use
in the construction project.

Schilling sold lumber to Weyerhaeuser.

K&T Steel sold steel to Intermountain.

The purchase price included delivery.

The purchase price included deli very.

Scbillittg contracted with Allpress to
cut and deliver the lllIIlber.
Allpress hired Spencer to
assist it in cutting the lumber.

K&T Steel hh'ed Snow to assist it in
delivering the st~el.

·--~· _ -M----~-W.eyerhaeuser .took the positmn, si.mim' JS) .th~ p.Q~tiq_n i~~n..l?.Y. .§nqwi.'!P.M Schi!lhm. ~---·...

'

,

a vendor, not a subconu:aotor. Schilling contracted with Allpress to cut and deliver the lumber.
Spencer was hired by Allpress to cut lumber, He did not work in the mill. Based on the
{oregoing, Weyerhaeuser argued it was not Spencer's statutory employer, Notwithstapding
Weyerbaeuser's ~gument, the Court held thai "in keeping with the objectives of1he Worker's
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a
Compensation Act, that W~yerhaeuser is liable to Spencer because Weyerhaeuser hired
sation
conb:actor who hired a subcontractor who had not complied with the worker's compen
provisions," Weyerhaeuser was Spencer's statutory employer.
Snow
As previously noted, Snow o]aims K&T Steel was a vendor, not a subcontractor.

was hired by K&T Steel to deliver steel. He did not work on the cop.struction project.

Based on

the foregoing, Snow argues that Intermountain was not his statutory employer.
The Idaho appellate courts have consistently applied the objectives of the Worker's
ns, to the
Compensation Act set forth i_n Blake, subjecting workplace injuries, with few exceptio
Worker's Compensation Act See Blake, supra., (Idaho Sand and Gravel was a primary
the
contractor. Traffic Products & Services provided flagging services to ISO. TPS hired
held that
claimant. The claimant was injured while working as a £tagger. The appellate Court
Idaho 120, 124
ISG was the claimanits statutory employer.); Gonzales v. Lamb Weston, Inc,, 142
P.3d 996 (2005) (L8lllb Weston produced frozen potato products. It con..tramed

with P.S.l. Waste,

r it. The
Systems to hau1 inaste to a transfer station. PSI htred the claimant to drive truck/o
appellate Court
claintant was injured while delivering a load of waste to the transfer station. The

o Delaware,
held that Lamb Weston was the claimant's statutory employer.); Venters v. Sorrent

witJ? 3..c
Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 108 P.3d 392 (2005) (Sorrento manufactured cheese. It CQqtracted
g
g to haul wastewater to Montierth Fanns. The claimant was employed b)l 3-C Trucla'n
Truckin

.~· --~ --~· as. a.tr.uck. dr.iver... _TJitt.Qlru,mant :W.!!§ jp.jyi:aj while w~ting to unload his truck,

The appellate court

Inc,, 139
held that Sonento was the clab.nant•s statutory employer.); Rob1son v. ,!3ateman-Han
ct building,
Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003) (Fred Meyer contracted with Bateman..aall to constru
f. The
Bateman..Hall subcontracted the roofing to Robison Roofing which hired the plaintif
Bateman~
plaintiff fell and was injured while attempting to access the roof. The Court held that

10
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(

Hall was the plaintiff's statutory employer and immune from third-party tort liability.); Findley
v, Flanigan, 84 Idaho 473, 373 P.2d 551 (1962) (Lumber mill operator plll:'Cba:sed a stand of trees

and hired McCoy to harvest them. McCoy hired the claimant to build roads on the property to
accommodate harvesting of the timber. The claimant was injured while driving home from the
property, On appeal, the Court he]d that the mill was the claimant's statutory employer because
'

the mill's 'contractor was McCoy, an~ that claimant was an employee oftbe cont.actor.'")

1

Only two parties, in the foregoing cases) were found not to have been the claimant's

statutory employer. In Venters, Montierth Farms, whose business did not include manufacturing
cheese, the production of related waste or the disposal of that waste, was not the claitnant's
statutory employer. In Robison, Fred Meyer, whose business did not include the construction of
buildings, was not the claimant•s statutory employer. The present situation is more analogous to

Spencer and Blake.
IV. CONCLUSION

Jntermountain expressly or impliedly hired K&T Steel to fabricate steel products for
•delivery to and use on a construction project in Jackson, Wyoming. Therefore, Intermountain
was an employer under the Worker's Compensation Act
K&T hired Snow to assist it in delivering the ste,el products fabricated by it.
K&T Steel fabricated and delivered the steel products to Intetmountain for use on the
Jackson construction project.
The Worker's Compensation Act's definition of an employer includes a person and/or
entity that hires another person to deliver mnterials to a job site, particularly materials fabricated
for use on the job to ~hich the materials were delivered, See Gonzales,· Venters,

:tvmMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR S~Y JUDGM:BNT .. 11
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P.O. Box 100
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Telephone: (208) 233-2001
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No.: CVl0-18-7400
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN
A. BAILEY, JR. IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION,
LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
County of Bannock )
I, JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and states as follows:
1.

Your Affiant is a citizen of the United States, a resident of Bannock County,

Idaho, of legal age, and competent to be a witness. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in
the State of Idaho, am counsel of record for defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC herein, and if
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called upon to testify, could testify to the following, all of which are within my own personal
knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" are true and correct copie-s of excerpts from the

transcript of the deposition of Dale Kelly taken on June 18, 2019.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of Snow v.

lntermountain Erectors! Inc,! Bonneville County Case No. CV-200 8-2231 (Idaho ih Dist.,
November 13, 2009), Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Summary Judgment,
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of the Uniform Bill of

Lading from Brown Struass, dated January 18, 2018.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANTNAUGHT.

DATED this /&fOctober, 2019.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me thisraay of October, 2019.

JJJy_em dlo1s

NOTARYPlff¥-,~CFO I_DA-HO

(SEAL)
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My Commiss10n xpires:
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the following:
Brent O. Roche
Rachel A. Miller
Racine Olson, PLLP
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

□

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

□
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lir'lCourt
0 E-mail: bor@racinelaw.net
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

3

4

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Plaintiffs,

5

6

vs,

) Case No, CV-10-18-7400

7

TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho

8

Limited Liability Co.,
Defendant.

9

\

10
11

12
DEPOSITION OF DALE KELLY

13

14

TAKEN JUNE 18, 2019

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

REPORTED BY:

22
23

MARY (RAINEY) STOCKTON, CSR No, 746

24
25

Notary Public

1 started.
2
Q. What is the -- that is -- sometimes a term
3 art for us lawyers. Is Dale Kelly Trucking incorporated
4 or is it just a d/b/a?
!
5
A Ifs doing business as Dale Kelly Trucking.
6 It's a sole proprietorship.
7
Q. Okay. Back to the history here 1 the history
8 lesson,
9
A Okay.
1O
Q, After you started leasing to Cedar Point and
11 that five years, which l 1m guessing puts you -- plus the
12 few months where you were working for them directly -13 at about 2001 or thereabouts.
14
What were you doing then after that?
15
A. I got my own authority and started doing my
16 own thing 1 getting my own loads.
17
Q. Okay. You 1re serving as your own broker and
18 your own jobber?
19
A. Yeah. l had to go through brokers, Or in
20 some cases, I hauled dlrect for1 like, Wada Farms, somei
21 of the other spud places up her~, potato houses. I'd
!
1
22 haul direct for them going east 1 and then l d use
23 brokers to come home,
24
Q. Did you operate under a business name at that
25 time in 2001 or thereabouts?
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A. Same one.
2
Q, Dale Kelly Trucking?
A. No. I was a company driver. I worked for
3
A. Yes.
Doug Andrus.
4
Q. That was the beginning of Dale Kelly?
Q. And after Doug Andrus in roughly '96 1where
5
A, Correct.
did you go to work?
1
6
Q. Okay, And have you operated continuously
A. I bought my first truck at the end of 96. I
7 since 2001 or thereabouts -- I understand it's an
went to work for Cedar_ Point for about three months
8 estimate -- as Dale Kelly Trucking?
while l was trying to get my truck financed. I bought
9
A. Correct.
my first truck from Cedar Point.
Q. You haven 1t worked for any other businesses?
Q. Okay. And then who did you work for when you 1O
11
A. No, other than November of last year when I
began?
12 hit an elk and my truck went down for five weeks, I
A I leased on to Cedar Point as a leaser for
13 em ployed at Jay Transport for five weeks.
five years,
14
Q, Okay, We'll talk about that. Who have -Q. Leasing your truck and yourself?
15 begi nnlng in 2001 when you're, I understand, picking up
A To them, correct, under their authorlty,
16 loads here and then and using brokers to come back at
Q, Did you have any other employees working for
17 the beginning of the Dale Kelly Trucking business, who
you at that time?
18 were the brokers you'd work with or who was the
A. No, never have.
19 companies that you would work with?
Q, Just you?
20
A. The main one I used was C.H. Robinson, That
A. Just me.
21
was
the broker to bring me home,
Q, Never had any employees?
22
Q, Okay, And who at C.H. Robinson would you work
A. No.
23 with?
Q, I was going to ask you about your current
24
A Oh, they have agents throughout the country.
business, Dale Kelly Trucking. No employees ever?
! 25 So, the one I used -- I don't even know what town he was
A Never. Been a sole proprietary ever since I
Q. Okay.
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1
A No, because when I went to Jay T~ansport ~~
2 when I contract to them l just use them only.
3
Q. You were exclusive with Jay Transport
4 beginning in 2012?
A Correct.
5
6
Q. Have been ever since?
7
A Correct. I still get e-mails from some of the
8 other brokers wanting me to haul their freights 1 but I
9 don't.
10
Q. Okay. No other side jobs, no other side
11 trrps?
12
A No.
13
Q. Since 2012?
14
A. Nope.
15
Q. Okay. In the compensation with Jay Transport,
16 looking at those contracts is, to me, just a little bit
17 vague. Maybe it1s because I don't understand it.
18
Tell me how it is you're compensated by Jay
19 beginning in 2012 and on to today.
20
A, Very simple. I get 10 percent of whatever
21 he's getting paid for the load,
22
MR. ROCHE: I think you misspoke there,
23
THE WITNESS: Did I?
24
MR. ROCHE: You said 10 percent
25
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry 1 l get 90 percent
1

1 DK Trucking?
2
A. They1re all mine.
3
Q. And who pays the premiums for the work comp,
4 for example?
5
A, I do,
6
Q. And how were they paid? Did you pay them
7 directly yourself or were they taken out of the gross
8 amount of loads that are run through Jay?
9
A I pay everything myself.
1O
Q. Okay. So you write the check after the-~
11
A. Every quarter.
12
Q. Okay. After the net is disbursed to you, you
13 write that out of your own company funds?
14
A. Correct.
15
Q. Under this agreement, you guaranteed that your
16 vehicles would be compatible with the loading and
17 unloading equipment at the origin and at the
18 designation correct?
19
A. Correct.
20
Q, You agree to provide personnel for the
21 transport of the steel that were fully quallfied and
22 trained and licensed in compliance with all rules and
23 regs?
24
A. Correct.
25
Q. What qualifications or training did you obtain
1

1

Page 100

Page 57

1
A. That is correct.
2
Q. Signed as Dale Kelly Trucking, not you
3 individually?
,
4
A. Well, it would be me individually because I'm
5 a sole proprietor.
6
Q. That's the way you interpret it anyway.
7
A That s the only way I know how to interpret
8 that.
Q. Okay. Fair enough,
9
1O
It required you to obtain various types of
11 insurance. I want to visit with you a little bit about
12 that. It talks about all risk cargo insurance, auto
13 liability, general liability, workman 1s comp, all of
14 those things.
15
Did you obtain all of that insurance?
16
A, I do.
17
Q. How did you do that with Jay -- when you re
18 working with Jay Transport?
19
A. I do it through Hub Financial, which is Great
1
20 West Insurance; and then all my workman s comp is
21 straight through the State.
22
Q. Do you do that through Jay's policies or in
23 association with policies that Jay Transport had?
24
A No, sir.
25
Q. These are all yours individually or yours as
1

1

Kelly, Dale

1 left and the fracture to the bones of your leg on the
2 right, any other injuries from this incident?
3
A. No, sir.
4
Q. And you did receive work comp benefits,
5 correct?
6
A. I did.
7
Q. And you provided that policy! as you testified
8 before?
9
A. Correct.
Q, What benefits did you receive from comp?
1O
11
A. It was $490 every two weeks, if I remember
12 right.
13
Q. $490 in wages?
14
A. From workman s comp, yeah. Yes.
15
Q. They paid all your medicals?
16
A. Paid all my medicals,
17
Q. They paid you a disability amount?
A. Theyire paying that still, yeah.
18
19
Q. Pay it over time, correct?
20
A. Correct.
21
Q. But you've been getting the monthly payments?
22
A. Right. Correct.
23
Q. Anything else the comp carrier took care of?
24
A. I think just all the medical, ambulance. They
25 covered it all.
1
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

1
2

I, MARY (RAINEY) STOCKTON, CSR No, 746,
That the

3

Certified Shorthand Reporter, certify:

4

foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time

5

· and place therein set forth, at which time the witness

6

was put under oath by me;

7

That the testimony and all objections made were

8

recorded stenographically by me and transcribed by me or

9

under my direction;

10
11
12

That the foregoing is a true and correct record
of all testimony given, to the best of my ability;
I

further certify that I

am not a relative or

13

employee of any attorney or party, nor am I financially

14

interested in the action.

15
161

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand and seal this
9th day of July, 2019.

17
18

19
20
21

MARY (RAINEY) STOCKTON, CSR

22

Notary Public

23

P.O. Box 2636

24

Boise, Idaho

25

83701-2636

My commission expires February 3, 2024
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CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
DALE KELLY TRUCKING

AND
JAY TRANSPORT

P ge 8

Jay Transport .F-lolding LLC
Jay Transport Inc.
PO Box 509
Ucon~ TD 83454
Telephone: 208-523-513 4 Fax: 208-523 .. 429.9

TRANSPORTAtlON AGREEM.ENT

The purpose ofth1s agreement fa to set-otfl the working relationship of the parties to thii-i
agreement and the conditions and obligations incumbent upon the tv1otor Cartier related to the
consider~tfon of Motor Carder s acceptance of frelght being dispatched. through Broker from and t.o
1

any point(s),
[t

is agreed between the parties that:

1. The above named Motor Carrier agrees to maintain and keep all vehicles used to transport
shipments for Broker In _good repair and running order and Jn compliance-with all safety
regul.ations ofthe Federal .Department of T.ransportf.1tio11;, Mo:tor Carrier further agrees to

pay and bear al 1operation expeirne-S, indudi ng but not limited to foel, taxes ctri-vcr s wages,
insurances) damages and any expenses related to openltioh of his vehicles whlfe tran.~p{)rting
shipme11ts fat Broker.
·
1

1

2. Motor Cm;ier and the drivers of Motor Carricr'"s vchrcle shall at no time be considered m1
employee. of.Broker. Motor Carrier's drivers must hove a curtent CDL. Moto1· Carrier shall
be conclusively deemed to be Jn exclusive cont-rol of said vehicle(s) ahd equipment unt!I all
merchandise has beep. unloaded at the designated destination to consignee.
3. Any a"i.1d aU claims ~gainst any shipments becnuse of damage in transit or $hortage •viiJl be
Motoi· Carriers full respons'.ibiHty and will pay for any and all costs associated with any
losses, dah1ctge or clain,1s.

4. As a condition of contracting and worki.ng_with Broker, Motor Canier agrees to execu(e a
non-compelition claus~ in a form attached he.reto.
5. Motor Cat'der fu.rthet agt'~es to suppo1i Broket's position regarding their business
reluttonshi.p with shippers and consignees and wrn refra.in from doing business \Vi.th 01·
so Uciwion of shippers and/or cuswnters who are introduced to Motor Carrier through
Broker 1 s·business.

Kelly_00234
a e 9

6. Motor Carder gives tbe right of bflling any customer 1 shipper or receiver pertaining to any
and all lands hauled under contract to Broker. tvlotor Carrier is giving Br(1ker Che right to net
on h.i~/her behalf concerning alt b!lling. Arid rel inqui.shcs tbe right to pmsue payment from
any other means unless n signed waver by the Broker-abtni.ned.
7.

Broker agre(:S to compensate Motor Carder us follow:

Broker ·s comntiss[on \v1!1 be based on the gros-s revenue actunlly ,re.c-eived by Broker.
The percentage rate ofBrciker s commission .may V£;ry according to competition,
dcslmbiHty of load, demand faclot·s and ofher trade customs.
1

1

Paymctit to Motor Carrier wUI be make no later than -forty.-fhe (45) days after all.
origi_na~ bHls offaciing, proof of dcllveryt signed delivery receipts, COD ch.eeks ot1
damage-free loads, and other t~quired and necessary paperwork relfft.e-d to the
trnnsport arc received-by Broker.
Motor Carrier's gross earning~ reportab'Je to tax authorilies shall be the gross revenue
actuaUy received by Broker, less corn mission. Motor Carrl('.r's net pay to be pa]d by
Brok·cr wUl be after all dedlic(ions lo Motor Carder's accounl for alf t·eirnbursable.

charges and advances expended by Broker on Motor Carrrer!s be.half have been
adJ usted. These deductions-shall include any charge thai has been expended directly
by Broker fo.r or on behalf of Molor Carrier.
It is so agreed,

,rJ-~? .,/ ·}

DATED:_(,/=-·.,.-----"-'(/__,_·(__ _ __

Kelly_00235
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UNIFORM STRAIGHT flll.l OF LADING
ORIGINAL NOT NEGOTIABI..E
RECEIVED, subject to the claBsificatlon end tariffs in effect on the da!e of I.he issue of this Bill of Lading.

i~:«%)}~J@I.$:fi:~~~!Il
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Tile propa,ly de..sr.r!ced bdnw, ln.ap~a,ent &nod order, except as n~\erl(coa,len!s and condition or conteni, of pac,,B"' "n!nowllj, rn,1ek~cl, co:"lslzod,
~ed d, milled a, Intllcat od below, wil k:1 rn I,I ,om p,ny (lha Word com!iany telrL 0 uud er< tend t!iro~glio ot this .an! rn ct ~l meo c.l ng ar.y person ~,
ccrp_oraHo,i In p~«,«lon iJI lhe p,oper\y under the mitract) •V~a> to imy to Tl, ~"'"' pl," of oe:1,,,,y ,t ~ald dostln,tlor,, ii Cl! Its own rn,a ur lls.
r:11t,n wat~r Hne, othcirvlls-e to d-elhtJ;"! lo driolh~r c·arcJ~r ,c;n the llllJ~e ta $~Jd de:!itin~tfori. Ith. mutu.1l[y a,5!t-e-d 1M to ~c1ch -ca:rrler of aH or :any of st1fci
property over ,!I or •oy per\!o,, or ;a!d roule \~ ,b\fnat!on, ,1,d" lo each pafr/ al aay lirna fntere.(ad I." ,;1 or any or said property, lhal any ~r ,ar~
pr,,perty, lliat ,verv ,er vice lo be perf□ r,ned /lereuouor shall be ,cibjecl lo all the (un~i:lom Jl □ l prnllibf!ed by law, w~e :lier prl11\scl o, wrltlan, h•rel,i
,on!olnetl, inc'udlng tho <anditloi,, on b,c~ heraor, vilil<:h are heraby agreed t~ oy the sh;ppecand acco~\ocl to hhn,elr anc hi, • .,:;;n;.
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1497d't1URUPA AVENUE
FONTA,~¢' CA 92335

909-350-9678
Fax:_ 90 9-35 0-9 758

IDAHO FALLS,

37656*00*QO*OO,

Cust #: 67161
Ordered

Customer P,0,

Number

By

17038~25227

NEFI

Line

01-PD

Order
Qty

1

SHIP roi
TRC FABRICATION LLC
1546 N 25TH E
IDAHO FALLS
ID 83401

SOlDTO:
TRC FABRICATION(FISHER)
MCCAIN FOODS #2
1546 N 25TH E
JD 83401-2300

208/542-9600 .

SalesRep:

Date
Requested

Date
Shipped

Fre!ght

01/17/18

01/19/18

PREPAID

Ship
Qty

CAMERON 31

Description

1

Carrier
JJO..YTRANSP

PAGE

1 of 2

Bill of Lading: 37656*01
Print Date:
01-18-2018
Print Time:
06:39pm MT
Ship Site

24
13

Ship Zone
LO_AD# 31191

,
·~ ·

stbP# 1

Length

8 X 4 x 3/16 RECT TUBE
1 PC 22' 6 7/8 .MK 3020 -=--.__
1 PC 22 6 7/8 "MK 3068 ~
HT: 1/RHEQ P46264

48,000

697.4

10 SQ 5/8
1 PC
1 PC
1 PC

44.000

26,868.2

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B

44.000

1,658.4

V

11

•

11

I'

02-PD

8

TUBE

41'1
41
41'
1 PC 41'
1 PC 41 1
1 PC 41'
1 PC 40'

AS.DOB

3
0
3
3
3
3

l/8
1/8"
1/2"
l/8 11
l/8
1/2
11

MK
MK
MK
MK

3002
3003
3004
3005
MK 3006
MK 3007
4 5/8 MK 3008
1 PC 40' 5" MK 3009
HT: 4/REVT TE4589
2/REVT TE6855
2/R.HRA 1714241
11

11

11

04-PD

1

1

05-PD

1

1

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B
1 pc 23' 0 5/8 MK 3371
1 pc 20' 6 3/4 MK 3377
HT: 1/RHEQ P39320

44.000

1.,658.4

06-PD

1

1

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B
1 pc 21' 2 1/4 MK 3375
1 pc 18' 11/4 MK 3374
HT: 1/RHEQ P39320

40.000

1,507.6

07-PD

1

1

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B
1 pc 24' 4 1/4 MK 3373
_ 1 pc 18' 3 1/4 MK 3372
HT: 1/RJPX F9723

44.000

1,658.4

Shipped Wgt

43,236.2

Invoiced Wgt

43,236.2

1 pc 22' 2 3/4 MK 3369
1 pc 21' 6 1/4 MK 3378
HT: 1/RHEQ P39320

'
ATTENTION DRIVER- ANY QUESTIONS

REC ..HRS. 7. AM .. 3 PM
MAX.. LIFT 6000# FORKLIFT
UNLOAD

PLEASE CALL US AT: 909-350-9678

CUSTOMER SIGNATURE
***PLEASE SIGNALL PAGES***

PREPAID
(Signature of consignor.)

Driver Signature
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UNIFORM STRAIGHT BiLL OF LADlls!G
OHIGINAI_ NOT NEGOT!ABLE
RECEIVED, subjec.i !o the classitica11on and la riffs i11 effoct on !he dale of Ille lss1;e of thin Blil of Lading.
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ond d~scrlbad .. Jndlca\ed b~low, whld, s;ai,i con1pcny (th• Vl<>rd company belr.: "ncier,tood thrm,.lrnut '.h's c~ntract a, me1t"nG any p~ .1nn or
1
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own w:iter m-ie, otheri,'ls.a io d~lilJ.l!t "to an1"J-H1.a:r c;i.:!".d~r ~11 tlrn rollte tc sald -1fes-tlc•Jtk1n. rt f.s. ::riuhia~iy iiilJ:lr~l!!dr ;is to ~-Reh t..tirr[~r :-f .af! C!f any cf H[d
prop~rty over all or ;my poriloo of •aid route to o~,lloallon, and" to each_pa/ty ,t ~o, tl!l',~ !n\er"e_<tod Jn ,;I or any or <a!d p;oporty, lhit ani d ,aid
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·14970 JURUPA AVENUE
FONTANA, CA 92335
SOLD TO:

909-350-9678
Fax: 909-350-9758

37656*00*00 *00

TRC FABRJCATION LLC

Cus·t #: 67161

SalesR~p:

Customer P.O.
Number

Ordered
By

17038~25227

NEFI

Line

08-PD

Order
Qty

1

St-llPTO:

TRC FABRJCATION(FJSHER)
MCCAIN FOODS #2
1546 N 25TH E
lDAHO FALLS,
ID 83401-2300
208/542-9600

1546 N 25TH E
IDAH_O FALLS

,

Date
Requested

Date
Shtpped

Freight

01/17/18

01119/18

PREPAID

Ship
Qty

Description

1

PAQE 2 of 2

LAST PAGE

ID 83401

CAMERON 31
Carrier
JAYTP.ANSP

Bill of Lading: 37656*01
Print bate:
01-1.8-2018
Print Time:
06:39pm MT

24

Ship Site
Ship Zone

13

LOAD# 31191
Length

STOP# 1
Weight

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE ASOOB

44.000

1,658.4

1 pc 20 2 7/8 MK 3376.
1 pc 20' 2 3/4 MK 3368
HT: 1/RHEQ P39320
1

09-PD

1

1

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B
1 pc 20' 2 3/8 MK 3370
1 pc 19' 9 1/4 MK 3367
HT: 1/RHEQ P39320

44.000

1,658.4

10-PD

2

2

8 X 6 X 5/16 RECT TUBE
1 PC 17' 7 S/8 MK 3360
1 PC 22' 0 5/8" 11 MK 3362
1 PC 17 I 7 13/6 MK 3361
. 1 PC 22' 0 7/8 MK 3363
HT: 2/QXFA SP82503

40.000

2,207.2

10 SQ 5/8 TUBE A500B
1 PC 42' 0 1/8 MK 3051
HT: 1/RGQK 1713396

48.000

3,663.8

11

11

11-PD

1

1

11

\

REC-HRS. 7 AM .. 3 PM
ATTENTION DRIVER-ANY QUESTIONS

MAX-LIFT 6000# FORKLIFT
UNLOAD

PLEASE CALL US AT: 909-350-9678

CUSTOMER SIGNATURE
***PLEASE SIGN ALL PAGES"'**

LAST PAGE

Shipped Wgt

43,236.2

Invoiced Wgt

43,236.2
PREPAID

(Signature of consignor,)

Driver Signature
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Electronically Filed
10/30/2019 2:53 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: John Frey, Deputy Clerk

Brent 0. Roche (ISB#2627)
Rachel A. Miller (ISB#8991)
RACINE OLSON, PLLP
P. 0. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109
Brent@racineolson.com
Rachel@racineolson.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No. CVl0-18-7400

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

v.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC,
an Idaho Limited Liability Co.
Defendant.

Plaintiffs, Dale Kelly and Nancy Kelly, through counsel and pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby submit their Opposition to Defendant TRC Fabrication,
LLC's motion for summary judgment ("MSJ").

I.
This is a negligence case.

INTRODUCTION
Dale Kelly alleged that he was severely injured when

delivering a shipment of steel tubing to TRC Fabrication, LLC's ("TRC") facility in Idaho Falls,
Idaho. Complaint, ilil 9-15, 22-23. Kelly alleges that TRC was negligent by failing to implement
or enforce safety procedures requiring that all truck drivers making deliveries to their facility
remain in the cabs of their trucks or in TRC's breakroom while their trailers were unloaded, by

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIITON TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 1

Page 84

overloading the capacity of the lift being used by TRC's employee to unload Mr. Kelly's trailer
by 1.5 times, by failing to maintain its unloading area so that its lift operators have a smooth flat
surface on which to back away the lift from the trailers being unloaded, by losing control of the
metal tubing being moved from Mr. Kelly's trailer, and by failing to devise and implement a plan
with Mr. Kelly for the safe removal of the dunnage. Complaint,
challenge the validity of Mr. Kelly's negligence claims.

,r 20.

TRC's MSJ does not

As a consequence, it will not be

necessary for the parties or the Court to discuss and assess the evidence relating to Mr. Kelly's
negligence claims.
Instead, TRC's MSJ is limited to its claim that it is entitled to immunity under LC. § 72223(1) of the Idaho Worker's C~mpensation Act (IWCA) as a statutory employer of Mr. Kelly.
However, for statutory employer immunity under LC.§ 72-223(1) to apply, TRC must prove the
existence of an unbroken chain of interrelated contracts for services between TRC and the
injured party, Dale Kelly. The chain of contracts TRC purports to rely upon includes at its core a
contract for the sale of goods. Because the IWCA and statutory employer immunity under LC. §
72-223(1) do not apply in the context of a contract for the sale of goods, TRC is not entitled to
immunity under LC.§ 72-223(1), and its MSJ must be denied.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the only
remaining questions are questions of law which are resolved in favor of the moving party. This
Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draws all
reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the
motion. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 768, 215 P.3d 485, 488 (2009) (citations omitted).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court is not permitted to weigh the

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIITON TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 2

Page 85

evidence or to resolve controverted factual issues. Siegel Mobile Home Group, Inc., v. Bowen,
114 Idaho 531, 757 P.2d 1250 (Ct. App. 1988). If reasonable people could reach different
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the motion must be
denied. Vincent v. Safeco Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 107, 29 P.3d 943 (2001).

III.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

TRC's memorandum in support includes a short factual summary at pages 2-3. Plaintiffs
do not dispute any of those assertions. Indeed, they are based on allegations in their Complaint
and Mr. Kelly's deposition testimony.
The core contract in this case was the purchase agreement between TRC and Brown
Strauss Steel ("Brown Strauss"). Significantly, the contract was for the purchase of goods. TRC
issued its purchase order to Brown Strauss on January 12, 2018. The purchase order referenced
"McCain 2." Roche Aff., ,r 2 and Exh. 1. As reflected in Brown Strauss's invoice# 803034, the
steel was intended for use on TRC's McCain Foods 2 job. Id. at ,r 3 and Exh. 2.

The McCain

Foods job was a lengthy one-year project in Burley. B. Nordstrom Dep., pp. 17-18.
Brown Strauss's invoice shows that TRC's purchase order consisted of twenty-seven (27)
pieces of steel tubing of various dimensions.

The total weight of the tubing was 43,236.2

pounds. The purchase price was $25,857.84. Roche Aff., ,r 3 and Exh. 2.
The invoice further indicates that the order was shipped from Brown Strauss to TRC's
facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho on January 19, 2018. The invoice does not identify the carrier
transporting the shipment.

However, the invoice includes the reference to "F.O.B.

DELIVERED." Id.
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Jay Transport billed Brown Strauss $1,850 for transporting the shipment. Id. at ,r 4 and
Exh. 3. The transportation charges paid by Brown Strauss constitute about 7% of the total
invoice amount.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs dispute the additional factual assertion made by TRC at
page 5 of its memorandum to the effect that "TRC contracted with Brown Strauss for the
delivery of metal tubes to TRC's Idaho Falls facility." This statement was not supported by any
reference to the record. As shown above, the contract was for the purchase of goods.
The second disputed factual assertion was made at page 8 of TRC' s memorandum. TRC
asserted that "[i]n this case, Kelly stepped in to perform part of the task of unloading the steel at
TRC. . .. Kelly intervened and was injured." Such is not supported by Mr. Kelly's deposition
testimony or any other part of the record.

Rather, Mr. Kelly explained that he had no

responsibility for unloading the steel from his trailer. D. Kelly Dep. p. 62. Nonetheless, TRC
employees asked him to remove the straps securing the load to his trailer so that the unloading
process could commence. Id. at p. 73. Mr. Kelly further testified that he had no control over the
unloading process, including the amount of the load removed from the trailer at any given time,
and that he was not supervising the unloading process. Id. at pp. 66-67. Most importantly, Mr.
Kelly did not testify that he intervened in the unloading process. Rather, he was positioned at the
end of the trailer when TRC's telehandler operated removed the top layer of the load. He
remained in that position until seeing the operator back away from the trailer about 16 feet.
Believing it was safe, he then walked up the passenger side of his trailer to push his wood
boards, used as dunnage to separate the top layer from the bottom layer of the shipment, off to
the driver's side of his trailer where his storage bins were located. Removing the dunnage is akin
to removing the straps and should not be considered part of the unloading process. Mr. Kelly's
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actions at TRC's facility were no different than what he had safely done before on many
occasions while delivering similar loads. Id. at pp. 83, 87, 93-94.
The final factual assertion of TRC that could be misconstrued appears in the sentence that
starts at the bottom of page 8 and carries over to the top of page 9. It states "[i]t is undisputed
that TRC was in the business of handling and fabricating large steel building components like
those involved in this incident." Again, TRC did not support that assertion with any reference to
the record. There is no evidence in the record that TRC, in the ordinary course of its usual
business, used its own employees and trucks to pick up its purchases of steel from companies
like Brown Strauss of Fontana, California for delivery to its facility in Idaho Falls.

Any such

argument by TRC should be rejected as being without factual support in the record.
Again, when resolving TRC's MSJ the record must be construed most favorably to
Plaintiffs. Such includes giving them the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION

Immunity under I.C. § 72-223(1) of the IWCA is only available in the context of a
contract for services and not in the context of a contract for the sale of goods.
The IWCA imposes a statutory system for compensating injured employees. LC. § 72-

201. Employers are required to pay for workers compensation insurance for their employees. LC.
§§ 72-203 & 72-210. Employees who are injured on the job receive compensation for on-the-job
injuries through the workers compensation system to the exclusion of other compensation from
their employers. LC. §§ 72-209 & 72-211. The exclusive nature of this workers compensation
remedy is referred to as the exclusive remedy rule. Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho
207,209, 76 P.3d 951, 953 (2003).
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However, there is an exception to the exclusive remedy rule. Robison, 139 Idaho at 209,
76 P.3d at 953. Idaho Code § 72-223(1) permits an injured employee who receives workers
compensation benefits to seek additional compensation from a responsible third-party "other
than the employer" so long as the third-party is not within two specific categories, as follows:
The right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact that the
injury, occupational disease or death is caused under circumstances creating in
some person other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages therefor,
such person so liable being referred to as the third party. Such third party shall not
include those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under
them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisions
of section 72-301, Idaho Code; nor include the owner or lessee of premises, or
other person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there
carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for any
other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed.
LC. § 72-223(1) (emphasis added). These two categories are generally referred to as Category 1
and Category 2 statutory employers.
By its terms, I.C. § 72-223(1) grants immunity to an "employer." Notably, the definition
of"employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a) uses similar language as LC. § 72-223(1), as follows:

"Employer" means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or
contracted the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It
includes the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the
proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there
being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer
of the workers there employed ....
I.C. § 72-102(13)(a) (emphasis added).
The interplay between the language in LC. § 72-223(1) and the definition of "employer"
under I.C. § 72-102(13)(a) was explained by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows:
The plain language of I.C. § 72-223 refers to the term "employer," which
has a specific definition under the Act. For at least the last 60 years, this Court has
interpreted this statutory definition and has developed significant case law to help
give the term meaning. As this Court has explained, this statutory definition of
employer is "an expanded definition designed to prevent an employer from
avoiding liability under the workmen's compensation statutes by subcontracting
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIITON TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 6

Page 89

the work to others who may be irresponsible and not insure their employees."
Thus, a statutory employer is anyone who, by contracting or subcontracting
out services, is liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct
employer does not pay those benefits. LC. § 72-216(1), (2). The case law
surrounding the definition of the term "employer" is what the Court refers to as
the statutory employer analysis. Because the legislature used the identical
language from the statutory definition when crafting third-party tort immunity
under LC. § 72-223, this Court determines the statutory employer analysis is a
necessary tool in determining the meaning and scope of LC.§ 72-223.
Robison, 139 Idaho at 210-11, 76 P.3d at 954-55 (emphasis added).
Therefore, the first step in determining whether TRC is entitled to immunity under LC. §
72-223(1) is to determine whether TRC falls within the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72102(13)(a). While TRC acknowledged that the definition of an "employer" is limited to those
who expressly or impliedly hire the services of another, it wrongly urges the Court to all but
ignore this requirement. Memo ISO MSJ, p. 4. This invitation should be rejected. In Robinson,
the Idaho Supreme Court admonished a lower court for having done exactly that without
considering the full definition of "employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a). Robison, 139 Idaho at
210, 76 P.3d at 954.
Therefore, the first sentence of the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a)
cannot be ignored. The first sentence defines an "employer" as "any person who has expressly or
impliedly hired or contracted the services of another." LC. § 72-102(13)(a) (emphasis added).
This is the crux of the definition of "employer" under the IWCA. This first sentence of the
definition of "employer" unambiguously qualifies the second sentence of the definition - such
that contractors, subcontractors, proprietors, and business operators are only "employers"
entitled to immunity under LC. § 72-223(1) if they "hired or contracted the services of another"
as required by the first sentence of the definition.
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This interpretation of the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a) for
purposes of immunity under LC. § 72-102(13)(a) is not new or novel. In fact, it has been
expressed and applied by the Idaho Supreme Court on numerous occasions. See, e.g. Cordova v.
Bonneville County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 641, 167 P.3d 774, 778 (2007)

(specifically analyzing whether a "contract of service" existed for purposes of the statutory
employer analysis). See also Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 850, 203 P.3d 1246, 1249 (2009) ("a
statutory employer was anyone who, by contracting or subcontracting out services, is liable to
pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct employer does not pay those benefits.");
Robison, 139 Idaho at 210-11, 76 P.3d at 954-55 ("a statutory employer is anyone who, by

contracting or subcontracting out services, is liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if

the direct employer does not pay those benefits.").
In the absence of a contract for services as required by the first sentence of the definition
of "employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a), immunity under LC. § 72-223(1) is unavailable,
regardless of whether the defendant may be a contractor, subcontractor, proprietor or business
operator under the second sentence of the definition. TRC is not claiming to have contracted
directly with Dale Kelly. Instead, TRC is claiming a chain of interrelated contracts and
subcontracts between TRC and Dale Kelly. Because TRC is relying upon a chain of contracts,
TRC has the burden of proving that every contract in this alleged chain of contracts is a contract
for services as required by the first sentence of the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72102(13)(a). See Krinitt v. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Ganie, 162 Idaho 425, 431, 398 P.3d 158, 164
(2017) (analyzing a chain of contracts for services for purposes of determining statutory
employer immunity under LC.§ 72-223(1)).
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This requirement of an unbroken chain of contracts for services for purposes of immunity
under LC. § 72-223(1) is evident in the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions over the last 60 years.
See, e.g., Krinitt v. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 162 Idaho 425, 431, 398 P.3d 158, 164 (2017)
(contracts for aviation services); Ewing v. State, Dep't of Transp., 147 Idaho 305, 307, 208 P.3d
287, 289 (2009) (contracts for construction services); Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 848, 203
P.3d 1246, 1247 (2009) (contracts for construction services); Cordova v. Bonneville Cty. Joint
Sch. Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 639, 167 P.3d 774, 776 (2007) (contract for counseling
services); Fuhrinian v. State, Dep't of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 802, 153 P.3d 480, 482 (2007)
(contracts for construction services); Kolar v. Cassia Cty. Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 349, 127 P.3d
962, 965 (2005) (contract for engineering services); Gonzalez v. Lamb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho
120, 121, 124 P.3d 996, 997 (2005) (contracts for disposal services); Venters v. Sorrento
Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 247, 108 P.3d 392, 394 (2005) (contracts for disposal services);
Robison v. Batenian-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 208, 76 P.3d 951, 952 (2003) (contracts for
roofing services); Dewey v. Merrill, 124 Idaho 201, 202, 858 P.2d 740, 741 (1993) (contracts for
construction services); Rhodes v. Sunshine Min. Co., 113 Idaho 162, 163, 742 P.2d 417, 418
(1987) (contracts for mining services); Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Prod., Inc., 107 Idaho 389,
391, 690 P.2d 324, 326 (1984) (contracts for repair services); Miller v. FMC Corp., 93 Idaho
695, 696, 471 P.2d 550, 551 (1970) (contracts for maintenance services); Adam v. Titan Equip.
Supply C01p., 93 Idaho 644, 645, 470 P.2d 409, 410 (1970) (contracts for salvage services);
Russell v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 466, 472, 305 P.2d 740, 743 (1956) (contracts for
livestock services).
In the absence of a contract for services under the first sentence of the definition of
"employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a), statutory employer immunity under LC. § 72-223(1) is

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIITON TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 9

Page 92

unavailable. Courts use the "predominant factor test" when determining whether a contract is a
"contract for the sale of goods" or a "contract for services" for purposes of determining whether
a contract is subject to the Uniform Commercial Code or other law. See Silicon Int'! Ore, LLC

Co. v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 546, 314 P.3d 593, 601 (2013); Fox v. Mountain West
Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 709, 52 P.3d 848, 854 (2002). There may be circumstances where a
contract has a mix of elements associated with both sales and services, such as when a contract
for the sale of goods includes ancillary delivery. Under the "predominant factor test," the test is
"not whether they are mixed but, granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor,
their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated is the rendition of services with goods incidentally
involved ... or is a transaction of sale with labor incidentally involved." Fox, 137 Idaho at 710, 52
P.3d at 855.
Consistent the predominant factor test applied by the Idaho Supreme Court, a contract for
the sale of goods with ancillary delivery is still a contract for the sale of goods and not a contract
for services under the first sentence of the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a) or
for purposes of immunity under LC. § 72-223(1). Whether a purchaser personally picks up the
goods or has the goods delivered does not alter the nature of the underlying contract for the sale
of goods. When a contract for the sale of goods with ancillary delivery exists, a defendant cannot
satisfy the definition of "employer" under LC.§ 72-102(13)(a) or the requirements of immunity
under I.C. § 72-223(1). "A contract for the sale and purchase of a product even though it includes
the delivery and unloading of the product upon the premises of the purchaser, does not render the
seller's delivery man a statutory employee of the purchaser." Shipley v. Gipson, 773 S.W.2d 505,
507 (Mo. App. 1989).
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Many courts from other jurisdictions have reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., Davis

v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784, 787-88 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that the Ford Motor
Company who purchased panels from the Budd Company who manufactured, sold and delivered
the panels was not the statutory employer of the Budd Company's employee who was injured
during the delivery of the panels); Meyer v. Piggly Wiggly No. 24, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 761, 763
(S.C. 2000) (holding that Piggly Wiggly who purchased cake products from a vendor was not the
statutory employer of the vendor's employee who was injured during delivery of the cake
products); Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc., 252 Va. 42, 471 S.E.2d 473 (Va. 1996) (holding
that JTE Constructors who purchased panels from RECO was not the statutory employer of
RECO's employee who was injured during delivery of the panels); Mobley v. Flowers, 440
S.E.2d 473 (Ga. 1994) (holding that a general contractor who purchased bricks from a vendor
was not the statutory employer of the vendor's employee who was injured during delivery of the
bricks); Gray Bldg. Sys. v. Trine, 391 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. 1990) (holding that Gray Building
Systems who purchased lintels from Dave's Welding Service was not the statutory employer of
Dave's Welding Service's employee who was injured during delivery of the lintels); Shipley v.

Gipson, 773 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Mo. App. 1989) (holding that a sawmill that purchased uncut logs
from a vendor was not the statutory employer of vendor's employee who was injured during
delivery of the uncut logs); Wilson v. Daniel Intern. Corp., 197 S.E.2d 686 (S.C. 1973) (holding
that Daniel Construction Company who purchased concrete from Winyah Concrete was not the
statutory employer of Winyah Concrete's employee who was injured during delivery of the
concrete); Hacker v. Brookover Feed Yard, Inc., 202 Kan. 582, 451 P.2d 506 (Kan.1969)
(holding that a feed lot who contracted to purchase silage from a farmer was not the statutory
employer of the farmer's employee who was injured during delivery of the silage); Doyle v.
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Missouri Val. Constructors, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 121 (D. Colo. 1968) (holding that Missouri Valley
Constructors who purchased concrete from a Vendor was not the statutory employer of the
vendor's employee who was injured during delivery of the concrete); Garrett v. Tubular Prods.,
Inc., 176 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Va. 1959) (holding that Tubular Products who purchased steel
columns from a manufacturer was not the statutory employer of the manufacturer's employee
who was injured during delivery of the steel columns).
Potentially millions of online purchases occur every day in this country. Consider a
hypothetical where an office manager of ABC Inc. purchases a stapler online from Amazon, and
Amazon contracts with UPS to deliver the stapler. Does the mere fact that Amazon agreed to
deliver the stapler instead of requiring that the office manager personally pick it up convert this
contract for the sale of goods into a contract for services within the IWCA definition of
"employer", and thereby automatically make ABC Inc. the statutory employer of the UPS
delivery person? The obvious answer is "no." A contract for the sale of goods with ancillary
delivery remains a contract for the sale of goods and not a contract for services for purposes of
the definition of"employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a).
If this were not the case, ABC Inc. as the statutory employer in this hypothetical would
be automatically obligated to provide workers compensation insurance to every delivery person,
and ABC Inc. would be immune from any tort liability to every delivery person under LC. § 72223(1). This would obligate every business purchaser of delivered goods to pay for workers
compensation insurance for the delivery person or alternatively demand a certificate of insurance
from the delivery person. This would also make every business purchaser liable for workers
compensation benefits for every injury to every delivery person regardless of where the injury
took place so long as the injury occurred at some point along the many miles-long path of
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delivery of the goods. This would also allow every business purchaser of delivered goods to
avoid liability with impunity for the purchaser's own tortious conduct toward the delivery
person. 1 And, this would require that workers compensation sureties collect premiums for the
delivery persons as additional statutory employees which would be impossible to
administratively manage.
Holding that all delivery persons are statutory employees of the recipient of the delivery
would impermissibly stretch the IWCA, its definition of "employer," and its statutory employer
immunity far beyond the intent of the law and the limits of reason. No Idaho legislator or citizen
would expect to be a statutory employer of a delivery person with the corresponding statutory
obligations under the IWCA simply because they ordered an item from Amazon or other
merchant and had it delivered. "The rule that the mere recipient of [delivered] goods is not a
statutory contractor makes a great deal of sense. To apply workers' compensation statutes to the
ordinary sale of merchandise would significantly disrupt and change commerce and business
dealings." Davis, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 787-88.
It would be contrary to the underlying purposes of the IWCA and the intent of the Idaho
legislature to characterize a contract for the sale of goods with ancillary delivery as a contract for
services for purposes of the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a) and immunity
under LC. § 72-223(1). As a matter of law, a contract for the sale of goods with ancillary

1

Although TRC is arguing that it is a statutory employer, TRC may not be pleased to learn that,
as a statutory employer of all delivery persons, it would be liable for workers compensation
benefits for all injuries to those delivery persons regardless of where the injury took place, even
if the injury took place 100 miles away from TRC' s place of business, so long as the injury
occurred at some point along the path of delivery. IfTRC's argument were accepted in this case,
it would expose TRC and other business purchasers to significantly more liability in the future.
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delivery is not a contract for services for purposes of the definition of "employer" under LC. §
72-102(13)(a) and immunity under LC. § 72-223(1).
B.

The contract upon which TRC relies is a contract for the sale of goods which does
not satisfy the defmition of "employer" under I.C. § 72-102(13)(a) or the
requirements for immunity under I.C. § 72-223(1).
The undisputed evidence in this case reveals a contract for the sale ofgoods at the core of

TRC's alleged chain of contracts. Under applicable law, a contract for the sale of goods with
ancillary delivery is still a contract for the sale of goods and not a contract for services. The
undisputed material facts are as follows.
It is undisputed that TRC entered into a contract with non-party Brown Strauss for the

purchase of more than 43,000 pounds of steel tubing. Complaint ,r 7; Answer, Third Defense,

,r

7. Brown Strauss's invoice # 803034 indicates that TRC's order was placed on January 12,
2018. It consisted of twenty-seven (27) pieces of steel tubing of various dimensions. The total
weight of the tubing was 43,236.2 pounds. The purchase price was $25,857.84. The invoice
further indicates that the order was shipped from Brown Strauss to TRC's facility in Idaho Falls,
Idaho on January 19, 2018. The invoice does not identify the carrier transporting the shipment.
However, Brown Strauss was responsible for payment of the shipping costs as the invoice
specifies that the shipment was "F.O.B. DELIVERED." Roche Aff., ,r 3 and Exh. 2.
It is also undisputed that Brown Strauss hired Jay Transport to haul the shipment from

Fontana, California to TRC's facility in Idaho Falls. Complaint ,r 7; Answer, Third Defense, ,r 7.
In tum, Jay Transport assigned the hauling of the shipment to Dale Kelly. Complaint, ,r 8;
Answer, Third Defense,
shipment. Roche Aff.,

,r 8.
,r 4

Jay Transport billed Brown Strauss $1,850 for transporting the

and Exh. 3. Such represents 7% of the total invoice charges for

TRC's purchase of steel tubing.
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TRC's purchase order and Brown Strauss's invoice unambiguously reveal a contract for
the sale of goods with ancillary delivery which as a matter of law is not a contract for services
under the first sentence of the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a). Because the
purchase agreement is not a contract for services under the definition of "employer" under I. C. §
72-102(13)(a), TRC is not entitled to immunity under LC. § 72-223(1), regardless of TRC's
alleged status as a contractor, subcontractor, proprietor or business operator. TRC's MSJ must be
denied.

C.

The appellate decisions relied upon by TRC are inapplicable, because they concern
contracts for services and not contracts for the sale of goods.
The appellate decisions relied upon by TRC in its Memorandum m Support are

distinguishable and should be disregarded, because each decision relies upon contracts for
services and not contracts for the sale of goods.
TRC cites Gonzales v. Lamb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120, 124 P.3d 996 (2005), and

Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 108 P.3d 392 (2005). Each case involved a
contract for waste hauling services. The truck driver employee in each case was injured while
providing the waste hauling services. The truck driving was not ancillary to a contract for the
sale of goods.

D.

Snow v. Intermoutain Erectors Inc. is not binding precedent.
Defendant also cites a 2009 district court decision in Snow v. Intennountain Erectors,

Inc. While the court concluded the purchaser of steel was a statutory employer, and thereby
immune from a negligence suit by the delivery driver injured while delivering the steel to the
purchaser's construction site, this decision was not appealed. As a result, the decision is not
binding precedent and has limited persuasive value. Without being privy to the facts of Snow, or
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to all of the parties' arguments, it suffices to say that Judge Anderson did not have the benefit of
Mr. and Mrs. Kelly's points and authorities set out in parts A and B above.
Moreover, it appears that Judge Anderson misunderstood or misapplied Spencer v.
Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000), which he discussed at length in his
Snow decision at pages 7 through 11.

Spencer involved a contract for logging services.

Schilling, who owned timber land, entered in a contract with Weyerhaeuser. Under the contract
Weyerhaeuser agreed to pay Schilling to harvest the timber and deliver the same to
Weyerhaeuser's mill. Schilling, in tum hired Allpress Logging to cut the timber and deliver it to
Weyerhaeuser' s mill. Allpress then hired Spencer to help with the harvesting services. Spencer
was severely injured when performing that work.

Since neither Schilling nor Allpress had

worker's compensation insurance, Spencer filed a worker's compensation complaint against
Weyerhaeuser claiming that it was his statutory employer and thereby liable to provide him with
worker's compensation benefits. The Industrial Commission ultimately ruled that Weyerhaeuser
was not liable as statutory employer.
On appeal the Idaho Supreme reversed, holding that Weyerhaeuser was Spencer's
statutory employer since "Weyerhaeuser was contracting with Schilling for logging the pine on
the property" and Schilling had hired a subcontractor who had not complied with the worker's
compensation provisions. Id. 134 Idaho at 861, 11 P.3d at 480.
Judge Anderson, when comparing the salient facts of Spencer and Snow on page 9 of the
decision, omitted the key fact, as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, that "Weyerhaeuser was
contracting with Schilling for logging the timber." In contrast, Snow involved a contract to
purchase goods, with ancillary delivery.
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Judge Anderson also overlooked the significance of the need for a contract for services in
the statutory employer analysis when referencing Gonzales and Venters on page 11 of the
decision.

("The Worker's Compensation Act's definition of an employer includes a person

and/or entity that hires another person to deliver materials to a job site, particularly materials
fabricated for use on the job to which the materials were delivered. See Gonzales; Venters.") As
previously explained in part C above, Gonzales and Venters both involved contracts for waste
hauling services. The truck driver employee in each case was injured while providing the waste
hauling services. The truck driving was not ancillary to a contract for the sale of goods.
It should also be noted that Judge Anderson attached special significance to the fact that
the steel involved in Mr. Snow's injury was being delivered to the construction jobsite for which
the steel was specially fabricated. Mem. Dec. p. 11. Such is different from the facts in this case.
Mr. Kelly was delivering the steel to TRC's fabrication facility in Idaho Falls. TRC purchased
the steel for its eventual use on the McCain Foods construction project in Burley, Idaho. Roche
Aff., ,r,r 2-3,6 and Exhs. 1-2, 5; B. Nordstrom Dep., pp. 17-18.
For all of the above reasons, Plaintiffs urge the Court to reject TRC's argument that the

Snow decision is binding or persuasive authority, and should be followed in this case.
E.

Schuler v. Battelle Energy Alliance is persuasive authority.
Moreover, if the Court is inclined to consider trial court decisions, then U.S. Magistrate

Judge Candy W. Dale's recent decision in Schuler v Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, is more
instructive. Judge Dale's decision is attached to the affidavit of counsel as Exhibit 6. Like this
case, Mr. Schuler was a truck driver injured while making a delivery of purchased goods. The
delivery was made at the INL site. In a Summary Judgment Decision issued June 12, 2019,
Judge Dale ruled that BEA was not a Category 1 or Category 2 statutory employer of Mr.
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Schuler and therefore BEA was not immune from Mr. Schuler's negligence claims.

Judge

Dale's decision, at page 11, noted that "BEA concedes that, if the contract was a contract for
goods, the statutory employer defense would not apply." (Emphasis added.) Judge Dale also
adopted the "predominant factor" test advocated by Schuler for use in determining when a
contract that provides for both goods and services is properly considered a contract for goods or
a contract for services. Such test requires a court to consider the contract in its entirety. Id. p.
12.
While Judge Dale, at page 19 of the decision, agreed with BEA's argument that the
predominant factor of the contract at issue in Schuler, which incorporated the terms of an
extensive Atomic Power Laboratory Requirements Document, was a contract for services, such
does not diminish the significance of the concession by BEA' s defense counsel set out above.
In contrast to the contract at issue in Schuler, TRC's contract with Brown Strauss is a
straight-forward contract for the purchase of goods. Delivery was merely incidental or ancillary
to the purchase. Such is not a close question. Based on her analysis in Shuler, if presented with
facts like those of this case, Judge Dale would rule that the contract predominately was one for
the purchase of goods, making inapplicable the statutory employer defense.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Judge Dale's decision in Schuler is persuasive authority
in support of Plaintiffs' opposition to TRC' s MSJ.

F.

TRC is neither a Category 1 or Category 2 statutory employer of Dale Kelly under
I.C. § 72-102(13)(a) and is therefore not immune under I.C. § 72-223(1).
Immunity under LC. § 72-223(1) as either a Category 1 or Category 2 statutory employer

1s contingent upon the defendant satisfying the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72-

102(13)(a), which requires an unbroken chain of contracts for services. At the core of the chain
of contracts relied upon by TRC is its contract for the purchase of goods from Brown Strauss.
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As a matter of law, TRC does not fall within the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72102(13)(a), because this contract was not a contract for services. Because TRC is not an
"employer" under LC. § 72-102(13)(a), TRC is not entitled to immunity under LC. § 72-223(1)
as either a Category 1 or Category 2 statutory employer.
TRC has argued that it is allegedly entitled to itmnunity under LC. § 72-223(1) simply
because it is an upstream contractor of Dale Kelly, dba Dale Kelly Trucking. However, as
explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Robison, that is not enough. There must also be an
unbroken chain of contracts for services within the definition of "employer" under LC. § 72l 02(13)(af Since an unbroken chain of contracts for services does not exist, TRC's attempt to fit
within Category 1 or Category 2 of LC. § 72-223(1) is irrelevant.
Additionally, with regard to TRC's Category 2 argument, a business can only be
Category 2 statutory employer if the work being carried out by the putative statutory employee is
the type of work that could have been carried out by employees of the owner or proprietor in the
course of its usual trade or business. Robison, 139 Idaho at 212, 76 P.3d at 956 (holding that
Fred Meyer was not the injured worker's Category 2 statutory employer because: (1) it was in
the business of retail sale of merchandise, not in the business of construction or roof installation;
(2) it did not employ individuals who were trained in building construction or roof installation;
and (3) it did not own materials or equipment necessary to engage in building construction or
roof installation).
Mr. Kelly was hired Jay Transport to haul the steel purchased by TRC from Brown
Strauss's facility in Fontana, California to TRC's facility in Idaho Falls. Mr. Kelly had no
responsibility for the unloading of his trailer. TRC has not presented any evidence that it had the
trucks and employees necessary to haul its purchases of steel products from businesses such as
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Brown Strauss for delivery to its fabrication facility in Idaho Falls. Likewise, TRC presented no
evidence that it used its trucks and employees to haul its purchases of steel products from
businesses such as Brown Strauss for delivery to its fabrication facility in Idaho Falls in the
ordinary course of its usual business. Accordingly, TRC cannot meet the test for Mr. Kelly's
Category 2 statutory employer. Such is in addition to Plaintiffs' primary argument that TRC
does not qualify as an "employer" since its contract with Brown Strauss was one predominantly
for the purchase of goods, not services.
With regard to TRC's argument that Mr. Kelly intervened in the unloading process, at
most, Mr. Kelly's conduct is applicable to the comparative fault defense asserted by TRC. It
does not make TRC his statutory employer, thereby barring his negligence claims.
G.

Mrs. Kelly's Loss of Consortium Claim Hinges on the Outcome of Mr. Kelly's
Negligence Claim.

TRC's motion also seeks dismissal of Mrs. Kelly's consortium claim based on its
statutory employer immunity arguments.
meritorious.

As demonstrated above, those arguments are not

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs concede that Mrs. Kelly's claim is derivative of her

husband's injury claim and that it cannot stand alone.

Therefore, if Mr. Kelly's claim is

dismissed on account of statutory employer immunity, then Mrs. Kelly does not oppose the
dismissal of her claim as well. The reverse is also true. If this Court denies TRC's MSJ on Mr.
Kelly's claim, TRC's MSJ on Mrs. Kelly's claim should be denied for the same reasons.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment be denied in its entirety.

It would also be appropriate for the Court to

dismiss with prejudice TRC's statutory employer affirmative defense.
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DATED this 30th day of October, 2019.
RACINE OLSON, PLLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of October, 2019, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
John A. Bailey, Jr.
Austin T. Strobel
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEYLLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83204

[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]

[ X]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - (208) 232-0150
Email-jbailey@hawleytroxell.com
Email - astrobel@hawleytroxell.com
iCourt

~

BRENT 0. ROCHE
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Electronically Filed
10/30/2019 2:53 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: John Frey, Deputy Clerk

Brent 0. Roche (ISB#2627)
Rachel A. Miller (ISB#8991)
RACINE OLSON, PLLP
P. 0. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109
brent@racineolson.com
rachel@racineolson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,

Case No. CVl0-18-7400
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT 0. ROCHE

Plaintiffs,

v.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC,
an Idaho Limited Liability Co.
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
County of Bannock )
Brent 0. Roche, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiffs Dale Kelly and Nancy Kelly in

this matter. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge and is submitted in opposition
to Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

Exhibit 1 attached hereto consists of a true and correct copy of an excerpt of

TRC's Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs' Third Set of Discovery Requests.

Exhibit 1

includes TRC's purchase order to Brown Strauss dated 1/12/18.
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3.

Exhibit 2 attached hereto consists of a true and correct copy of an e-mail

exchange between the parties' counsel on October 18, 2019. Exhibit 2 includes Mr. Bailey's
e-mail indicating that the attached invoice from Brown Strauss to TRC should be considered as
formal supplementation ofTRC's responses in this matter.
4.

Exhibit 3 attached hereto consists of a true and correct copy of an excerpt of

Plaintiffs' Responses to TRC's First Set of Discovery Requests. Exhibit 3 includes the subject
shipment documents then available to Plaintiffs. Such included the Bill of Lading, Master Load
Sheet, and invoice from Jay Transport Inc. to Brown Strauss Steel.
5.

Exhibit 4 attached hereto consists of a true and correct copy of an excerpt of Dale

Kelly's deposition taken on June 18, 2019.
6.

Exhibit 5 attached hereto consists of a true and correct copy of an excerpt of

Brian Nordstrom's deposition taken in this matter on June 19, 2019.
7.

Exhibit 6 attached hereto consists of a true and correct copy of the Memorandum

Decision and Order issued on June 12,2019 by Candy W. Dale, U.S. Magistrate Judge in Aaron
Schuler and Pamela Schuler, husband and wife, Plaintiffs v. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC,
Defendant, in Case No. 4:18-CV-00234-CWD, venued in the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho.
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DATED this 30th day of October, 2019.

BRENT 0. ROCHE

NOTARPlJBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at: ~-(1\i,~vv~\\t:,
Commission expires:

b-\°'-J..-'1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of October, 2019, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to the following persons as follows:
John A. Bailey, Jr.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEYLLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83204

[
[
[
[
[
[X

]
]
]
]
]
]

Austin T. Strobel
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEYLLP
2010 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - (208) 232-0150
Email-jbailey@hawleytroxell.com
Odyssey E-file & Serve

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - (208) 232-0150
Email - astrobel@hawleytroxell.com
Odyssey E-file & Serve

BRENT 0. ROCHE
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John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 233-2001
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150

Email: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com

Attorneys for Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT CQURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Co.

Case No.: CVl0-18 .. 7400
DEFENDANT TRC
FABRICATION, LLC'S ANSWERS.
AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, TRC FABRICATION, LLC, by and through counsel, and

pursuant to Rules 26, 33 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure answer and respond to
Plaintiffs' Third Set of Discovery Requests (hereinafter ~~Discovery Requests"), as set forth
below. To the extent that the definitions and instructions contained in Plaintiffs' requests conflict
with, vary from or add to the requirements of such rules~ the Defendant does hereby object to the
same and states that its answers hereto are made without regard to such definitions and
instructions.

DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION, LLC'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD
SET OF DISCOVERY -PAGE 1
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Hender at that time, however, the Defendant is unable to create or produce a copy of this video
as it is in a protected format that prevents copying,
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32:

Produce a copy of each forklift or

telehandler training video shown to John Hender after the subject incident, as well as any
documents, such as attendance sheets or tests, related to Mr. Bender's review of the video(s).
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32: The Defendant has no
knowledge of which video(s) Mr. Hender viewed after the subject incident as no specific records
were created related to that review.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33: Produce any documents pertaining to John
Hender' s resignation from employment at TRC Fabrication, LLC.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33: Objection as this request
seeks protected personnel documentation of a non-party. Without waiving said objections, and

subject to Defendant's proposed Protective Order, please see the attached records.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 34: Produce the Operator's Manual for the Gehl
telehandler being operated by John Hender at the time of the subject incident.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 34: Please see the attached
document.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 35: Produce TRC Fabrication's Purchase Order
Number 17038~25227 to Brown Straus [sic] Steel covering the steel tubing described in the Bill
of Lading attached as Exhibit 1.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 35: Objection as this request
is vague, overbroad and unduly burdensome. Without waiving said objections, and subject to
Defendant's proposed Protective Order, please see the attached records.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 36:

Produce all written communications

between your company and Brown Straus [sic] Steel related to your company's purchase.of the

DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION1 LLC'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF~s THIRD
SET OF DISCOVERY - PAGE 8
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steel tubing described in the Bill of Lading attached as Exhibit l ~ delivery of said shipment to
your facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho or the subject incident.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 36: Objection as this request

is vague, overbroad and unduly burdensome as the term written communication is vague, and as
this information has been requested, produced and discussed in depositions previously. Without
waiving said objections> see the Defendant's prior discovery responses.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37: Produce any safety manual in effect at TRC

Fabrication on January 22, 2018 covering its employees and truck drivers making deliveries to
the TRC Fabrication's facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37: Objection as this request

is vague, overbroad and unduly burdensome. The Defendant is not in possession or aware of any
such document that addresses our employees and truck drivers making deliveries to Idaho Falls.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 38: Produce all documents related to the truck

making the delivery to your facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho immediately after your employees

finished unloading the shipment delivered by Dale Kelly~ including, but not limited to, the
purchase order, bill of lading, and any documents identifying the driver, and his or her contact
information.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 38: The defendant is unable

to identify the vehicle in question. TRC' s records of this type are not retained in such a fashion·

that they are searchable for such a request. As a result, after a diligent search, the Defendant is
unable to determine which, if any records, are responsive to this request.

DATED this

Zit day ofJuly, 2019.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

isl John A. Bailey Jr.
JOHN A. BAILEY JR.
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VERIFICATION
Mark Shel1, being first duly sworn upon oath~ deposes and says:
Thatheis CL

Mtwtber

of the Defendant in the above-entitled action, that

he has read the within and foregoing Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC's Answers and Responses

to Plaintiffs t Third Set ofDiscovery~ and that the statements therein. contained are true.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville
I,

)
) ss.
)

f!J i\J'ik,h~
. , Notruy Public, do hereby certify on this
19, _personaly appeared before me Mark Shell; who, being me first duly

~day of July,

that

a

by

sworn, declared that he is (1. M6tDb-e,c of the Defendant in the foregoing action) that he
signed the foregoing document, and that the statements therein contained are true.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Pub
Residing at-L-.L.!.1~·~ 1 - - - . . . . . . - - - + - - - . My commission
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TRC FABRICATION, LLC
1546 N 25th E
Idaho Falls, fD

25227

i. Please send _ _ copies of your Invoice.
2. Order Is to be entered In acoordance with prices, delivery and specifications shown above.
3, !~otlfy us lmmadlately II you are unable to ship as specified.

TRC0223 ~~f
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Brent Roche
John A. Bailey Jr. <JBailey@hawleytroxell.com>
Friday, October 18, 2019 3:57 PM
Brent Roche
RE: Kelly v. TRC Fabrication [IWOV-IMANAGE.FID1008073]
image007.png; image008.png; image009.png; image01 0.png; image011.png;
image012.png; image013.png; image014.png; image015jpg; image016.png;
image001 jpg; JohnBailey_20191018_ 143831.pdf

From:

Sent:
To:

Subject:
Attachments:

Attached are two pages of the Brown Strauss Invoice for the Kelly shipment. The third page is a sheet of terms that
currently comes with Brown Strauss invoices. A Terms of Sale sheet was not attached to this invoice, but on the off
chance that one was used then, and became separated, I am producing this current version of their terms. Please
consider this a formal supplementation of our discovery responses in this matter.
JOHN A. BAILEY
Partner
Main 208.233.2001
fax 208.232.0150
email jbailey@hawleytroxell.com

HAWLEY TROXELL
Attorneys and Counselors

Member

•

I
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains
informatior:i that may be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable
law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for
delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or
reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 208.344.6000 if you have received
this message in error, and delete the message.

-J,

Please consider the environment before printing this email.

From: Brent Roche [mailto:brent@racineolson.com]

Sent: Friday, October 18, 2019 1:36 PM
To: Becky Davis
Cc: John A. Bailey Jr.
Subject: RE: Kelly v. TRC Fabrication [IWOV-IMANAGE.FID1008073]

John - Thanks for the quick response. I confirmed that the PO was included in your documents produced. Sorry for
overlooking it. However, it doesn't appear complete as it contains the notation "See Attachment" and none was
provided. Also, I was expecting that the PO would specify the steel tubing that TRC was purchasing. TRC0223 does not
contain any specifics of what TRC was buying. It does contain references to 9 separate INVs. If those were the
attachments, then we request that they be produced in response to RFP 35. If they weren't the attachments referenced
on the PO, then the INVs or other correspondence specifying the steel tubing TRC wanted to purchase, and the terms of
1
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such purchase, would be within the scope of RFP 36. Please advise if you have and will produce additional responsive
documents. Thanks.

Brent 0. Roche
Partner

RA,CINE OLSON
201 E. Center Street/ P.0. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
(208)232-6101- Phone
(208)232-6109 - Fax
www.racinelaw.net

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE - This email and its attachments may contain information that is confidential, privileged, or
otherwise protected from disclosure. If you believe this email may have been sent to you in error, please notify the sender
immediately.
From: Becky Davis <BDavis@hawleytroxell.com>
Sent: Friday, October 18, 2019 12:14 PM
To: Brent Roche <brent@racineolson.com>
Cc: John A. Bailey Jr. <JBailey@hawleytroxell.com>
Subject: Kelly v. TRC Fabrication [IWOV-IMANAGE.FID1008073]
Attached please find a reply to your meet and confer letter. Please let John know if you have any questions.

BECKY DAVIS
Paralegal
direct 208.233.2001
fax 208.232.0150
email bdavis@hawleytroxell.com

HAWLEY TROXELL
Attorneys and Counselors

II

rm

This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains
information that may be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable
law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or agent responsible for
delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or
reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 208.344.6000 if you have received
this message in error, and delete the message.

~

Please consider the environment before printing this email.
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This email has been scanned for spam and viruses by Proofpoint Essentials. Click here to report this email as
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Invoice #
803034
Invoice Date
01/19/18
Order#
37656
Order Date
01/12/18
Release #
00*00
Page #
Page 1 of 2

P.O. Box 16450
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
801-972-5328
( S0L0TO:

)

( SHIPTO:

TRC FABRICATION(FlSHER)
MCCAIN FOODS #2
1546 N 25TH E
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401-2300

~

TEST REPORTS
3-24-1
All Claims- for Shortage,
Damage, or Errors must
) be
made within 5 days
of Receipt of Material.

TRC FABRICATION LLC
1546 N 25TH E
lDAHO FALLS ID 83401
SHIPVIA: CC

Cu.stomex Ordered
By
Number

67161
:Item
No.
800843

NEFI

Qty

Customer

SLM

P.O.
1703~:-2.15227;

#
315

Description

Ord

l BX 4 X 3/16 RECT TUBE

F.O.B.

PREPAID

DELIVERED

X

COLL. Date Shipped
01/19/18

Quantity

Weight

Length Pcs

Shipped

ooc

:1

697.4

44.000

B

26868 • .2

48 .•

1/2 OF 1% 10 ~NET 30

)
....

Price

Per

Amount

828.00

en

397,44
16.00

352.0C 4576.00

CF'l

161107.52

48 .0(

PROCESSING CHARGE
1 PC 22' 6 7/8 MK 3020
1 PC 22 1 6 '7/sn MK 3068
8 10 SQ 5/8 TUBE ASOOB
PROCESSING CHARGE
l PC 41 t 3 1/8 11 MK 3002
1 PC 41 1 0 1/8 11 MK 3003
1 PC 41 1 3 1/2 11 MK 3004
1 PC 41 1 3 1/8 11 MK 3005
l PC 41 1 3 1/8 11 MK 3006
1 PC 41 1 3 1/2 11 MK 3007
1 PC 40 1 4 5/8 11 MK 3008
1 PC 40 1 5 11 MK 3009

l

Terms

11

801000

800806

1 8 SQ 3/8 TUBE ASOOB

144.0C

44 •. OOC

1

1658.4

44.0C .2148.00

CF'I

PROCESSING CHARGE
1 pc
800806

16.0C

22' 2 3/4 MK 3369

1 pd 21 1 6 1/4 MK 3378
1 8 SQ 3/8 TUBE ASOOB
PROCESSING CHARGE
pc 23 1 0 5/8 MK 3371
1 pc 20' 6 3/4 MK 3377
1 8 SQ 3/8 TUBE ASOOB
PROCESSING CHARGE

44.00C

1

1658.4

44.0C 2148.00

CF'I

sopso6

l pc
1 pc

40.000

1

1507.6

40.00 214S. 00

CF'.!

859,20
Hi.00

44.00C

1

1658.4

44.0C 2148.00

CF'I

945.12

21' 2 l/4 MK 3375

18

1 1 1/4 MK 3374
1 8 SQ 3/B TUBE A500B

PROCESSING CHARGE
800806

1 pc 24' 4 1/4 MK 3373
1 pc 18l 3 1/4 MK 3372
i 8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B

16.00
44 ..000

1

1658.4

44.0C 2148.00

CF'l

945,12
16.00

44.000

l

16"58.4

44.0C 2148.00

CF'I

945.12

PROCESSING CHARGE
1 pc
1 pa

800806

800865

945.12

16.0C

+

800806

.945.12

20' 2 7/8 MK 3376

20 1 2 3/4 MK 3368
1 B SQ 3/8 TUBE ASOOB
PROCESSING CHARGE
1 pc 20 1 2 3/8 MK 3370
1 pc 19 1 9 l/4 MK 3367
2 8 X 6 X 5/16 RE!CT TUBE
PROCESSING CHARGE
1 l?C 17 1 7 5/8 11 MK 3360
1 l?C 22' 0 5/8 11 MK 3362
1 l?C 17 1 7 13/6" MK 3361

16.00
40.00C

2

2207 -~

BO.CC 1572. 00

CF'!

1,257.60
40.00

\.

1-1/2% MONTHLY CHARGE, NOT TO
SXCEED MAXIMUM LAWFUL CHARGE,
)NALL ACCOUNTS PAST DUE.

PROCESSING

CHARGES

INVOICE PEDUCT

WEIGHT

IF PAID
BY

Invoice
Continuecl
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~nvoipe
Continued

( Slll.•D TO~

67161
r

Item
No.

Qty
Ord

Invoice #

MCCAIN FOODS #2
1546 N 25TH E
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401 ..2300

Length l?cs

Description
1 PC 22 1

8 01000

J TRC FABRICATION(FISHER)

7/81! MK 3363
1 10 SQ 5/8 TUBE ASOOB
PROCESSING CHARGE
1 PC 42 1 0 1/8 11 MK 3051

Invoice Date 01/19/18
Page 2 of 2

Page #

Weight

Quantity
Price
Shipped

0

48.000

l

803034

3663. t

48.

oc

Per

4576.00

Amount

CF'I

2,196.48
18.00

f.-~~- ·: ~/ c~·::r~~;:~\TI.~:·.;.·=·-~i
Ib,H 2, ~t

,JH8

"'

1-.~:·{': ....---~-~--~,~-------~- -~,.-~,~="·

I..

1-1/2% MONTHLY CHARGE, NOT TO
lsXCEED MAXIMUM LAWFUL CHARGE1
:)NALL ACCOUNTS PAS'!' DUEL
18282

PROCESSING
CHARGES
314.00

INVOICE
DEDUCT
WEIGHT

. .

129.29 ·

43236.~ IF PAID 01/29/18
'BY

I

.! ,: : ::

..

'!_,.~

•.

...1

·-

25,857.84
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EXHIBIT NO. 3
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Brent 0. Roche (ISB#2627)
Rachel A. Miller (ISB#8991)
RACINE OLSON, PLLP
P. 0. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Fax: (208) 232-6109
bor@racinelaw.net
ram@racinelaw.net
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CVl0-18-7400
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION,
LLC'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS

TRC FABRICATION, LLC,
an Idaho Limited Liability Co.
Defendant.

Plaintiffs, Dale Kelly and Nancy Kelly, through counsel and pursuant to Rules 33 and 34
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby answer and respond to Defendant's First Set of
Discovery Requests to Plaintiffs as set forth below.
To the extent that the definitions and instructions contained in the Requests conflict with,
vary from or add to the requirements of such rules, Plaintiffs do hereby object to the same and
state that their answers hereto are made without regard to such definitions and instructions.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Name and identify the last known address and phone

number of each person who you will, or may, call as a fact or expert witness at the trial in this

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION, LLC'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - PAGE 1
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce each and every document or

thing which relates in any way your contention that Defendant TRC and/or its agent were at fault
or negligent in this matter.
RESPONSE: See the report of Jon E. Bready which is being produced.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce a true, correct, and complete

copy of!v1r. Kelly's personnel file(s) from any and all employment from 2008 through the
present.
RESPONSE:

Plaintiffs are producing Mr. Kelly's Driver's Qualifications file.

See

Kelly_00258-00287.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Please produce true and correct copies of

any and all filings made by any paiiy in any workmen's compensation action filed by or on
behalf of Mr. Kelly arising out of or related to the accident at issue in this lawsuit.
RESPONSE:

Objection, this Request seeks documents that are not relevant to this

personal injury action and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Without waiving these objections, Plaintiffs are producing the work comp complaint
and answer filed in Mr. Kelly's work comp proceedings. They are also producing Dr. Selznick's
impairment rating. See Kelly_00226-0023 3.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Produce your driver's log for the time

encompassing the trip for transporting the subject load to TRC, including at least thirty days
prior to the trip ending on January 22, 2018.
RESPONSE: Objection, this Request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. Without

waiving these objections, Plaintiffs are producing !v1r. Kelly's driver's log covering his
transportation of the shipment of steel tubing from Brown Strauss in Fontana, California on

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION, LLC'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS-PAGE 16
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January 19, 2018 through his delivery of the shipment at TRC Fab1ication LLC's facility in
Idaho Falls on January 22, 2018. See Kelly_00250-00253.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Please produce copies of any documents or

other tangible things establishing or otherwise related to the legal relationship between Jay
Transport and lvfr. Kelly. With this request, TRC seeks, among other things, the production of
any employment or independent contractor agreements between :M:r. Kelly and Jay Transport.
RESPONSE: The contract documents are being produced. See Kelly_00234-00244.

DATED this ./dL_day of February, 2019.
RACINE OLSON, PLLP

By:_/_·~-·
. . - '- - -vfki
'- -_ _ 9----"---'~---=---cc~==---__
BRENT 0. ROCHE

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION, LLC'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - PAGE 17
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Bannock )
DA~E KELLY, after first being duly sworn on oath, depose and state that he has read the
contents of the foregoing instrument; and that the facts therein stated are true to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
DATED this -14:._ day of February, 2019.

SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN TO before me this R_ day of February, 2019.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at: fl<:::ce- f ()_ lid
/
My Commission Expires: If ts;-

.

/a-.. Y

.

PLAJNTIFFS' RESPONSES TO DEFENpANT TRC FABRICA-TION, LLC'S FIRST SE'l;' OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - PAGE 18
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DOCUMENTS RE SUBJECT SHIPMENT
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In,

14970 JURUPA AVENUE
FONTANA, CA 923a5

909-350-9678
Fax: 909~350-9758

1546 N 25TH E

lDAHO FALLS,

37656*00*00*00
'

Cust#· 67161

Customer P . 0 . .
Number

Ordered
By

Line

01-PD

Order

Ship

Qty

Qty

1

1

208/542.-9600
Reques\ed

Date
Shipped

01f17l18

01/19/18

8

8

Bill of Lading: 37656*01

SatesRep: CAMERON 31

Print Date:
Print Time;
Carrier

freight

JAYTRANSP

Description

8

10

SQ

5/8

TUBE

MK

01-18-2018
06:39pm MT

Ship Site

24

Ship Zone

13

LOAD# 31191

Length

X 4 X 3/16 RECT TUBE
,<' l PC 22 11 6 7/8" MK 3020

X' 1 PC 22 6 7/8"
HT:· 1/RHEQ P46264
02-PD

1RC FABRICATION LLG
1546N25TH E
IDAHO FALLS
ID 83401

10 83401-2300

0'1te

NEFI

17038-25227

PAGE 1 of 2

SHIP TO~

SOLO TO:

TRC FABRICATION(FlSHER)
MCGAlN FOODS #2

STOP# 1

Welght

48.000

3068

A500B

1 PC 41 11 3 1/8''11 MK 3002
l PC 41 0 l/8 MK 3003
1 PC 41'1 3 1/2° MK 3004
1 PC 41 3 1/8" MK 3005'
1 PC 41 11 3 1/8" MK 3006

44.000

26,868.2

1 PC 41 3 l/2n MK 3007
1 PC 40'1 4 S/8 MK 3008
11

1 PC 40 5n MK 3009
HT: 4/REVT TE4589

2/RHRA 1714241

2/REVT TE6855

04-PD

1

1

3/8 TUBE A500B
)(1 pc 22'1 2 3/4 MK 3369
Xl pc 21 6 1/4 MK 3378
HT: 1/RHEQ P39320

44.000

~658._4

05-PD

1

1

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B
1(1 pc
23 • 0 5/8 MK 3371
~1 pc 20' 6 3/4 MK 3377

44.000

1,658.4

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE 1 A500B

40.000

8

SQ

HT; 1/RHEQ P39320
06-PD

07-PD

1

1

1

1

'1 pc 21 2 1/4 MK 3375
)(1 pc 18' 11/4 MK 3374
HT: 1/RHEQ P39320
8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B

24' 4 1/4 MK 3373
18 1 3 1/4 MK 3372
HT; 1/RJPX F9723
)CL pc
X1 pc

f REC-HRS. 7 AM - 3 PM
j

ATTENTION DRtVER ~ ANY QUESTIONS
PLEASE CALL US AT: 909-350-9678

CUSTOMER SIGNATURE

I

MAX-LIFT 6000# FORKLIFT
UNLOAD

1,507 .. 6 .
~

44.000

1,658.4

Shipped Wgt

43,236.2

Invoiced Wgt

43,236.. 2

)

PREPAlD

.,...*PLEASE SIGN ALL PAGES***

Driver Signature

Kelly_00250
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pro~ovcr~µ ut ,if\~ pmuj1to, .,...,... •.,.._ .... ,- .. -

prup'-~tv. thal•<~r/ «tvire Lo l!c-~s~fo•n"',H,e1~•ruh<1 •l....it Ir:'. ~ubJ;i.:t lo.ltlha wndlilon, not prtr.110,,~~ u 1 ....., .. ,-~,., ! . .
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14970 JURUPA AVENUE
FONTANA, CA 92335

909~350-9678
Fax: 909-350-9758

tDAHO FALLS,

37656*00*00*00

,

Cust #: 67161

Customer P.O.

Ordered

Number

By

17038..25227

NEFl

Line

Order

Ship

Qty

Qty

PAGE 2 of 2

SHIP TO:

SOLD TO!

TRC FABRlCATtON LLC
1546 N25TH E

TRC FABRtCATION(FlSHER}
MCCAlN FOODS #2
1546 N25TH E

IDAHO FALLS

LAST PAGE

ID 83401

Bill of Lading; 37656*01

\D 83401-2300

208/542~9600
Date
Requested

SatesRep:

Date

Carrier

Freight

Shipped

01119118

. 01/17118

CAMERON 31

PREPAlD

JAYTRANSP

Print Date:

01-18~2018

Print Time:

06:39pm MT
24

13

08-PD

1

1

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE A500B
" l pc 20' 2 7 /8 MK 3376
X 1 pc 20' 2 3/4 MK 3368
HT: 1/RHEQ ?39320

44.000

09-PD

-1

1

8 SQ 3/8 TUBE 1 A5O0B

44.000

10-PD

2

2

X 1 pc 20 2 3/8 MK 3370
_xl pc 19' 9 1/4 MK 3367
HT: 1/RHEQ P39320

40.000

7 s;sn MK 3360
l
O 5/BH MK 3362
)(1 PC 17' 7 13/6" MK 3361
J(l PC 22' 0 7 /8n MK 3363
PC 17
Xl PC 22

Weight

1,658.4
,,.,.....

1,658.4
I"

8 X 6 X 5/16 RECT TUBE

xi

STOP# 1

LOAD# 31191

Length

Description

-..,

Ship .Site .

Ship Zone

1

~·

2,207.2

~

HT: 2/QXFA SP82503

11-PD

1

1

10

5/8 TUBE A500B
1 PC 42' 0 l/8 MK 3051
HT: 1/RGQK 1713396
SQ

48.000

11

3,663.8

.....

,

1/ REC ..HRS. 7 AM - 3 PM
ATTENTlON DRIVER- ANY QUESTlONS
PLEASE CALL US AT: 909·350-9678

{
~AX-•UFT 6000# FORKLIFT
'UNLOAD

;-;f(/11/~
l'~r~~~

)

LAST PAGE

Shipped Wgt

43,236.2

Invoiced Wgt

43,236.2

A

CUSTOMER SIGNATURE
'AttPLEASE SIGN ALL PAGES~""

PREPAID

( Signature of consignor.)

Driver Signature

Kelly_00251
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----------~__......---.."' Page#

MASTER LOAD SHEET

...

Load#

\

14970 Jurupa Avenue
Fontana, CA 92335
909/350·9678
FAX~ 909:..350-9758

Ship From:
Ship To:

Page 1 of 1

Print Date

01 ...1s..201a
10:14am

Print Time

31191

. Ship.Date
Shlp Via

L.A. FONTANA
ldaho

01/19!1'8

Arranged By

Lon est t..en: 48~000
Stop Sales

Order

1

ao
g

Plck
Tkt

37656 00 01

Customer

TRC FABRfCATlON LLC

I
J

JAY TRANSPORT

To~I Wgt

Sub Zone:

I

43i236.2
JROBERT

City

tOAHOFALLS

18

48.000

43,236.2
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,,) '.[/(, H ,,,,«c},:'tt tJ"tS: J::} 0 y·"·t

y

5C/3 ;V, 406,2. £

R;gbg.,

l.O 8344:Z

Phone: 208-523-5134

Fax: 208-545-7883

13 roWVt Strauss Steel
PO Box :Lb450

Salt La.ke Cit!.j, UT

841--1-h-0450

CA., FONTANA

\f\AOU Ull

Need t/tte, ov-i9iV\.als

•

r

lVt\/OrCe

;,~-t.~ 39979

ID., IDAHO FALLS

\\'l)-. c;r·

Truck
DKT-1 CT

t)crb~,

1/22/2018

Load Date

Billing & Reference Numbers

Terms

1/19/2018

LO/-\J)::lf; :5 J,.,~f.- Cf 1-

Nct10

WT/Ml/QU

1

TRUCK
DKT-1

DESCRIPTION
T/L PRODUCT CA TO ID

RATE
1,,850.00

AMOUNT

1,850.00

d1
Kelly_00253 ~·
<;::;L.~::.
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EXHIBIT NO. 4
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Dale Kelly
June 18, 2019

Kellyv.
TRC Fabrication

Page 64

Page 62

Q. So, that would be the question you would ask?
A. Yeah.
3
Q. Okay. Do you recall any specific instance
4
where you sought or you were given any specific
5
information or instruction about the characteristics of
6 this steel?
7
A. Not any specific incident, but I've asked a
8
lot of questions over my career.
9
Q. I'm sure. But just trying to narrow the -1o
A. I don't know how you can narrow that one down
11 because -12
Q. Just trying to narrow it to this type of load,
13 to this type of steel.
14
A. Nope.
15
Q. Have you handled and transported tube steel
16 before?
17
A. Yes, I have.
10
Q. And how often would you transport or handle
19 tube steel?
2o
A. I usually have some tube steel on every load I
21 haul out of Brown Strauss -22
Q. You -23
A. -- one size or another.
24
Q. Do you haul out of any other fabricator's?
25
A. We haul out of Searing out of Cheyenne, and
1
2

which would happen ifit shifted, so ...
Q. You were employed by Jay as a regular
3
employee, correct?
4
A. After the accident.
5
Q. That's the accident with the elk?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. And that was for, you say, about five weeks?
8
A. Correct.
9
Q. What were the terms of your employment then?
1o
A. As far as what? Just -- I was just an
11 employee.
12
Q. Okay. And how were you paid?
13
A. By the mile.
14
Q. When did you work and how often did you work?
15 What was -- what were the terms?
16
A. I worked five weeks while my truck was in the
17 shop.
10
Q. Did you work every day?
19
A. Pretty much. Pretty close.
20
Q. What hours did you work? DOT hours?
21
A. DOT hours.
22
Q. Okay. That's all going to be in your log
23
book?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q. And how much were you paid a mile?
1

2

Page 63

that's tube steel. That has to be tarped. Off the top
of my head, I can't think of any others that I do
3
regularly.
4
Q. Did you learn any -- in your on-the-job
5
training, so to speak, and experience, did you learn any
6
specific things about safe loading or safe unloading
7
methods with regard to this type of steel?
8
A. As far as my end goes?
9
Q. As far as your end goes.
1o
A. I don't even know how to answer that question
11 because I'm not doing the unloading.
12
Q. You're responsible for the unloading, correct?
13
A. No.
14
Q. That's not what your agreements say, what
15 you're telling me?
16
A. I'm not responsible to unload it, no.
17
Q. Okay.
18
A. I'm responsible to make sure they don't damage
19 my equipment. I'm responsible to make sure that, you
20 know, they don't hurt me to the best ofmy ability. But
21 I don't unload it, so I don't -- I don't know why that's
22 phrased that way.
23
My responsibility is once the load's on the
24 trailer, I tie it down and make sure it's secure. And
25 when I untie it, make sure it doesn't fall off on me,

Page 65

1

1

2

2

Min-U-Script®

3
4
5

6
7
8
9

A. Forty-one cents, I think is what it was.
Q. Roughly the same you would net as an
owner/operator?
A. No.
Q. What's the difference?
A. Well, I'd have to sit down and figure it all
up. I need my economist to tell me what my actual
personal income was because I'm a sole proprietor, so I
pay tax on everything that I don't get to write off,

so ...
Q. How does 41 cents measure up to what you would
12 on average receive as an owner/operator?
13
A. About half.
14
Q. Did you get loads from Jay the same way you
15 did when you were working as an owner/operator?
16
A. I would receive loads the same way. I just
17 didn't have the option to turn it down.
10
Q. Okay. Dispatched the same way?
19
A. Correct.
2o
Q. Use the same paperwork and documents as when
21 you're working as an owner/operator?
22
A. Except for the delivery receipt. It says "Jay
23
Transport" on it.
24
Q. Make the same trips basically, the same kind
2s of customers?

10

11

M & M Court Reporting Service
(208)345-9611(ph) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-8800(fax)
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Dale Kelly
June 18, 2019

Kellyv.
TRC Fabrication
Page 66

A. Exactly the same stuff.
Q. Now, were you covered by Jay's work comp or
3
your own work comp during that time?
4
A. During that time, I would have been covered by
5
his.
6
Q. Did you void your coverage for that -- or
7
suspend your coverage for that five weeks?
a
A. No, I didn't.
9
Q. Performed the same services exactly?
10
A. Exactly.
11
Q. So in your view, you're not responsible for
12 the unloading. You don't supervise the unloading and
13 loading of your vehicle?
14
A. As far as getting the load lined up on the
15 truck, make sure it's safe to tie down, that's as far as
16 I can tell you I help load because I don't run the
17 machines. And as far as unloading, it's ldnd of out of
18 my control.
19
Q. Okay. Why is that?
2o
A. Because I'm not running the machine. I
21 don't -22
Q. Same as when you're loading?
23
A. Right.
24
Q. Okay. Y,ou approved the way it was loaded on
2s this particular load?
1
2

Page 68

Q. This was loaded in their outdoor yard?
A. Correct.
3
Q. The steel was not bundled; is that correct?
4
A. It wasn't banded, no.
5
Q. It wasn't banded anywhere -6
A. No.
7
Q. -- on any part?
a
A. No.
9
Q. Didn't you find that to be unusual?
10
A. No, sir.
11
Q. And why not?
12
A. Because it's common practice to load them that
13 way, unless, like, half ofit would have been to another
14 stop, they might bundle smaller units together to keep
15 them tied up.
16
But as a rule, especially on a one drop, they
17 don't -- they don't band them unless there's smaller
18 pieces they need to keep in there. And I think all of
19 those were 20-foot, 21-foot, 30-foot lengths, so ...
2o
Q. And you secured the load afterwards after it
21 was loaded?
22
A. Correct.
23
Q. How did you do that?
24
A. Well, seeing how it's all tubing, I used
25
nothing but straps because I don't have to worry about
1

2

Page 67

A. Absolutely because I knew I could tie it down
and ship it safely.
3
Q. And you supervised that loading?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. And you supervised the unloading here at TRC,
6
correct?
7
A. No. I just stood back. I was at the tail end
8
of my trailer when he started. So, once everything's
9
untied, it's ldnd.of out of my control on how much he
10 picks up.
11
Q. When this load was loaded at Brown Strauss,
12 what equipment did they use to load this specific load
13 that's involved in this lawsuit?
14
A. Really big forklifts.
15
Q. Okay. One or more than one?
16
A. They were able to do -- because they put the
17
first layer on with one forklift and the second layer on
18 with one forklift.
19
Normally they use two. But the bottom layer
2 o was only half the load and, therefore, it picks up the
21 whole load if they need to. So they're pretty -- pretty
2 2 powerful.
23
So, once again, I just had to line up the
24 bottom to make sure it was square on my trailer, and
25
then they put the next layer on top.
1

2

lVHn-U-Script®

Page 69

the straps getting cut because the tubes are round' -- or
rounded comers. Gut wrap the bottom layer on the ends,
3
which is the bottom first layer, so none of that can
4
move. Wrap the loose stuff. You take your strap over,
5
back under, and back over, so that becomes a band. Any
6 time you have tubing that you have the possibility of
7
something coming out of the center, you'll squeeze it
8
together just like a banding. They didn't band it, so I
9
did just with a strap.
10
Q. Banded with the nylon straps.
11
A. Correct. And that's common practice also. It
12 just gives you more security going down the road that
13
something's not coming out of the middle.
14
Q. Okay. And so you would cinch them all up
15 together and -- with the nylon straps?
16
A. Right.
17
Q. And you loop it over it twice?
18
A. Yeah. You go over, under, around your
19 dunnage, and then back over and then to your winch, so
2 o when you tighten it up, it pulls it in. It tightens up
21 the inside stuff. Because you never know how tight a
22
group is even on a banded one. If you look at a banded
23
one, you think: "That one in the middle doesn't look
24 right," you're going to crank down on it, so .._..
25
Q. No dunnage in between the individual pieces or
1

2

M & M Court Reporting Service
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Dale Kelly
June 18, 2019

Kellyv.
TRC Fabrication

Page 72

Page 70

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8

9

10

11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23

24
25

groups of pieces?
A. No. They just have the dunnage between the
short ones, which was the bottom layer, dunnage, and
then the bigger group.
Q. Do you remember how many pieces were in each
group?
A. I think there was eight or nine on the bottom.
We have it written down somewhere. And 20 -- I think
there was 20 pieces on that other unit. I'd have to go
back and look at the bill oflading. It's all on the
bill of lading, the actual amount.
Q. The yard at Brown Strauss in Fontana is not
paved, correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Let me ask it this way: Do you understand
that you're responsible for the load until it's fully
unloaded and all delivered?
A. Once it's on the machine, I'm not responsible
for it anymore.
Q. What's your basis for that conclusion?
A. Because it's no longer on my truck.
Q. Okay. Anything else that leads you to that
conclusion?
A. No, that's it.
(Exhibit No. 4 marked.)

1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9

10

11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23

24
25

Q. (BY MR. BAILEY) Thanlc you. That's exactly
what I was going to have you explain.
And you agreed to the terms of these
documents, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I want to visit with you about the
unloading process and the accident itself here.
So you've not made any prior deliveries to
TRC?
A. That is correct.
Q. Have you had any incidents or situations where
while unloading steel some of the steel fell off the
truck or fell off the unloading equipment?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And how many times has that happened on loads
that you have been hauling?
A. Not very often.
Q. But it has happened?
A. It has happened.
Q. Something you're aware of could happen?
A. Always aware it could happen.
Q. Is it fair to say that in the unloading
process especially with forklifts or things like that
where you don't have the entire load wrapped up in
chokers or something like that, there's always a risk
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Q. (BY MR. BAILEY) What I'm next handing you is
1
Deposition Exhibit 4, and I understand this to be the
2
bill of lading and other related documents for this
3
4
delivery.
5
Would you look those over and tell me if I'm
right on that, and tell me if that's -6
7
A. This would be the bill of lading.
Q. There's several pages there.
8
A. Yeah. The master load sheet comes with every
9
1o
load.
11
Q. It looks like there's an overlay on that third
or fourth page there of another document at the bottom.
12
13
Next to the last page.
14
A. Yeah, that's my delivery receipt.
Q. And then the last page is what?
15
A. This would be their billing information that I
16
17
never see.
Q. Okay. So you don't see that.
18
A. They sent this over for you guys.
19
Q. Okay. You don't see that, and you don't carry
2o
that with you when you're handling the delivery?
21
A. I do not. Just this one, this one, and this
22
one.
23
MR. ROCHE: Everything but the last page.
24
25
THE WITNESS: Everything but the last page.
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that the load is going to fall or is going to separate
and conie apart?
A. Always that risk.
Q. Okay. And you knew that from early on in your
trucking career, I'm assuming?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Tell me about arriving here at TRC and where
you first stopped and what you did when you first
brought the load in.
A. I stopped down just before the gate at the
edge of the fence, and I don't remember who I talked to
the first time. But I met somebody coming across the
parking lot. I can't remember who it was. And I can't
remember because it's been so long ifl gave him the
paperwork or if I gave the forldift driver the
paperwork.
Q. Okay. And what do you remember about that
first stop? I understand the paperwork is fuzzy, but
what el.se do you remember about that first stop?
Anything?
A. Then they just had me pull up into the gate
area so they could come in from the side, had me untie
my load so they could unload it.
Q. Do you recall what you said to the first
fellow that you talked to?

M & M Court Reporting Service
(208)345-961l(ph) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-8800(fax)

(18) Pages 70 - 73

Page 134

Dale Kelly
June 18, 2019

Kellyv.
TRC Fabrication
Page 82

1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Did you tell the operator you were going to
remove the dunnage?
A. No.
Q. Nor how you were going to remove the dunnage,
I guess.
A. I did not.
Q. Is it true that you didn't need to remove the
dunnage in the manner in which you did?
A. I probably could have left it up there. I
just don't do that.
Q. You could have?
A. I could have.
Q. You could have climbed onto the trailer itself
and removed the dunnage, correct?
A. I try not to get on the trailer if I don't
have to.
Q. But the fact of the matter is there wasn't
anything that physically kept you from doing that,
climbing on the trailer, removing the dunnage from the
bed of the trailer?
A. No. Other than I had no reason to climb the
trailer because it was this high (indicating) just above
the trailer.
Q. You could have removed the dunnage from the
other side of the trailer, correct?
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Q. Ido.
A. You got the gate and you got the fence, both
sides. I was at the back of my trailer along the fence.
Q. Let's kind of orient this a little bit. Your
truck was pointed towards the office building here?
A. Correct.
Q. And they were unloading from the passenger
side of your truck?
A. Correct.
Q. And you were standing at the rear of the
trailer?
A. That's correct.
Q. All right. And when the operator began to
lift the load off the truck, did you see or hear or
observe anything unusual or that concerned you?
A. No, I did not.
Q. If you had, you would have said something?
A. I would have.
Q. You lmow what the weights of the material
were, correct?
A. Yeah. They were 12,700 or something like that
total weight.
Q. What was 12,700 or 12,000 whatever hundred?
A. That bundle that he was picking up.
Q. And did you make any comments to the operator
Page 85
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A. No.
Q. And why not?
A. I had to push the dunnage over to the other
side of the trailer, so I could put it away.
Q. Okay. What would have stopped you from
reaching it from the other side?
A. Because I was using 4-foot dunnage, so I had
4-foot on each side, so I was pushing over to the other
side because all that dunnage goes in my one box.
Q. And that's what you were going to do with the
dunnage is put it into a storage box underneath the
trailer, I'm assuming?
A. That's correct.
Q. As the unloading began, what did you observe
the operator do or prepare to do to lift this load?
A. Same thing I always watch them do. Just drove
up under there, put his forks under the load and lifted
it up.
Q. Didn't see anything unusual in the way that
all transpired?
A. Not a bit.
Q. Where were you located when the forklift
approached the truck and began to lift the steel off
there?
A. You lmow how it's set up out there, right?
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that it was too heavy or you felt it was too heavy or
the size wasn't right?
A. Absolutely not. I don't know what his
forklift's rated for.
Q. So, when he began the lift and began to back
away, did you feel you were in a safe position at that
point?
A. Where I was still standing, yes.
Q. And you were still at the rear of the trailer?
A. Correct.
Q. Not between the forklift and the load or
between the load and the truck?
A. No, sir.
Q. All right. And had you stayed there, would
you have been injured in this accident?
A. Nope. No, sir.
Q. As the operator lifted the load, what did you
observe him do to operate the lift and to move the steel
from the trailer?
A. Just nonnal forklift activity. I wasn't
looking for anything specific. I look -- I always watch
the back of the forklift. If the back end comes up, I
know he's overweight. His back end didn't come up.
Q. So -A. But that -- that's just a regular thing I do.

M & M Court Reporting Service
(208)345-9611(ph) (800)234-9611 (208)-345-8800(fax)

(21) Pages 82 - 85

Page 135

Dale Kelly
June 18, 2019

Kellyv.
TRC Fabrication
Page 86

Q. Sure. That's fair and that's what I'm asking
you.
3
A. If you're talking about supervising, that's -4
I'm still not supervising. I'm just watching for the
5
danger zone.
6
Q. And if somebody's was lifting and the back end
7
of the forklift had come up, you would have said
8
something?
9
A. I would have been waving like crazy.
10
Q. Okay. What specifically now -- and I'm
11 talking about as they begin to move away from the truck.
12 And I should tell you -- let me -- don't walk off with
13 any of those that have the stickers on them.
14
A. I won't.
15
Q. Because she'll chase you down the street.
16 You'll be surprised how often we all do that, lawyers
17
and witnesses alike.
18
Back to the question, though. As he's backing
19 away from the load, what did you observe the operator
2 o do? What did you observe with regard to the load?
21
A. Nothing.
22
Q. Looked normal?
23
A. Looked normal. Absolutely normal.
24
Q. So, what did you do next?
25
A. I waited until I felt he was far enough away,
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A. No.
Q. And so when you last saw the load, where were
you?
A. As I was walking up to my trailer, I was
watching him back it away still, still under control.
So I felt safe enough to walk up and start removing my
dunnage. The reason I do that is so they can come get
the next pick, so ...
Q. Then what happened? Tell me what-- as you
were -- you took a look as you're walking down the side
of your trailer, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And then where did you look?
A. Then I was just watching my dunnage. I was
pushing it across the trailer to the other side, and I
heard a piece of steel hit the ground so I figured he
dropped one piece. Turned to look and the whole thing
was coming at me.
Q. Okay. What whole thing? What do you mean?
A. The entire load on his forklift was on the
ground. The only way I can describe that was like an
avalanche coming across the parking lot.
Q. Okay. So, there was nothing left on the
forks? No steel at all?
A. Well, I wasn't looking at the forks anymore.
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and then I went up and started removing my dunnage.
Q. Load was stable as far as you could tell.
A. As far as I could tell, he was under perfect
control.
Q. Okay. Didn't say anything to the operator or
wave at him and indicate you were going to move from
where you were?
A. No.
Q. Okay. How long did you watch as he was
backing away?
A. In minutes or feet or. ..
Q. Whatever you can use to give me an idea,
whether it's distance or time.
A. Distance would have been at least tvv-o trailer
widths away from me.
Q. Okay.
A. That's like 16 -- 16 feet estimated.
Q. Fifteen, 16 feet is your guess?
A. Correct.
Q. And where was the load relative to the ground?
A. Still up.
Q. How far up?
A. I don't think he dropped it an inch. He just
went, picked it up, took it straight back.
Q. Did you ever see him lower the load?
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I was looldng at what was coming across the ground. But
nothing was left on the forks when it was all said and
3
done.
4
Q. Okay.
5
A. Because it all came off.
6
Q. And this was when it was about 15 feet from
7
where you were?
8
A. That's when I started walldng up there.
9
Q. Okay. How long did it take or how far away
10 was the load when you heard the noise?
11
A. I couldn't even give you a good estimate on
12 that because I had walked up and then started wallcing
13 back pushing my dunnage off.
14
Q. Wallced up to where?
15
A. The front of my trailer to push the first
16 piece of dunnage. I push it over, go to the next one,
17 push it over, go to the next one, push it over. Then
18 when I'm all done, I walk around and grab.them and put
19 them in the side box.
2o
Q. And how many pieces of dunnage or how many
21 rows of dunnage did you have?
22
A. Four.
23
Q. When the operator was moving away from the
24 truck, was he moving away at a slow pace?
25
A. Yeah. He seemed to be under control.
1

2
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Q. So, you don't know where -- let me say it this
way: You don't know how far away from the truck the
3
forklift and the load was when that first piece started
4
to -- when you heard the first piece?
5
A. Yeah. I do not know exactly where he was
6 other than he was out in the dirt. The machine was out
7
in the dirt because it was almost in the dirt when I
8
started walking up, so ...
9
Q. What do you mean "it was almost in the dirt"?
10
A. Your asphalt ends and then you have dirt. So
11 when I started walldng up, he was under control moving
12 out into the dirt.
13
Q. And the machine was already moving into the
14 dirt at that point in time?
15
A. Correct.
16
Q. Okay.
17
A. As far as I can remember. That's a
18 year-and-a-half ago, so ...
19
Q. To be clear, the first row of dunnage near the
2 o front of the trailer isn't at the very front of the
21 trailer, correct?
22
A. Correct. It's close to the landing gear.
23
Q. Close to the landing gear is about where that
24 first row of dunnage would have been?
25
A. Correct.
1

2

Page 92

A. Both feet were in the air just below the
bottom of my toolbox. When the steel came under my
3
toolbox, it took my feet with it.
4
Q. Both feet?
5
A. Both feet.
6
Q. And only the right one was injured?
7
A. It fractured the heel on my left one. They
8
had to do an MRI to find that.
9
Q. Did you have dunnage in your hands at the time
10 you heard this?
11
A. No, sir.
12
Q. Had you pushed all the dunnage over by that
13 point?
14
A. All but the last one.
15
Q. How many pieces of steel did you get contacted
16 by?
17
A. Just the first.
18
Q. Just one?
19
A. Well, when they came down, they were still
2 o double-stacked and as they came across the parldng lot,
21 so they were two high. And then I think it dropped down
22
to one high. I couldn't really tell you. Whatever it
23
took to get underneath that toolbox.
24
Q. When they were on the truck -- excuse me -25
this tube steel, how many high was it stacked up?
1

2
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Q. All right. And so, where approximately down
the length of the trailer were you when you heard the
steel hit?
A. Right by my front toolbox, right about the
halfway point.
Q. Did you move any-- to any other position
before the accident happened and you were hit by the
steel?
A. Didn't have time.
Q. Okay.
A. I just jumped.
Q. So you were right about mid-trailer when this
accident took place?
A. Correct. Right next to the front toolbox.
Q. I'm sorry?
A. Right next to my front toolbox. I have four
toolboxes on the trailer. My feet were still below the
toolbox when I tried to hold myself up.
Q. What did you do to -- when you heard that
steel and you saw the steel fall?
A. Grabbed the side of my trailer and tried to
lift myself -- feet up because it was coming underneath,
and I didn't get them up.
Q. Were both feet still on the ground or just
one?
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A. It's the one time I wish I would have had a
picture, but I think it was five high. I can't swear to
3
it. You can actually do the math and figure it out on
4
the width of the tubes, the width of the trailer. I
5
thinlc it was 6 feet across, which his forks would have
6
grabbed. And then do the math adding them up how many
7 you had to go high, but I thought it was five high.
8
Q. In the neighborhood, four or five, six,
9
somewhere in there?
10
A. Probably five.
11
Q. You didn't see the steel fall off the truck-12 or off the forks of the forklift?
13.
A. No.
14
Q. You had your back turned to the load at that
15 point in time?
16
A. When I first heard it, yes.
17
Q. And how long had you had your back turned to
18 the load about?
19
A. A minute.
2o
Q. Long enough to go from -21
A. Correct.
22
Q. -- at least three of the -23
A. -- pieces of dunnage, correct.
24
Q. You don't know and didn't see what caused or
25
contributed to the instability of the load?
1

2
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1
A. Not that I can remember, not until the
A. I do not know.
2
ambulance
got there.
2
Q. Have you ever been told that it's a safe
3
Q.
All
right.
Let's talk about that, then. You
3
practice to tum your back to a load while it's being
4
talked to the ambulance people. What I'm trying to get
4
moved?
5
at is did you talk to anybody else from TRC or
5
A. I've been told that, but I also can tell you
6
Intermountain Erectors?
6
without a doubt I felt safe. I've been doing this a
7
A. At that moment, I don't think I did. I can't
7
long time. I've never had that happen to me.
8
remember. Like I said, the one came up, one went and
8
Q. I want to just clarify your answer. I think I
9
got my phone. Don't know who that was. And if there
9
sort of asked the question one way and you answered it
10 differently, so I want to make sure we're communicating. 10 was a conversation going on, I don't really recall it·-11
Q. Okay.
11
What you have been told is it's a safe
12
A. -- b~cause my foot was still kind of pointing
12 practice to never tum your back to a load, correct?
13 that way (indicating).
13
A. That's correct.
14
Q. Okay. Okay. You called Jay Transport. Who
14
Q. I understand what your answer was. I just
15 did you tallc to there?
15 wanted to clarify it with my question. My question was
16
A. First one I called was Steve Schoff,
16 a little vague.
11
S-C-H-0-F-F, Steve Schoff.
17
Do you think it's a safe practice to wallc
18
First one I called was Jordan Jay, but he
18 under or in the area of an elevated load?
19 didn't answer the phone, so I called Steve because I
19
A. Never.
2 o knew he was in town.
2o
Q. In fact, you're trained not to do that. You
21
Q. Who is Steve?
21 know that from your experience?
22
A. He's one of the owner/operators for Rounds
22
A. Correct.
23
Trucking, and told him to go get Jordan to come get my
23
Q. What did the operator do when the load fell?
24 truck.
24 Did you see him or have any contact with him?
25
Q. Okayo And what did you tell him happened?
2s
A. I just heard him running up saying: "I'm

1
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1
sorry. I'm sorry."
2
Q. Anything else?
3
3
A. Not with him. At least-- it might have been
4
4
him because at this point, I was not feeling really
5
5
good. And I had one of -- somebody go to the truck and
6
6
get my cell phone so I could call Jay Transport and have
7
7
them send somebody down to get the truck.
8
8
Q. There was more than one person who came to
9
9
your aid?
10
10
A. Yeah. There was the forklift driver, and then
11 I remember seeing somebody running from the yard and I 11
12
12 don't know who that was. And then that truck driver
13
13 that was behind me came running up.
14
14
Q. And who was the truck driver from behind you?
15
1s
A. I have no idea.
16
16
Q. Do you know who he was?
17
17
A. He was in line to unload.
10
18
Q. Do you know who he was driving for?
19
19
A. I have no clue.
20
2o
Q. Another load of steel being delivered is all
21
21 youknow?
22
22
A. Yeah, I think so.
23
23
Q. Other than somebody coming up and saying:
24
24 "I'm sorry, I'm sorry," did you have any other
25
25
discussions with anyone else?
1

2
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A. Told him I just got a load of steel dumped on
me and I broke my leg.
Q. Okay.
A. And that's as far as that conversation went.
Q. Okay. And did you talk to anyone else other
than the ambulance drivers when they got there while you
were -- while you were at the scene or at the hospital?
A. Not that I can remember.
Q. All right. Do you know -- I guess you were
transported by ambulance.
A. I was.
Q. And did you advise your wife of this accident
or anybody else?
A. A little late, but, yeah, I called her. I
don't remember if it was from the ambulance. She wasn't
my first call. My first call was to get the truck.
MS. KELLY: You were still on the steel.
THE WITNESS: I guess I was still on the
steel.
Q. (BYMR.BAILEY) Okay.
A. Brent's going, "How does he do that?" Doesn't
call his wife first.
Q. Other than when you were here with your
experts, have you ever been back to the facility here at
TRC?
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of those classes was a train-the-trainer course, which
authorized me to be able to start training employees.
I've done -- I've probably done three to four of those.
I don't remember off the top of my head. I've done a
40-hour OSHA class that was done over in Boise ten years
ago by a safety consulting company.
I've done another 30-hour OSHA that was done
by the AGC probably maybe five years ago, I believe. I
don't remember the exact dates.
Q. Okay. AGC stands for what?
A. Associated General Contractors of America.
Q. Okay.
A. And then last -- not last September, September
of 2017 I went down to University of Utah and took the
OSHA 500 and the OSHA 501 training course, which allows
me to basically--which allows me to teach OSHA 10-hour
and OSHA 30-hour construction training.
Q. And do you have occasion to present those
training programs?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it confined to Intermountain Erector
employees?
A. Currently.
Q. Okay. Have you ever provided safety training
to TRC employees?
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authorized.
Q. Are you considered a safety professional?
MR. BAILEY: Objection. Calls for a legal
conclusion. Calls for speculation and lacks foundation.
And, I guess, asked and answered.
THE WITNESS: So, what do I do?
MR. BAILEY: You can -- you can answer it
again.
THE WITNESS: I don't know the criteria that I
have to have to be a certified safety professional. I
don't understand that part of it.
Q. Apparently, somebody at OSHA has made it clear
that you can't use the word "certified"?
A. Correct. And there is a title safety -- there
is a certified safety professional title that a lot of
safety tech people carry. But I don't know what
credentials and/or hours of training or things like that
you have to have to have that title. So, I probably
would make that criteria, but I don't truly know the
answer to what it takes to do that.
Q. Okay. Have you developed a safety manual for
use by either TRC employees or Intermountain Erectors'
employees?
A. I didn't develop it, no.
Q. Does one exist?
Page 17

Page 15

A. So, when -- yes, I have very minimally. What
happened was, probably in like July -- June or July of
3
2017, I actually took on the role of being the full-time
4
QA and safety manager for Intermountain Erectors and
5
TRC. So, I started going down the path of doing TRC
6
safety, and so -- and that's when I took this OSHA
7
training and did some of that.
8
And then I actually put together some rigging
9
training and an introduction to OSHA training that I did
10 with TRC employees. I don't remember the exact date.
11 But, then, as I got moving into this, some job sites
12 really required my attention full-time for Intermountain
13 Erectors. So I really shifted from that QA safety
14 position back into production for Intermountain
1.5 Erectors, and so I've never really had a chance to do
16 much of anything with TRC's safety program.
1. 7
Q. QA stands for?
1. 8
A. Quality assurance.
1. 9
Q. So your position encompassed both quality
2 o assurance and safety?
21.
A. Correct.
22
Q. Are you certified as a safety professional?
23
A. I am -- I'm authorized by OSHA to teach
24 IO-hour and 30-hour construction classes. They've told
2s
me I'm not allowed to use the word II certified. 11 I'm
1

2
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A. Yes.
Q. Does the safety manual -- is it confined to
3
Intermountain Erectors' work or does it encompass both
4
companies?
5
A. I don't know the answer to that. I'm assuming
6
TRC has their own safety manual. I know they do, but I
7
haven't really read through it. The one I know is the
8
one for Intermountain Erectors.
9
Q. Does TRC have a safety director at this time?
1o
A. Not that I'm aware of.
11
Q. In January of 2018, did TRC have a safety
12 director?
13
A. I don't believe they had a specific safety
14 director, but I would like to clarify that basically our
15 foremen and our main managers are responsible for the
16 safety of their employees and overseeing the safety of
17 the company, a setup similar to how Intermountain
18 Erectors does it with myself and our field foremen.
19
Q. At the -- I mean, this lawsuit arises from an
2 o incident that occurred here at TRC's facility on
21 January 22nd, 2018.
22
Were you on-site at the time?
23
A. No.
24
Q. Do you know where you were?
25
A. I was in Burley.
1

2
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Q. Okay. Working on a project?
A. Yes, McCain Foods. I was down there for
almost a year.
Q. When did you finish that project?
A. Probably about a year ago right now, and then
I went to a project in Boise after that.
Q. So, you're away from home a lot?
A. Quite a bit here recently.
Q. So, have you seen a safety manual for TRC?
A. No, I haven't.
Q. Given your involvement with the safety program
at Intermountain Erectors as it relates to telehandlers,
forklifts, is it important for the operator to be
familiar with the operator's manual prepared by the
manufacturer of the machine?
A. Could you re-ask me that again?
MR. ROCHE: Can you reread it, please?
(The record was read.)
THE WITNESS: It's important for the operator
to be familiar with the operator's manual of the machine
if he's not already familiar with that machine.
Q. (BY MR. ROCHE) Do all of the telehandlers
come with an operator's manual?
A. Typically, they do.
Q. Have you had personal experience operating the
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8,000 pounds, does that lifting capacity decrease
depending on the configuration of the boom?·
A. Could you be more specific on "configuration
of the boom"?
Q. Well, when the boom's extended.
A. Yes, yes. Correct. The further away from the
forklift itself is, the center of gravity completely
changes.
Q. And is that dynamic set out in something
called a load chart on the Gehl telehandler?
A. Yes.
Q. And where's an interested person find the load
chart?
A. Right to the right-hand side, right above the
main control, there's a -- they have a bunch of things
you can scroll through that gives you different load
charts for different -- wherever your boom's at and
things like that.
Q. Under any circumstances, should the operator
attempt to lift more than 8,000 pounds using a
telehandler rated at 8,000 pounds?
MR. BAILEY: Objection. Calls for speculation
and lacks foundation. You can answer, if you can.
THE WITNESS: Would you ask me that again,
please?
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telehandlers or forldifts at this facility in Idaho
Falls?
A. Yes.
Q. Which ones have you operated?
A. All of the reach forklifts out there with the
telescoping booms. I've run some of the shop-type
forldifts. Straight mast forklifts, I haven't run much
of those.
Q. I'm familiar with a Gehl telehandler.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that one of the telehandlers that you've
operated?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And do you recall what the lifting capacity of
that machine is?
A. I think that Gehl is an 8,000-pound lift, but
I'm not sure. I'd have to look at the number on the
side of it.
Q. Okay, And that number is posted on the
machine itself?
A. Yeah. Usually it will be, like, a Gehl 883 or
a Gehl 1083 or -- and that tells you. An 883 is an
8,000-pound forklift. A 1083 is a 10,000-pound
forldift, things like that.
Q. Okay. And assuming it's rated at around
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Q. (BY MR. ROCHE) Is it important to -- for the
operator to follow the lifting limitations when
operating the telehandler?
A. Yes.
Q. It would be wrong and unsafe for the operator
to attempt to lift a weight greater than the lifting
capacity of the machine?
MR. BAILEY: Objection. Calls for
speculation. Lacks foundation.
THE WITNESS: And I wouldn't agree to that.
Saying that it automatically becomes unsafe, I don't
believe is true.
Q. (BY MR. ROCHE) Okay. Do you allow your
telehandler operators to exceed the lifting capacity of
the machine?
A. Not if they know the lifting capacity. But,
also, the machine itself typically will not let you go
past that capacity. It either won't lift, or the back
tires will start to come off of the ground.
Q. Okay. When unloading a truck making a
delivery of steel tubing to the plant, is it important
for the telehandler operator to develop a plan that will
allow his picks to be limited to the capacity of the
machine he's operating?
A. Yes.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
AARONSCHULERandPAMELA
SCHULER, husband and wife,

Case No. 4:18-CV-00234-CWD

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER (DKT 15; DKT 22)

Plaintiffs,
V.

BATTELLE ENERGY ALLIANCE,
LLC,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Comi is Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Dkt. 15.) Also pending before the Court is Aaron and Pamela Schuler's
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 22.) The motions are fully briefed,
and oral argument was held on the motions on May 30, 2019. For the following reasons,
the Court will deny the Motion for Summary Judgment and will grant the Motion for
Leave to Amend.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 1

Page 144

Case 4:18-cv-00234-CWD Document 56 Filed 06/12/19 Page 2 of 28

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2017, Aaron Schuler arrived at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
site in Idaho Falls, Idaho, to make a delivery via a long-haul semi-truck. (Dkt. 1 at 2.)
Schuler was making the delivery to INL's Advanced Test Reactor Complex (ATR
Complex). Id. The ATR Complex is a nuclear reactor designed to test nuclear fuels for
the United States Navy. Id. Schuler sustained serious injuries while making the delivery.
1.

Entities involved in the facts of this case

The contractual relationship between the entities responsible for managing and
operating the ATR Complex is relevant to the legal issues before the Court. The United
States Department of Energy (DOE) owns the INL. (Dkt. 33 at 12.) The INL, located
near Scolville, Idaho, is comprised of several facilities, including the ATR Complex. Id.
There are two DOE administrative offices with responsibilities related to the ATR
Complex, the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors (Naval Reactors),
and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy (Nuclear Energy). Id.
•,,

Defendant Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA), is a Delaware limited liability
company with its principal place of business in Idaho Falls. Id. BEA is a private
contractor for the DOE. Id. BEA contracted with the DOE' s Nuclear Energy office to
carry out the Nuclear Energy office's day-to-day operation and maintenance
responsibilities with respect to the ATR Complex. Id. at 13; Dkt. 34 at 4; 8.
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Another entity, Bechtel Marine Propulsion Corporation (Bechtel), contracted with
the Naval Reactors office to carry out other responsibilities related to the ATR Complex. 1
(Dkt. 33 at 13.) Under its contract with the Naval Reactors office, Bechtel designed
experiments and purchased certain supplies for the experiments, including "in-pile tubes"
(IPTs), which are used in a pressurized water experiment to test nuclear fuel and
materials under various conditions. Id. at 12-13; Dkt. 34 at 4-5. Schuler was delivering
one of these IPTs on the day of the incident. Pursuant to a purchase order with GE
Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GE Hitachi), Bechtel purchased ten (10) IPTs. (Dkt. 33 at 14.)
Under the purchase order, Hitachi, the seller, agreed to supply the IPTs to Bechtel, the
buyer, and deliver them to the ATR Complex in exchange for a payment of
approximately $4,500,000. Id. The IPT Schuler was delivering, number 28 (IPT 28), was
valued at $450,000. Id.
Hitachi contracted with a third party manufacturer, Vigor Works, LLC, to make
the large pipes, including IPT 28. Id. When the manufacture of IPT 28 was complete,
Hitachi contracted with Combined Transport Logistics Group, Inc. (CTL), to transport
the IPT from the manufacturing plant to the ATR Complex. Id. In turn, CTL contracted
with Cardmoore Trucking Limited Partnership (Cardmoore) to provide a driver for the
semi-trailer truck used to pick up and deliver IPT 28 to the ATR Complex. Id. Cardmoore
assigned its employee, Schuler, to be the driver of the semi-trailer truck. Id. Cardmoore

1

The parties dispute whether Bechtel's contract with the DOE included management and
operation of an Idaho facility. (See Statement of Material Facts in Support of Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 43 at 7; see Statement of Uncontested Facts in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendant), Dkt. 19 at 2-3.)
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instructed Schuler to deliver IPT 28 to the ATR Complex. Hitachi paid CTL $4,300 to
deliver IPT 28 to the site. Id.
The contractual relationship between the entities is illustrated in the following
chart:

Department of Energy

DOE Office of Naval Reactors

Bechtel Marine Propulsion Corporation

DOE Office of Nuclear Energy

BatteUe Energy Alliance

t
PURCHASE ORDER No. 3015656

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy

Vigor Works LLC

Combined Transport Logistics Group

Cardmaore Trucking Limited Partnership

Aaron Schuler

(Dkt. 33 at 15.)

2.

Facts related to the delivery of IPT 28
The ATR Complex is a high security site. (Dkt. 1 at 2.) The ATR itself is a nuclear

reactor. (Dkt. 34 at 2.) The only entrance to the site is through a vehicle inspection bay.
All vehicles are subject to an onsite inspection in the bay prior to entering the ATR
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Complex. (Dkt. 1. At 2.) The security guards who perform onsite inspections of vehicles
entering the complex are employed by BEA. Id.; Dkt. 33 at 15. When Schuler arrived at
the inspection bay, the BEA security guards instructed him to pull his semi-truck
completely into the inspection bay. (Dkt. 1 at 2.) However, the truck Schuler was driving
had a 53-foot flatbed and was too long to fit entirely within the bay. Id. BEA guards
instructed Schuler to drive the truck forward into the bay as far as possible to fit the
majority of the truck into the bay for inspection. Id.
The entrance to the inspection bay is protected by an in-ground retractable vehicle
security barrier that can be raised by the security guards to prevent vehicles from entering
the bay. Id. Once Schuler moved the truck into the bay, the security guards ordered
Schuler to exit the truck and to open the engine hood, all doors, all tool bins, and all other
enclosures on the truck. Schuler complied and was then told to stand neat the rear of his
trailer while the guards performed an inspection of the truck, including its enclosures. Id.
Once the inspection was complete, the guards instructed Schuler to close the previously
opened areas, including the engine hood. Id. at 4.
To close the engine hood, Schuler had to stand directly in the front and in the
center of the open hood. Id. Because the semi-truck was pulled as far as possible into the
inspection bay, closing the hood required Schuler to stand between the vehicle security
barrier and the front of the semi-truck. Id. The space between the security barrier and the
semi-truck was approximately 18 inches wide. (Dkt. 37-7 at 10.) While Schuler was
working on closing the engine hood, one of the BEA guards lowered the security barrier
behind Schuler. Id. at 11. As the security barrier lowered, it crushed Schuler's leg. (Dkt. 1
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at 4; Dkt. 37-7 at 11-12.) Schuler cried out, and once the BEA security guard realized
what had happened, he raised the barrier and called for medical care. Id.

3.

BEA's investigation of the delivery incident
On July 17, 2017, BEA issued a Root Cause Analysis Report regarding the

delivery incident. (Dkt. 34 at 6; Dkt. 37-7 at 7.) In the report, BEA concluded that the
incident was caused by (1) the negligent actions of the BEA security guard; (2) BEA's
negligent training and supervision of the security guard; and (3) BEA's negligent failure
to maintain and repair the wedge barrier. (Dkt. 34 at 6-7; see Dec. Scott J. Smith, Exhibit
G, Root Cause Analysis Report, Dkt. 37-7 at 1-39.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As a result of this incident, Schuler filed a complaint against BEA alleging three
claims: (1) BEA security guards' negligence resulted in Schuler's severe and permanent
physical injuries, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, past and future pain and
suffering, past and future medical expenses, lost wages, and reduced wage-earning
capacity. (Dkt. 1 at 5); (2) BEA had a duty to entrust the retraction of the wedge barrier to
a properly trained, experienced employee capable of lowering the wedge in a manner that
would not injure other persons, and BEA breached the duty (Id. at 5-6); (3) BEA
breached its duty to properly supervise its employees through negligent supervision; and
(4) due to the personal injury of Aaron Schuler, his wife, Pamela, suffered a loss of
consortium. (Id. at 6.)
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BEA filed an answer denying each of the Schulers' claims. (Dkt. 5.) BEA's
answer also set forth six affirmative defenses, including: contributory and comparative
negligence on the part of Aaron Schuler; res judicata and collateral estoppel; Idaho's
statutory employer doctrine; Plaintiffs failure to name necessary and indispensable
parties, including his employer; lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the
claims; and waiver, estoppel, and laches. (Dkt. 5 at 5-7.) BEA then filed the present
motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 15.) In its motion, BEA argues, because Aaron
Schuler received worker's compensation benefits, and because BEA is a statutory
employer of Aaron Schuler, BEA bears no third:party liability as the worker's
compensation benefits were Aaron Schuler' s sole and exclusive remedy for the injuries
he sustained in the incident. (Dkt. 16 at 1.)
After BEA filed its motion for summary judgment, the Schulers filed a motion for
leave to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. 22.) Therein, the Schulers seek permission to
add two new causes of action based in negligence and one new factual allegation. Id. at 3.
The motion also seeks permission to amend the complaint to remove Pamela Schuler as a
plaintiff and to remove the claim for loss of consortium, because Ms. Schuler passed
away after the filing of the complaint. Id. In response, BEA does not contest the motion
as to the removal of Pamela Schuler, but argues the remainder of the motion is futile as
the new causes of action would not save the complaint against BEA' s statutory employer
defense. In reply, Schuler argues that the statutory employer defense does not defeat the
claims in his complaint or in the proposed amended complaint.
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STANDARD OF LAW
1.

Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates "there is no genuine issue of any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986); Galen v. County ofLos
Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). Evidence includes "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits .... " De Vries v. DeLaval, Inc., 2006 WL 15 82179, at *5 (D. Idaho June 1,
2006), report and recommendation adopted, 2006 WL 2325176 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2006).
The moving party initially bears the burden to show no material fact is in dispute
and a favorable judgment is due as a matter oflaw. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the
moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party must identify facts showing
a genuine issue for trial to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Cline v. Indus.
Maint. Eng'g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court must

enter summary judgment if the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986).
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ANALYSIS
1.

Idaho Worker's Compensation Act
This motion requires the Court to consider the Idaho Workers Compensation Act

(Act). 2 In general, the Act provides employees a remedy for injuries sustained in the
course of employment. I.C. § 72-201; Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 76 P.3d 951, 953
(Idaho 2003). While providing relief to injured employees, the Act also limits employer
liability. I.C. § 72-209(1); I.C. § 72-211. The Act's remedy for injured employees is
referred to as the "exclusive remedy rule." Robison at 953. Under the rule, worker's
compensation payments are provided "to the exclusion of every other remedy,
proceeding, or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in the worker's
compensation scheme." Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 127 P.3d 962, 967-68 (Idaho
2005).
However, Idaho Code Section 72-223 provides that an individual who receives
workers compensation benefits under the Act is not precluded from brining an action in
tort for damages against a third party that is not the individual's employer. Id. Section 72223(1) reads:
The right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact that
the injury, occupational disease or death is caused under circumstances
creating in some person other than the employer a legal liability to pay
damages therefor, such person so liable being referred to as the third party.

2

BEA argues that Idaho state law applies in this case. (See Dkt. 16 at 3-5.) Schuler does not
challenge BEA's choice of law argument at this time. (Dkt. 33 at 3.) Therefore, for purposes of analyzing
the motion for summary judgment, the Court will apply Idaho state law as it is applicable to the claims
and defenses in this matter.
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I.C. § 72-223(1) (emphasis added).
The Act defines an "employer" as:
Any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the services
of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It includes the owner
or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or
operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being
an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer
of the workers there employed.
I.C. § 72-102(12)(a); Robison, 76 P.3d at 955.
The Idaho Supreme Comi has "developed significant case law to help give the
term [employer] meaning" in the context of negligence claims against third parties.

Robison at 954. The resultant expanded definition is termed "statutory employer" and is
"designed to prevent an employer from avoiding liability" under the worker's
compensation statute "by subcon!racting the work to others who may be irresponsible and
not insure their employees." Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Harpole v. State, 958
P.2d 594, 597 (Idaho 1998).
To this end, the Supreme Court of Idaho has determined that the parties who are
"employers" for purposes of worker's compensation benefits under Idaho Code Section
72-102 are "the same parties deemed immune from third-party tort liability" under Idaho
Code Section 72-223. Robison at 955. In Robison, the court noted that, had the legislature
intended any broader immunity for third parties, it could have used language distinct
from that supplied in Section 72-102. Id. Therefore, under the Act, "an employee may
have more than one employer: the employer who directly hired the employee and a
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person or entity who, by statute, is also held to be the employer for the purposes of
worker's compensation." Blake v. Starr, 203 P.3d 1246, 1248 (Idaho 2009).
This legal framework defines statutory employees in two specific categories: (1) a
category one statutory employer "means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired
or contracted the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors;" and (2)
a category two statutory employer, who is "the owner or lessee of premises, or other
person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but
who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not
the direct employer of the workmen there employed." Id.; Kolar v. Cassia Cty. Idaho,
127 P.3d 962, 968 (Idaho 2005).
In this case, BEA argues it is both a category one and category two statutory
employer of Schuler, and is thus immune from third party liability. In response, Schuler
argues BEA is not a statutory employer under either category. Alternatively, Schuler
asserts that, even if BEA is a statutory employer, because one of the underlying contracts
was for goods and not services, the Act's statutory employer defense does not apply.
In reply~ BEA concedes that, if the contract was a contract for goods, the statutory

employer defense would not apply. However, BEA asserts that, although the contract
involved the purchase of a good -the IPT' s from GE Hitachi- the IPT purchase was part
and parcel of a larger services contract. Therefore, as a threshold inquiry, the Court will
determine if the contract at issue was a contract for the sale of goods.
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2.

The contract between Bechtel and GE Hitachi was a contract for services.
The issue of whether a contract is for goods or services is a question of law. See

Fox v. Mountain W. Elec., Inc., 52 P.3d 848, 855 (Idaho 2002). Under Idaho law, when

contracts provide both goods and services, courts consider "whether their predominant
factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale,
with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom)." Id.
This "predominant factor" test requires courts to consider contracts in their entirety. Id.
When a party is more concerned with the goods and less concerned with servicebased aspects of the contract, such as who will install the goods, the predominant factor
of the contract is the goods. Pittsley v. Houser, 875 P.2d 232, 234 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
On the other hand, where the goods provided are "merely incidental" to services such as
design, testing, and installation, the predominant factor of the contract is the services. Fox
at 855.
Here, Schuler asserts that, because BEA is relying on a chain of contracts and
subcontracts, BEA has the burden to prove that every contract in the chain was a contract
for services. (Dkt. 33 at 6.) Schuler argues that BEA cannot prove that the contract
between Bechtel and GE Hitachi was a contract for services. Schuler asserts that the IPTs
were clearly goods, and any services provided under the contract for the IPTs, such as
delivery and inspection, were incidental to the goods provided to Bechtel. (Dkt. 50 at 5.)

In response, BEA asserts that the services related to the manufacture of the IPTs, such as
GE Hitachi's inspections and certifications, were the predominant factors of the contract.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 12

Page 155

Case 4:18-cv-00234-CWD Document 56 Filed 06/12/19 Page 13 of 28

A close review of the entirety of the contract between Bechtel and GE Hitachi
shows that the thrust of the agreement was the provision of services. Notably, the
agreement contains two parts, the first is Purchase Order No. 3015656, the second is the
"Atomic Power Laboratory Requirements Document." (Dkt. 41-2.)
A review of Purchase Order No. 3015656 provides the following information: (1)
GE Hitachi is identified as the supplier and Bechtel is identified as the buyer; (2)
shipping terms are identified, including that the method of shipping was "Seller's
Choice;" (3) GE Hitachi was to supply a lot of ten IPTs, including IPT 28, to Bechtel for
the fixed price of $4,571,933; (4) each IPT had a different delivery date; and (5) GE
Hitachi was required to include a complete packing list with each IPT shipment. (Dkt. 412 at 2.)
The "Atomic Power Laboratory Requirements Document" was expressly included
as "part of purchase order 3015656." 3 Id. at 3. The parties do not dispute that the
Requirements Document is part of the purchase order. The Requirements Document first
includes a list of documents that the parties agreed are also included in the purchase
order. Id. According to the contract, Bechtel made the majority of these documents
available to GE Hitachi via citation within the Requirements Document to Bechtel-run
website. Id. at 4. These documents included items such as specification drawings
prepared by Bechtel and/or the DOE, the DOE's general provisions for "Fixed Price

3

Bechtel Marine Propulsion Corporation assumed responsibility for the management and
operation of the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory for the DOE on February 1, 2009. (Dkt. 41-2 at 3.) All
references to Bettis in the requirements document mean Bechtel. Id. For purposes of this analysis, the
Court will use Bechtel.
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Orders," a "Seller Property Certification Data" form, and a form providing "Instructions
for Seller's Preparation of Submittals," including a "Request for Engineering Change"
form. Id. The documents included also a "Laboratory Procurement Quality Assurance
Requirements" form. Id.
The Requirements Document further included a statement of work, pricing terms,
general contracting terms, authorization and approvals terms, invoicing and payment
terms, delivery terms, transportation requirements, certifications requirements,
agreements related to government furnished property (GFP), inspection and quality
assurance requirements, correspondence requirements, identification of key personnel,
and cancellation terms. Id. at 5-15. It is these terms and requirements that BEA asserts
show that, although the purchase order was for ten IPTs, the thrust and predominant
factor of the agreement as a whole were the services GE Hitachi provided to Bechtel, and
up the contracting chain, to the DOE.
BEA asserts that, "GE Hitachi is not a retail parts outlet, it is a world-leading
provider of advanced reactor technology and nuclear services" and that Bechtel
contracted with GE Hitachi for those services. (Dkt. 50 at 5.) BEA advances that the title
of the contract-purchase order- does not trump the fact that the agreement "clearly
contemplates the acquisition of services through the use of 'purchase orders'" like
Purchase Order No. 3015656. Id. at 6.
BEA cites a case from the Northern District of Indiana, Bamcor LLC v. Jupiter
Aluminum Corp., as support for its argument. 767 F.Supp.2d 959 (N.D. Ind. 2011). That

case centered on a contract dispute where a company agreed to refurnish and rebuild an
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industrial machine's gearbox. Id. There, the court found that, although the contract, also a
purchase order, referred to the parties as a buyer and a seller, the contract stated that its
purpose was for "rebuilding certain equipment." Id. at 972. The price specifically
included labor, equipment, and materials that the company agreed to provide. Id. The
court noted that "activities such as mounting, setting, removing, reassembling, reworking,
cleaning, replacing, and fitting the equipment" indicated the company was providing a
service, and any parts the company had to purchase to complete the service-based tasks
were incidental to rebuilding the gearbox.
BEA asserts that the purchase order in this case is similarly a contract for services.
BEA points to the Statement of Work, which provides terms similar to those fou!}d in the
Bamcor purchase order: "Seller [GE Hitachi] shall furnish the necessary labor,

supervisions, services, tools, equipment, and materials (except as otherwise specified)
and do all things necessary to accomplish the entire workscope ... which is called for by
the purchase order and order specifications." (Dkt. 41-2 at 4.)
The entire workscope is set forth in the Requirements Document within a table. Id.
at 13-14. The table contains four columns: Purchase Order Period; Date by Which
Obligation is Due; Total Amount of Obligation; and General Work to be Performed. Id.
at 13. According to the table, a percentage of the total purchase order amount was to be
paid to GE Hitachi at the close of nine distinct purchase order periods. Id. at 13-14. In
turn, GE Hitachi was to perform the work on eac~ of the IPTs in stages, culminating with
the final shipment of all IPTs by the ninth purchase order period. Id. The nature of the
work in each purchase order period included: receiving and inspecting the government
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furnished metal and beginning fabrication; completion of "deep hole drilling" of the
metal; completion of IFP wel;ding and assembly, completion of IPT testing, partial
shipment of items, and final shipment of items. Id. at 14.
The following language, which appears in the Requirements Document after the
purchase order periods table, provides support for BEA' s argument that the thrust of the
agreement between Bechtel and GE Hitachi was the provision of services. The agreement
provides: "Seller is not obligated to provide services for any purchase order period after
the first unless and until written notification is received from [Bechtel] of an increase in
availability of funds." Dkt. 41-2 at 15 (emphasis added).
The Requirements Document provides also that the purchase order "is placed
pursuant to [Bechtel's] Prime Contract with the Department of Energy." Id. In line with
that contractual structure, the purchase order provides that Bechtel would review and
approve any "approval request" or request for an "engineering change" submitted by GE
Hitachi, but that, GE Hitachi was still obligated to maintain the schedule to meet the
completion date and delivery dates for the IPTs. Id. at 5.
As noted above, the Requirements Document contains invoice and payment terms
as well. Id. at 6. These terms include that GE Hitachi was to submit a separate invoice for
each purchase order showing the shipment destination. Id. The terms include also that
Bechtel would issue checks to "Sellers" on Wednesdays, but only for delivered and
completed items, and payments could be withheld should GE Hitachi fail to deliver any
data or test reports and certifications required by the purchase order. Id. Further, the
terms include that, if GE Hitachi delivered "less· than the total purchase order quantity,"
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payment could be made for acceptable product delivered based on unit pricing. Id. As a
part of the payment schedule, the purchase order includes a progress schedule that
indicates the percent total of the purchase order price as a weighted percentage of each
stage of the item manufacture. Id. at 7. The percent totals were divided as follows: 5
percent for the receipt and inspection of the GFE; 25 percent for the completion of deep
hole drilling of the GFE material; 60 percent for completion of the assembling and
welding, per each line item; 5 percent for completion of testing; and 5% for final
shipment of each item. Id.
Finally, the Requirements Document provides additional terms for delivery. Id. It
states that the seller must complete the scope of work in its entirety by July 5, 2018, and
make deliveries as specified of each of the ITPs to the ART Complex in Scoville, Idaho.
It required that the Bechtel purchase order number appear on the outside of all shipping

containers, and that GE Hitachi's packing slip had to identify the item number for each
item delivered. Id. at 7-8.
At this juncture of the analysis, it is important to note that GE Hitachi was not the
only entity involved in the manufacture of the IPTs described in Purchase Order No.
3015656. As set forth in the facts above, GE Hitachi hired a subcontractor, Vigor Works,
LLC, to manufacture the IPTs. (Dkt. 33 at 15.) The Court has not been provided with the
agreement between GE Hitachi and Vigor Works. However, because Schuler has not
raised that agreement in the context of the determination of whether any of the contracts
at issue were for the provision of goods, the Court will assume for purposes ofBEA's
motion for summary judgment that Vigor Works was providing services to GE Hitachi.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 17

Page 160

Case 4:18-cv-00234-CWD Document 56 Filed 06/12/19 Page 18 of 28

Yet, the existence of the agreement between GE Hitachi and Vigor Works for the
manufacture of the IPTs does lend weight to BEA's assertion that the thrust of the
agreement between Bechtel and GE Hitachi was for the provision of services. In its
contract with the DOE, Bechtel agreed to design experiments to be conducted at the ATR
Complex, and to procure all materials necessary to conduct the experiments. IPTs were
one of the necessary materials. However, as is evidenced by Purchase Order No. 3015656
and the Requirements Document, the IPTs supplied for the experiments differeddepending on their intended use. As such, Bechtel ordered the IPTs from GE Hitachi
according to the needs dictated by the experiments it designed, as well as according to the
DOE' s regulations and requirements for manufacture of materials to be used at nuclear
facilities.
Bechtel relied on GE Hitachi's expertise as a provider of "advanced reactor
technology and nuclear services" to ensure that the manufacture of the IPTS (by Vigor
Works) conformed with Bechtel's specifications and DOE regulations. Thus, GE Hitachi
was responsible for inspecting material provided by the government for the IPTs, and
testing the IPTs and providing certifications to Bechtel and DOE. GE Hitachi was also
required to obtain approval for any changes or deviations from the specifications
provided by BEA and the DOE. The entire process of completing an IPT could take a
year or more. (See Purchase Order No. 3015656, Dkt. 41-2 at 2.)
Considering the contract as a whole, although the predominant factor of Purchase
Order No. 3015656 is the provision often IPTs, the predominant factor of the
Requirements Document, which the purchase order expressly incorporates, is the
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provision of GE Hitachi's services during the IPT manufacturing process. The
Requirements Document colors the nature of the relationship between Bechtel and GE
Hitachi. Although the IPTs themselves were important and the ultimate goal of the
contract, the duties GE Hitachi had under the agreement show that its involvement was
centered on the provision of advanced nuclear technology services. Therefore, the Court
finds that the contract between Bechtel and GE Hitachi was a contract for services. As
such, the Court will address the issue of whether BEA is a statutory employer of Aaron
Schuler.

3.

BEA is not a category one statutory employer of Schuler.
Here, BEA argues it is a category one statutory employer of Aaron Schuler. To

qualify as a category one statutory employer, BEA "must be liable to pay worker's
compensation benefits if the direct employer" did not. Fuhriman v. State, Dep 't of
Transp., 153 P.3d 480,485 (2007). A party is liable as a statutory employer "for payment
of worker's compensation to an employee of its contractor whenever a contractor is liable
to its employee under the Worker's Compensation Laws." Id. As a statutory of the
contractor's employees, the same party is also the "employer" of the contractor's
subcontractor's employees. Id. (citing Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 108 P.3d 392,
396 (Idaho 2005).
When there is no direct or indirect contractual or employment relationship
between an entity and an injured employer, there is not a statutory employer relationship.
Struhs v. Prat. Techs., Inc., 1992 P.2d 164, 169 (1999). Put another way, where an
employer indirectly employs a party through a succession of service contracts, it is the
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statutory employer. Id. at 720. However, the inverse is also true: where a party has "no
contractual employment relationship" with the injured party, it is not a statutory
employer. Id. Thus, to determine whether BEA was a statutory employer of Schuler, the
Court must determine whether BEA indirectly employed Schuler through the chain of
service contracts that led to Schuler delivering IPT 28 to the ATR Complex.
The chain of contracts is as follows: Schuler was employed by Cardmoore;
Cardmoore contracted with the transportation company CTL to provide Schuler as a
driver; CTL was hired by GE Hitachi to transport the pipe; GE Hitachi was hired by
Bechtel to supply the pipe (and GE Hitachi contracted with Vigor Works to manufacture
the pipe); Bechtel was hired by the DOE's Naval Reactors office to design experiments
and procure any necessary equipment; and the DOE funded and managed its Naval
Reactors office. This is where the contract chain ended for the procurement of IPT 28
delivered by Schuler.
BEA asserts that, because there is an unbroken chain of service agreements
between the DOE and Schuler, the DOE4 qualifies as a statutory employer of Schuler
under Idaho law. Id. at 10. BEA then argues that, because DOE is a statutory employer of
Schuler, BEA "shares DOE's status as a statutory employer for purposes of the personal
injury claims asserted by Plaintiff." Id. To support this argument, BEA points to Idaho
Code Section 72-209(3).

4

Notably, Plaintiff is not suing DOE, but instead, BEA, which contracted with DOE to manage
the ATR Complex.
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Idaho Code Section 72-209(3) extends the worker's compensation law's
exemption from liability from employers "to the employer's surety, and to all officers,
agents, servants and employees of the employer or surety." LC. § 72-209(3). BEA asserts
that, because it is an agent of the DOE, and the DOE is a statutory employer of Schuler,
the worker's compensation law exemption extends to BEA. BEA also cites two Idaho
cases to support its assertion, Blake v. Starr, 203 P.3d 1246 (Idaho 2009), and Kolar v.
Cassia County Idaho, 127 P.3d 962 (Idaho 2005).
In Blake v. Starr, a contractor hired a subcontractor to provide flagging services on
a construction site. 203 P.3d at 1247. An employee of the subcontractor was injured on
the jobsite when an employee of the contractor struck him with a frontend loader. Id. The
subcontractor provided worker's compensation to its injured employer, and the Supreme
Court of Idaho found that the contractor was a statutory employer and thus not liable as a
third party. Id. at 1249. The court found also that the contractor's immunity extended to
its employee who was operating the frontend loader pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72209(3 ). Id. at 1249-50.
The facts in this case are readily distinguishable from the facts in Blake. In Blake,
Section 72-209(3) applied to extend immunity directly from the contractor who hired the
subcontractor to its employee who was involved in working on the same project the
injured employee was hired to work on. Here, the contractual relationship between the
DOE and BEA did not involve the entities or the work performed in the contractual
relationship that resulted in the hire of Schuler to deliver IPT 28. BEA asks the Court to
extend the immunity of DOE as statutory employer to a separate and distinct contractual

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 21

Page 164

Case 4:18-cv-00234-CWD Document 56 Filed 06/12/19 Page 22 of 28

relationship that the DOE had with BEA to manage the ATR Complex. The Court
declines to do so.
In Kolar, the injured worker was an employee of an engineering company that was
hired as an independent contractor by a county highway district to improve a road owned
by the United States Forest Service. Kolar v. Cassia Cty. Idaho, 127 P.3d 962, 965
(2005). The county had earlier agreed to provide the personnel, equipment, and
management necessary to maintain the road. Id. The employee of the engineering
company was injured when an employee of the county ran him over with a dump truck on
the road construction site. Id. The injured worker plaintiff argued that the county highway
district was not his statutory employer, because his own employer, the engineering firm,
was hired as an independent contractor. Id. at 968. ·Specifically, the injured worker
argued that, because Section 72-223 specifically names "contractors or subcontractors,"
the Act excludes "independent contractors" from statutory employer status. The worker
asserted that, because the county highway district hired his engineering firm as an
independent contractor, the highway district would not have been liable as a statutory
employer had the engineering company failed to pay worker's compensation benefits. Id.
The Supreme Court of Idaho rejected Kolar's argument, refusing to categorize the
county highway district as anything other than a statutory employer simply on the basis
of the type of contractor it hired. Id. The Court found the injured employer was the direct
employee of the engineering firm, which contracted directly with the county highway
district and, therefore, the county highway district was his statutory employer. Id. at 969.
The court explained:
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At the time of his unfortunate injury, [the worker] was doing the work [the
engineering company] had contracted to do. Indeed, all of the work [the
engineering company] was obligated to do under its contract with the
[highway district] was work required under the main contract for the project.
Id.

In this case, all the work Schuler' s employer was obligated to do under its contract
with CTL was work required under the subcontract for the project between Bechtel and
GE Hitachi. This work was far removed from the work being performed by the BEA
security guard who lowered the gate at the ATR Complex and injured Schuler. Therefore,
there is no parallel between Kolar and this matter, and the Court finds BEA's argument
unpersuasive.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds BEA was not a category one statutory
employer of Schuler.
4.

BEA is not a category two statutory employer of Schuler.
BEA argues it was also a category two statutory employer of Schuler. Pursuant to

Idaho Code Section 72-233, a party is a category two statutory employer if the party was
the owner or lessee of the premises where the incident occurred, or was "virtually the
proprietor or operator" of the business carried on there.
Category two statutory employers do not include parties who are "mere owners [or
lessees] of the premises." Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 76 P.3d 951, 956 (2003).
Owners are not statutory employers unless:
[T]he owner is also the virtual proprietor or operator of the business there
carried on. To determine who is a virtual proprietor or operator, the Court
must consider whether the work being done pertains to the business, trade,
or occupation of the owner or proprietor and whether such business, trade, or
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occupation is being carried on by it for pecuniary gain. Generally, to find a
business or person to be a statutory employer, the work being carried out by
the independent contractor on the owner or proprietor's premises must have
been the type that could have been carried out by employees of the owner or
proprietor in the course of its usual trade or business. In short, "if a person is
normally equipped with manpower and tools to do a job and nevertheless
contracts it to another employer, he is the statutory employer of the second
employer's employees.

Id. (quotations omitted.)
BEA argues that, as the contracted operator of the INL ATR Complex, BEA is
clearly a category two statutory employer of Schuler. However, as set forth above, the
statute indicates that, to be considered a statutory employer, the "work being carried out
by the independent contractor on the owner or proprietor's premises must have been the
type that could have been carried out by employees of the owner or proprietor in the
course of its usual trade or business. I.C. § 72-233. To make a determination to this end,
the Court considers whether BEA is "normally equipped with manpower and tools" to
procure and deliver the pipes, "and nevertheless contract[ ed]" it to Cardmoore. BEA
argues the job performed-the delivery- is part of the larger services contract, and that the
DOE was equipped with the manpower and tools to make the delivery itself. BEA asserts
that this fact is not disputed.
The case with facts that provide the nearest parallel is Venters v. Sorrento

Delaware, Inc., 108 P.3d 392 (Idaho 2005). There, a cheese factory contracted with local
farmers to dispose of factory wastewater on their properties. Id. at 394. The cheese
factory contracted with a trucking company to transport the wastewater from the factory
site to the farmers. Id. In addition to the contract with the trucking company, the
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cheesemaker contracted with the farmers to allow for the disposal of the wastewater on
their properties. Id. at 394-95. A truck driver, employed by the trucking company, was
injured while delivering wastewater to one of the farmers. Id. at 395. The injury occurred
on the farmer's property. Id. At the time of his injury, the worker was covered by
worker's compensation insurance from the trucking company, his direct employer, and he
received benefits thereunder. Id.
The estate of the truck driver sued the cheese factory and the farmer. Id. The
farmer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting under category two, he was a
statutory employer of the truck driver. Id. The cheese factory also filed a motion for
summary judgment, asserting it was the truck driver's statutory employer. Id. The court
held it was clear that, because the farmer was not engaged in the business of hauling
water for pecuniary gain, the farmer was not a category two statutory employer. Id. at
397.
Here, although the DOE, a mammoth government agency, may very well have had
the manpower and type of truck deliver IPT 28 to the ATR Complex, the DOE is not in
the delivery transportation business. Furthermore, BEA was even farther removed from
that type of activity, as it contracted with the DOE to manage and operate the ATR
Complex, and was in not involved with the design of nuclear experiments or the
procurement of materials to complete them. BEA was, quite simply, not in the trucking or
transportation business. This reasoning coincides with the Court's analysis above
regarding BEA's contractual separation from the parties contracting under the DOE's
Naval Reactors office. To extend the DOE's potential statutory employer immunity
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through all branches of its operations at the ATR Complex would have ramifications not
intended by the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act. For these and the foregoing reasons,
the Court finds BEA was not a category two statutory employer of Schuler.
5.

The corrections in Schuler's proposed amended complaint are not futile.
Lastly, the Court will address Schuler' s motion for leave to amend his complaint.

Schuler seeks leave to amend his complaint in the following five ways: (1) to remove
Pamela Schuler as a plaintiff and her loss of consortium claim as a result of her recent
death; (2) to remove the allegation that Aaron Schuler was employed by Combined
Transport Logistics Group, Inc., because it was discovered that he was an employee of
Cardmoore Trucking Limited Partnership; (3) to add an allegation regarding the BEA
security guard negligently instructing Schuler about where to park his truck; (4) to add a
cause of action for negligent failure to train employees; and (5) to add a cause of action
for negligent maintenance and repair or the security barrier. (Dkt. 22-1 at 3.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs pleading amendments prior to trial.
Rule 15 provides that the "court should freely give leave" to amend "when justice so
requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply this policy "with
extreme liberality." Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th
Cir. 2001). Courts consider the following factors when deciding whether to permit leave
to amend:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of
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amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely
given."
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 183 (1962).
Although all the Forman factors may be considered by the court, weighing
potential prejudice to the opposing party caused by any amendment carries the greatest
weight. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)
"Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there
exists a presumption under Rule 15 (a) in favor of granting leave to amend." Id. (emphasis
in original).
In response to Schuler' s motion to amend his complaint, BEA does not argue the
proposed amendments would cause it prejudice. Instead, BEA asserts that the
amendments would be futile because, as explained above, BEA asserts Schuler' s claims
are defeated by the statutory employer doctrine. Yet, as the Court has explained,
Schuler's claims are not so defeated. Further, the Comi finds Schuler's one new
allegation and two new causes of action are sufficiently related to the existing causes of
action as to not cause undue prejudice to BEA. For these reasons, the Court will grant
Schuler' s motion for leave to amend the complaint.

CONCLUSION
The Court will deny BEA' s motion for summary judgment because BEA was not
a category one or category two statutory employer of Schuler. The Court will also grant
Schuler' s motion for leave to file an amended complaint because the proposed
amendments are not futile and will not cause undue prejudice to BEA.
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ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1)

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 15) is DENIED.

2)

Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Dkj. 22) is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file the proposed First Amended Complaint

within ten (10) days of this Order.

DATED:June 12, 2019

Candy W. Dale
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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Attorneys for Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

Case No.: CVl0-18-7400

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC
FABRICATION, LLC'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Defendant.

Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC ("TRC"), by and through its attorney of record,
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, hereby submits its Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I.
INTRODUCTION
On October 30, 2019, Plaintiffs Dale Kelly and Nancy Kelly ("Plaintiffs") filed their
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Opposition").
Though quite lengthy, the Opposition focuses primarily on a single legally unsupported
argument - that the application of the statutory employer doctrine requires "the existence of an

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAGE-1
4 7820.0034.12374360.1

Page 172

unbroken chain of interrelated contracts for services between TRC and the injured party, Dale
Kelly" and that "[t]he chain of contracts TRC purports to rely upon includes at its core a contract
for the sale of goods."

Opposition at 2.

Based on this goods versus services distinction,

Plaintiffs conclude that TRC cannot rely on statutory employer immunity, and that TRC' s
Motion must be denied. Aside from this goods/services distinction, Plaintiffs do not otherwise
substantively oppose the Category 1 statutory employer aspect of the Motion.
Plaintiffs single argument fails for a variety reasons.

First, the purported statutory

requirement that every contract in the contractual chain must be a contract predominant!y for
"services" creates a new extra-statutory requirement that does not exist in the text of Idaho Code
§ 72-102( 13 )(a), nor can it be gleaned from Idaho appellate and district court decisions
interpreting the statutory employer doctrine. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly refused to
graft new requirements onto the statutes dealing with the statutory employer doctrine.

See,

Gonzalez v. Lamb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120 (2005). Second, a requirement that every link in

the "statutory employer" contractual chain must be a "services" contract, in addition to not
existing in the statutes, would cast serious doubt on (and significantly undermine) the important
protection of "sure and certain relief' that the IWCA and statutory employer doctrine were
designed to provide to Idaho's workers.
With respect to the Category 2 statutory employer component of TRC' s Motion, Plaintiff
argues primarily that TRC has failed to support its argument with citations to the record. That
alleged defect, if any, has now been cured by the concurrently-filed supplemental affidavit.
II.

REPLY ARGUMENT
A.

TRC is a Category 1 statutory employer and entitled to immunity and summary
judgment.
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For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' arguments in the Opposition regarding TRC's
claim to Category 1 statutory employer status are unpersuasive.
i.

The plain language of the applicable sections of the IWCA and Idaho case
law does not support Plaintiffs' argument that every link in the "statutory
employer" chain must be predominantly a "services" contract in order for
statutory employer immunity to apply.

Plaintiffs' argument in opposition to TRC' s Category 1 statutory employer argument
focuses only on the definition of "employer" as set out in Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(a).
Plaintiffs argue that to be deemed an "employer," a contractor must be part of an unbroken chain
of interrelated contracts for services between the contractor and claimant. Simply put, Plaintiffs'
argument reads into the statute a requirement that does not exist in the text of the statute. Idaho
Code§ 72-102(13)(a) defines "employer" specifically as follows:
"Employer" means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted
the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It includes
the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor
or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being
an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of
the workers there employed. It also includes, for purposes of section 72-438(12)
and ( 14), Idaho Code, a municipality, village, county or fire district that utilizes
the services of volunteer firefighters. If the employer is secured, it means his
surety so far as applicable.
Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(a) (emphasis added). Here, all that the plain language of the statute
requires for immunity to apply is a showing that TRC (the contractor at the top of the contractual
chain) "impliedly hired" the "services" of Dale Kelly. The undisputed facts here show that TRC
entered into a contract, even if we assume it to be characterized as predominantly for the
purchase of goods, that required someone to perform a service -- the transportation and delivery
of the steel tubes purchased by TRC (e.g. "F.O.B. Delivered") (see Roche Aff. at

,r 3,

Exh. 2),

and that Dale Kelly - by virtue of the chain of contracts that began with the contract between
TRC and Brown Strauss - was the someone that was "impliedly hired" to provide the "service"
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of delivering the steel tubes.

1

In other words, even if the principal contract between TRC and

Brown Strauss were assumed for this motion to be predominantly for the purchase of goods, it
involved a service component which was subcontracted out and ultimately performed by Dale
Kelly. See e.g., Spencer v. Al/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000) (finding
statutory employer immunity applicable even though principal contract dealt with the purchase
of a good --- timber); see also Bailey Aff. at ,r 5, Exh. D at 9 (Judge Anderson's table comparing
Spencer and Snow).

Dale Kelly was unquestionably performing services pursuant to that

subcontract at the time of his claimed injuries, as evidenced by the fact that he applied for and
received worker's compensation benefits. This should end the inquiry, and result in the entry of
summary judgment in TRC's favor.
Notably, nowhere in the statute (and nowhere in Idaho case law), is there any hint of a
requirement that every contract in the chain must be predominantly a "services" contract for
Category 1 statutory employer immunity to apply to an upstream contractor. The IWCA does
not adopt any sort of "predominant factor" goods/services test akin to what is found in UCC
Article 2.

2

Moreover, TRC is not aware of any Idaho appellate or state district court case that

has adopted UCC Article 2' s "predominant factor" test in the context of statutory employer
immunity. Indeed, none of the Idaho statutory employer cases cited by Plaintiffs adopt the UCC
"predominant factor" test argued for by Plaintiffs, let alone impose an extra-statutory
1

Plaintiffs' characterization that TRC "wrongly urges" the Court to "all but ignore" the requirements of the statute is
perplexing, when TRC is applying the statute as written and it is Plaintiffs that are seeking to graft on the additional
requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts that does not exist in the text of the statute.
Opposition at 7.
2
TRC does not dispute that Idaho has adopted the "predominant factor" test to determine applicability of the UCC
to a particular case. See Pittsley v. Houser, 125 Idaho 820, 823, 875 P.2d 232, 235 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Silicon
Int'! Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 546, 314 P.3d 593,601 (2013); Fox v. Mountain W Elec., Inc., 137
Idaho 703, 709, 52 P.3d 848, 854 (2002). However, TRC is unaware of any reported Idaho case adopting or
extending the "predominant factor" test to the IWCA statutory employer context, let alone a case that adopts any
sort of extra-statutory requirement that every contract in the statutory employer contractual chain be predominantly
for services.
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requirement that every contract in the contractual chain must have "services" as its "predominant
factor." See Opposition at 9; Krinitt v. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 162 Idaho 425, 432, 398
P.3d 158, 165 (2017) (no mention of predominant factor test, let alone a requirement of an
unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts); Ewing v. State, Dep't of Transp., 147 Idaho
305, 208 P.3d 287 (2009) (no mention of predominant factor test, let alone a requirement of an
unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts); Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 203 P.3d
1246 (2009) (no mention of predominant factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken
chain of predominantly service contracts); Cordova v. Bonneville Cty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93,
144 Idaho 637, 641, 167 P.3d 774, 778 (2007) (no mention of predominant factor test and
focusing on only whether claimant "work[ ed] under contract of service" with an "employer," not
whether every contract in the chain was predominantly for services); Fuhriman v. State, Dep 't of
Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 153 P.3d 480 (2007) (no mention of predominant factor test, let alone a
requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts); Kolar v. Cassia Cty.
Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 (2005) (no mention of predominant factor test, let alone a
requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts); Gonzalez v. Lamb
Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120, 124 P.3d 996 (2005) (no mention of predominant factor test, let
alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts); Venters v.
Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 248, 108 P.3d 392, 395 (2005) (no mention of
predominant factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service
contracts); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003) (no mention of
predominant factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominant! y service
contracts); Dewey v. Merrill, 124 Idaho 201, 858 P.2d 740 (1993) (no mention of predominant
factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts);
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Rhodes v. Sunshine Min. Co., 113 Idaho 162, 742 P.2d 417 (1987) (no mention of predominant
factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts);
Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Prod., Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 690 P.2d 324 (1984) (no mention of
predominant factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service
contracts); Miller v. FMC Corp., 93 Idaho 695,471 P.2d 550 (1970) (no mention of predominant
factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service contracts);
Adam v. Titan Equip. Supply Corp., 93 Idaho 644, 470 P.2d 409 (1970) (no mention of
predominant factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service
contracts); Russell v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 466, 305 P.2d 740 (1956) (no mention of
predominant factor test, let alone a requirement of an unbroken chain of predominantly service
contracts).

Notably, both the Fuhriman and Robison cases cited above actually involved

contracts that were mixed goods and services contracts. Robison, 139 Idaho at 208-09, 76 P.3d
at 952-53 (addressing roofing contract, which necessarily included labor and materials);
Fuhriman, 143 Idaho at 802, 153 P.3d at 482 (2007) (addressing road construction contract,
which necessarily included labor and materials). Notwithstanding that fact, the Idaho Supreme
Court did not perform any analysis whatsoever about whether goods or services were the
"predominant factor" of the respective principal contracts in each of those cases. Clearly, under
existing Idaho law, the question of whether a contract's "predominant factor" is good or services
is entirely irrelevant to the question of whether a statutory employer relationship exists. And
such a requirement would be completely counter to the express purpose of the IWCA and the
statutory employer doctrine to expand the definition of the "employer" to make sure and certain
the workers compensation relief for workmen.

See, Gonzalez, supra, at] 22.

The proposed

additional requirement for services only contracts would severely limit the definition of an
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"employer" under the statutory employer doctrine in clear violation of the Legislature's intent to
expand that definition. See, Robinson, supra.
As recognized by Judge Anderson's opinion in Snow v. Intermountain Erectors, Inc.,
even a contract with the predominant purpose of purchasing goods can result in someone, by
virtue of a chain of contracts and subcontracts, being "impliedly hired" to perform a service
within the meaning of the IWCA. Bailey Aff. at ,r 5, Exh. D at 11. Judge Anderson did not adopt
any extra-statutory requirement that every contract in the contractual chain have "services" as its
"predominant factor." Instead, Judge Anderson simply applied the plain text of the statute and
applicable Idaho case law and determined that Intermountain Erectors was a statutory employer
of Dale Snow and entitled to immunity, notwithstanding that the principal contract at the apex of
the contractual chain arguably had the purchase of goods (steel) as its predominant component.
Id. at 9 (noting that "Intermountain purchased steel from K&T Steel for use in the construction

project").
The out-of-jurisdiction cases relied on by Plaintiffs in support of their goods/services
argument are not only not binding, but also deal with distinct worker's compensation laws in
other states and are also factually distinguishable and unpersuasive. Opposition at 10-11. These
cases do not focus on the definition of "employer" as Plaintiffs do here (see Opposition at 6), but
instead, deal with the definition of "contractor," are applying a Category 2 statutory employer
analysis, or both. See e.g., Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789 (W.D. Ky. 2003)
(discussing Kentucky law defining "contractor" as a "person who contracts with another ... [t]o
have work performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of the work of the trade,
business, occupation, or profession of such person" and determining that Ford was not a

contractor under that definition); Meyer v. Piggly Wiggly No. 24, Inc., 338 S.C. 471, 474, 527

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT TRC FABRICATION LLC'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAGE-7
47820.0034.12374360.1

Page 178

S.E.2d 761, 763 (2000) (ostensibly applying a Category 2 analysis and determining that a
vendor-vendee relationship does not render one a "contractor" and that "a vendor's employee is
not the purchaser's statutory employee basically because the vendor does not perform part of the
purchaser's business."); Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc., 252 Va. 42, 44, 471 S.E.2d 473, 47475 (1996) (ostensibly applying a Category 2 analysis and determining that "an employee of a
company supplying materials is not engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the general
contractor when the employee is injured while delivering the materials to the job site."); Mobley
v. Flowers, 211 Ga. App. 761, 761, 440 S.E.2d 473, 474-75 (1994) (noting that "[i]n order to
make a party to the contract for the sale of goods such a 'contractor,' the contract to sell must be
accompanied by an undertaking ... to render substantial service in connection with the goods
sold."); Gray Bldg. Sys. v. Trine, 260 Ga. 252, 252, 391 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1990) (same); Shipley
v. Gipson, 773 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. App. 1989), overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection,
121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (noting that "only a contract
which delegates to another the performance of the usual operations of the employer's business
comes within the meaning of the statute."); Wilson v. Daniel Int'/ Corp., 260 S.C. 548, 554, 197
S.E.2d 686, 689 (1973) (noting Category 2 "trade, business or occupation" requirement); Hacker
v. Brookover Feed Yard, Inc., 202 Kan. 582, 586, 451 P.2d 506, 511 (1969) (performing
Category 2 analysis and concluding that "[a] sale and delivery of merchandise is not such a
contractual relationship as is anticipated by K.S.A. 44-503 creating statutory employers and
employees for the purpose of workmen's compensation."'); Doyle v. Missouri Val. Constructors,
Inc., 288 F. Supp. 121, 123, fn. 1 (D. Colo. 1968) (noting that statutory employer immunity in
Colorado applied only where the claimant was "performing work which would ordinarily be
accomplished through the defendant's employees, as required by Colorado decisional law[,]"
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(e.g. Category 2)); Garrett v. Tubular Prod., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D. Va. 1959) (while
not entirely clear from the opinion whether the Eastern District of Virginia is applying something
akin to a Category 1 or Category 2 analysis, it is clear that the opinion turned on a
vendor/supplier vs. subcontractor distinction).
Here, an "impliedly hired" employee of a subcontractor (Kelly), rather than a vendor,
made a delivery to TRC, resulting in a clear contractor/subcontractor chain of contracts running
from TRC to Kelly, and obviating any sort of viable argument that TRC is not a "contractor"
under a Category 1 analysis in Idaho. The above cases focusing on a vendor/vendee as opposed
to contractor/subcontractor relationship are therefore materially distinguishable and unpersuasive
even if they were applicable in a Category 1 context. Moreover, nearly all of the above cases
appear to be analyzed solely under something equivalent to Idaho's Category 2 statutory
employer analysis, leading TRC to conclude that: (1) defense counsel in these cases did not raise
a Category 1 statutory employer argument; and/or (2) at the time of these respective cases in
these respective states, nothing equivalent to Idaho's Category 1 statutory employer immunity
existed in these states. This distinction is critical, because unless a defendant is also engaged in
the transportation and delivery business (i.e. a sale of goods between two entities that each
provide transportation and delivery services), a purchase of goods contract with a transportation
and delivery component would never qualify a defendant for statutory employer immunity under
a Category 2 analysis.

Again that result is a clear violation of the Legislative directive to

expand, not contract the definition of an employer beyond that established in the common law.
Critically, even if the above cases were on point, they do not adopt UCC Article 2' s
"predominant factor" test in the statutory employer context. At most, in distinguishing between
goods and services, the case law in this context looks to whether the purchase of goods was
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accompanied by "substantial services." See e.g., Bros. v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 217 Ark.
632, 638, 232 S.W.2d 646, 650 (1950) ("We do not hold that a mere contract for the sale of
goods makes either the buyer or seller, or both, a 'contractor' within the meaning of section 6,
but we are committed to the view that when the contract to sell is accompanied by an
undertaking by either party to render substantial services in connection with the goods sold, that
party is a 'contractor' within the meaning of the section.") (emphasis added); Davis v. Ford
Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788 (W.D. Ky. 2003) ("There appears to be two notable

exceptions to this general rule: ( 1) when the contract to sell is accompanied by an undertaking by
either party to render substantial services in connection with goods sold; or (2) when the
3

transaction is a mere devise or subterfuge to avoid liability."). In Hall v. 84 Lumber Co., No.
CV409-057, 2011 WL 13279174, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2011), the Southern District of Georgia
noted:
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that "[a] mere contract for the sale
of goods does not make either the buyer or seller or both a 'contractor' as used in
[O.C.G.A.] § 34-9-8." Gray Bldg. Sys. v. Trine, 260 Ga. 252, 253, 391 S.E.2d
764, 765 (1990). However, a party can be a statutory employer if the contract is
"accompanied by an undertaking by either party to render substantial services in
connection with the goods sold." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, Defendant 84
Lumber qualifies as a statutory employer if the delivery of the materials to its
customers is a substantial service.
After reviewing the applicable case law in Georgia, the Court concludes that the
delivery of the goods was a substantial service, making Defendant 84 Lumber a
statutory employer with tort immunity.
TRC was able to locate only a single case in U.S. jurisdictions (state and federal) that has adopted the UCC's
"predominant factor" test in the statutory employer context - Judge Dale's recent opinion in the case of Schuler v.
Battelle Energy All., LLC, No. 4:18-CV-00234-CWD, 2019 WL 2477609, at *5 (D. Idaho June 12, 2019). In that
case, Judge Dale's adoption of the "predominant factor" test appears to be directly traceable to the concession of
Battelle's prior counsel in that case (the undersigned has since substituted in to defend Battelle in that still pending
case). In any event, Plaintiffs' reliance on that case is curious in that Judge Dale rejected Schuler's argument that
the delivery of in-pile tubes in that case was predominantly a contract for goods rather than services. Nonetheless,
TRC asserts that given the text ofldaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a) and the public policy argument below, Judge Dale's
adoption of the "predominant factor" test in the statutory employer context is not supported by existing law and/or
considerations of good public policy.
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Hall v. 84 Lumber Co., No. CV409-057, 2011 WL 13279174, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2011)
(emphasis added). While the Hall Court dealt with the slightly different context, it's finding that
delivery was "a substantial service" in connection with the purchase of goods is equally
applicable to TRC here. Thus, even if the goods/services distinction mattered at every level of
the contractual chain (which under existing Idaho law, it does not), the delivery of the steel tubes
was a "substantial service" performed in connection with the purchase of the steel tubes.
Therefore, even if the case law cited by Plaintiffs were applicable here, the principal contract at
issue - even if deemed to be predominantly for the purchase of goods - was accompanied by the
"substantial service" of delivery, which as Plaintiffs note, was billed at $1,850 and constituted
about 7% of the total invoice amount. Opposition at 4.
In sum, because TRC (a contractor) at least "impliedly hired" the services of Dale Kelly
to deliver the steel tubes through a chain of subcontracts, TRC is a statutory employer of Dale
Kelly under Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(a). The Plaintiffs' theoretical defense fails to follow the
instructions of Ventners, supra, where the Court noted that to properly define an "employer" in
this context a court must read Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(a), together with Idaho Code § 72216(1).

Such an analysis leads to the conclusion that, "a statutory employer [is] liable for

payment of worker's compensation to an employee of its contractor whenever a contractor is
liable to its employee under the Worker's Compensation Laws." Fuhriman v. State, supra at 805,
summarized very succinctly, that the Category 1 protection for employers exists for "employers
who make use of a contractor's or subcontractor's employees." The Court added no further
requirements and made no classification or characterization of the type of contracts involved in
the transactions. Clearly, TRC falls within the definition of a statutory employer. In an attempt
to rebut this clear and obvious conclusion, Plaintiffs seek to graft into the IWCA (and impose on
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TRC) the "predominant factor" test from UCC Article 2. From there, Plaintiffs further elaborate
that the IWCA contains an additional requirement that does not exist in the text of the statute namely, that all contracts in the unbroken chain must be predominantly for services in order for
statutory employer immunity to apply. As set forth above, Plaintiffs' arguments run far afield of
the requirements of the plain text of the statute and of existing Idaho case law, and should be
rejected.
ii.

In addition to contradicting the plain language of the IWCA, a finding that
every link in the "statutory employer" contractual chain must be a "services"
contract casts doubt on and undermines the important protection that the
statutory employer doctrine was intended to provide to Idaho's workers.

As set forth in TRC's prior briefing, the Idaho Legislature enacted the IWCA to
remove-with few exceptions-all workplace injuries from "private controversy." I.C. § 72201. To that end, the Legislature crafted a system whereby "sure and certain relief' would be
provided to injured workers regardless of fault. Id. Part of the "sure and certain relief' provided
to Idaho's workers through the IWCA is the statutory employer doctrine, which provides
"upstream" relief to Idaho workers in the event their direct employer has failed to provide
workers compensation coverage. Idaho Code § 72-216(1). Again, this is known as the "grand
bargain," and exists in Idaho (as set forth in the previously-filed Memorandum) as well as in
other states. See e.g., Hall v. 84 Lumber Co., No. CV409-057, 2011 WL 13279174, at *2 (S.D.
Ga. Mar. 4, 2011) ("The purpose of this statute is to pressure employers to require that the
subcontractors they hire to assist them in conducting business carry workers' compensation
insurance. This pressure is applied by rendering the employer secondarily liable for workers'
compensation benefits in the event of a workplace injury. However, the statutory employer does
receive one important benefit in exchange for the additional exposure: the promise of tort
immunity provided by workers' compensation.") (citations omitted); Humphrey v. Whole Foods
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Mkt. Rocky Mountain/Sw. L.P., 250 P.3d 706, 709 (Colo. App. 2010) (This provision prevents

employers from avoiding responsibility to pay workers' compensation benefits by conducting
their business through a separate, uninsured employer.

In tum, section 8--41--401 (2),

C.R.S.2009, provides statutory employers concomitant immunity from suit if the injured
worker's direct employer carries workers' compensation insurance.").
Plaintiffs' attempt to tum the "grand bargain" on its head by resorting to ridiculous
"house of horrors" examples such as a business purchasing a single stapler being held liable for
worker's compensation benefits for UPS delivery drivers. However, Plaintiffs' projected sea
change in the way people do business, is, as a practical matter, very unlikely to occur. The
reality is that most companies (especially large companies like UPS used in Plaintiffs example)
provide workers' compensation insurance for their employees. This reality is in all likelihood
the result of the very purpose of the statutory employer doctrine, and the pressure contractors
have placed on the parties they do business with to purchase worker's compensation coverage.
However, in the rare circumstance where that is not the case, the Idaho legislature has already
made the policy choice that ABC, Inc., would, in Plaintiffs' far-fetched and unlikely example, be
liable as a statutory employer had all upstream contractors failed to secure worker's
compensation coverage for the injured driver making the delivery to ABC, Inc. Indeed, this is
one of the lynchpin principles of the statutory employer doctrine. Adam v. Titan Equip. Supply
Corp., 93 Idaho 644,647,470 P.2d 409,412 (1970) ("Undoubtedly one object of the statute in

making the operator of the business liable for workmen's compensation, was to afford full
protection to workmen by preventing the operator or contractor avoiding liability under the
workmen's compensation act by subcontracting work to others who might be irresponsible.").
Plaintiffs example proves that the Plaintiffs misunderstand not only the workings of the
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statutory employer doctrine, but also its stated Legislative purpose. As a result, this Court should
put no stock in Plaintiffs' misguided theory that would limit workers protection under IWCA.
In fact, a much more realistic "house of horrors" would potentially result if the Court
were to accept Plaintiffs' invitation to adopt and apply UCC Article 2' s "predominant factor" test
in the statutory employer context. Indeed, imagine the same facts of this case with one minor
wrinkle - that neither Dale Kelly Trucking, nor any of the upstream contractors of Dale Kelly
save TRC had secured worker's compensation coverage for their employers. Would it be good
public policy, particularly given that Mr. Kelly was unquestionably "impliedly hired" by TRC to
perform the service of transportation/delivery of the tubes, to allow TRC to avoid payment of
worker's compensation benefits to Mr. Kelly on the ill-defined technical grounds that the
"predominant factor" in TRC' s upstream contract with Brown Strauss was primarily the
purchase of steel tubes, not the transportation and delivery services expressly required by that
contract and that Mr. Kelly was "impliedly hired" to perform? It does not take much imagination
to realize that if Mr. Kelly had not obtained worker's compensation coverage through Dale Kelly
Trucking or any other upstream contractor, then at least Mr. Kelly's answer to this question
would be "no," and he would have sought recovery of worker's compensation benefits from
TRC under the statutory employer doctrine.
However, in such a scenario, under Plaintiffs' proposed "predominant factor" test
approach, Mr. Kelly's right to what he otherwise would have assumed to be "sure and certain"
relief under the IWCA would be clouded, would require the injured worker to incur significant
legal fees and costs to obtain a determination of his or her rights, and would ultimately come
down to a Court's determination of the predominant factors/motivations of upstream contractors
in entering into contracts. Idaho worker's rights to "sure and certain" relief under the IWCA
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should not be clouded and overcomplicated - e.g. made unsure and uncertain - by the adoption
of the UCC' s "predominant factor" test in the worker's compensation context. In resolving this
issue, it cannot be overlooked that adopting the "predominant factor" test and applying it to
every contract in the chain would not only undermine and cloud upstream contractors' rights to
immunity, but would, as a corollary, also cloud and undermine the important "sure and certain"
relief that the statutory employer doctrine was intended to provide to Idaho's workers.
TRC is entitled to summary judgment as a Category 1 statutory employer.
C.

TRC is also Dale Kelly's Category 2 statutory employer and is also entitled to
immunity and summary judgment on that additional ground.
In addition to the Category 1 argument addressed above, TRC has also moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that TRC is a Category 2 statutory employer of Dale Kelly.
This alternative ground requires a finding that "'the work being carried out by the independent
contractor on the owner or proprietor' s premises must have been the type that could have been
carried out by employees of the owner or proprietor in the course of its usual trade or business.'
In short, if a person is normally equipped with manpower and tools to do a job and nevertheless
contracts it to another, he is a statutory employer of the second employer's employees." Robison
v. Bateman-Hall Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212, 76 P.3d 951, 956 (2003) (quoting Harpole v. State,

131 Idaho 437, 440, 958 P.2d 594, 597 (1998)); see also Idaho Code§ 72-223(1) ("Such third
party shall not include. . . the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the
proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an
independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there
employed.") (emphasis added).
Here, if the focus of the Category 2 inquiry is on the task of unloading and handling the
steel at TRC, it is undisputed that TRC was in the business of handling and fabricating large
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steel building components like those involved in this incident, and that a TRC employee was in
the process of unloading the tubing at the time Kelly intervened and was injured. If the focus of
the Category 2 inquiry is on the transportation and delivery services provided by Kelly, then it
undisputed that at the time Kelly was injured, TRC was" normally equipped with manpower and
tools" needed to, if necessary, pick up and transport the purchased building components to
TRC' s facility, but that in this circumstance, such service was contracted out to Kelly.
Plaintiffs only briefly substantively oppose this aspect of TRC's Motion by disputing
TRC' s characterization that Kelly participated in the unloading process, notwithstanding Kelly's
admission at his deposition that he removed straps securing the load to his trailer so that the
unloading process could begin.

Opposition at 4 (citing D. Kelly Dep. P. 73).

Primarily,

Plaintiffs oppose TRC's Category 2 argument by claiming that TRC has failed to adequately
support this additional basis for summary judgment with citation to facts in the record.
Opposition at 19 ("TRC has not presented any evidence that it had the trucks and employees
necessary to haul its purchases of steel products from businesses such as Brown Strauss for
delivery to its fabrication facility in Idaho Falls"). Given that it was Plaintiffs' counsel that
questioned TRC employee John Hender at this deposition regarding all of the elements needed to
establish a Category 2 statutory employer, TRC considered the question unopposed for purposes
of this Motion. To the extent citation in the record is needed to support the argument, TRC has
concurrently filed a supplemental declaration attaching relevant portions of Mr. Hender's
deposition testimony that establishes that: (1) TRC was engaged in steel fabrication work of
converting raw steel into steel needed for construction projects (Hender Depo. at pp. 38, 62); (2)
TRC owned a semi-truck and flat bed trailer (identical to the platform used by Kelly) used for
hauling and making deliveries of fabricated steel to customers (Hender Depo. at pp. 11, 39); (3)
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that TRC employed John Hender principally as a delivery driver (Hender Depo. at pp. 10, 38);
(4) that truck driving was John Hender's primary responsibility at TRC (consisting of 69.5
percent of John Hender's time) (Hender Depo. at pp. 10-12); and (5) that John Hender also
assisted with loading and unloading trucks at TRC when he was available (Hender Depo. at pp.
11, 77-78). This testimony establishes that TRC was "equipped with manpower and tools"
needed to perform loading and unloading, and the transportation and delivery services performed
by Mr. Kelly had TRC and Brown Strauss not agreed to contract those services out to Jay
Transport, and ultimately, to Dale Kelly Trucking.
TRC is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a Category 2 statutory employer.
D.

The parties agree that loss of consortium claims are derivative.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Nancy Kelly's claims are derivative of Dale Kelly's
claims. Therefore, if the Court finds that Dale Kelly's claims are barred by the exclusive
remedy rule under a Category 1 or Category 2 statutory employer analysis, then so too is Nancy
Kelly's derivative loss of consortium claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing argument and argument set forth in TRC' s prior Memorandum in
Support, TRC respectfully requests that the Court find that Dale and Nancy Kelly's claims are
barred by the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho's workers compensation law, and therefore, enter
and order granting summary judgment to TRC.
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DATED this 6th day of November, 2019.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

/s/ John A. Bailey
JOHN A. BAILEY JR.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day ofNovember, 2019, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Brent O. Roche
Rachel A. Miller
Racine Olson, PLLP
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

□

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
□ Hand Delivered
0 iCourt
□ E-mail: bor@racinelaw.net
□ Fax: 208.232.6109

/s/ John A. Bailey Jr.
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
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Electronically Filed
11/14/2019 9:09 AM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: John Frey, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 233-2001
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150
Email: ibailey@hawleytroxell.com

Attorneys for Defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No.: CVl0-18-7400
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT TRC
FABRICATION, LLC'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
County of Bannock )
I, JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and states as follows:
1.

Your Affiant is a citizen of the United States, a resident of Bannock County,

Idaho, of legal age, and competent to be a witness. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in
the State of Idaho, am counsel of record for defendant TRC Fabrication, LLC herein, and if
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called upon to testify, could testify to the following, all of which are within my own personal
knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" are true and correct copies of exce-rpts from the

deposition of John Hender taken on June 19, 2019.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this
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of November, 2019.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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NOTARY
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Q. When did you terminate at TRC?

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
I

12

i 13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21

22
23
I

24

125

A It's been a few months ago.
Q. So, we re in June of 2019. Was it earlier
this year?
A. Yeah.
Q. And which month?
A. Close to three months.
Q. So, in March?
A. lsh.
Q. About March 2019, you ended your employment at
TRC. Was it voluntary?
A. Yes.
Q. And why did you resign?
A, Well, I did some bodywork on something while I
was here and I -- the job that I did and with my
abilities, I didn t think that driving a truck was what
I should be doing. l1ve got talents that don 1t -- that
don't necessarily have to have me on the road all the
time.
And my wife has some serious health concerns,
and I've got a regular schedule. And I didn't have a
regular schedule when I was driving truck for TRC.
Q. Was truck driving your primary responsibility
at TRC?
A. Yes.

Hender, John
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Q. And what was your typical schedule, if you had

2 one, when you did that?
3
A Oh 1 there was hardly a typical schedule. I'd
4 leave at 5:00 0 1clock in the morning or 4:00, or
5 sometimes I'd be gone for a couple days and sometimes
6 the day would go up to 14 hours in a day including
7 breaks.
8
Q. The -- let's see. Do you have a -- I take it
9 you had a commercial driver's license?
10
A Still do.
11
Q. Okay, And what type of trucks were you
12 driving for TRC?
13
A A semi.
14
Q. Pulling a flatbed trailer?
15
A Yes.
16
Q. That was your typical truck accommodation?
17
A Yes, tractor-trailer. As well as what they
18 hired me to do was operate a forklift as well. So, when
19 I wasn't on the road, I was either loading my trailer or
20 loading other things, other trailers.
21
Q. Did your responsibilities also include
22 unloading trucks that were making deliveries to TRC?
23
A Yeah, when I was available to do that
24
Q. Okay.
25
A I was -- I was mostly gone, though.
Page 12

Q. Can you estimate how much of your time was
2 spent away from the TRC facility here in Idaho Falls?
3
A. 69.5 percent.
4
Q. Okay. Did you ever do the math?
5
A. Nope.
6
Q. That's just your estimate?
7
A That1s right.
8
Q, Okay. More than 50 percent of the time?
9
A Yeah.
1O
Q. More than two-thirds of the time or
11 thereabouts?
12
A. Sure.
13
MR. BAILEY: Objection, That misstates his
14 testimony. That 1s an estimate.
15
Q. (BY MR ROCHE) Do you ever work in building
16 construction?
17
A I have substantial time in building
18 construction in my life, yes.
19
Q, Okay. Before we leave the topic of your
20 current employment, who do you work for?
21
A Classic Truck Collision.
22
Q. Is that a company that you had worked for
23 previously?
24
A Yes.
25
Q. Where's that located?

Pages 1, 10, 11 1 12
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A Yes.
2
Q. How many different shops are on the TRC
3
3 facility?
4
time.
the
at
three
were
There
A
4
5
Q. Okay. Can you Identify those by name?
5
6
A The east shop, the west shop, and the
6
7
7 painter -- the paint shop.
8
Q. And in those three shops, fabrication work is
8
9
needed
steel
the
into
steel
9 done converting the raw
10
10 for-- by customers for their construction projects?
11
A I believe so 1 yes.
11
1 12
Q. Okay. Was it your understanding that Bo's
12
13 primary responsibility was moving steel around for the 13
14 shops to use in their fabrication or moving the finished 14
15
15 product around from the shops?
16A. Material handling.
16
Q. Okay. Was Bo also a driver making deliveries 17
17
18
18 of the finished product?
. 19
A. No.
19
20
Q, Were you the only driver?
20
21
A. The only one employed by TRC,
21
Q, So, by your answer, 1take it TRC used private 22
! 22
23
trucking companies to make some deliveries?
24
A Yes.
. Q. Th~y only have the one truck that you drove to 25

2

1 make the deliveries?
A. One semi, as well as a dually Chevy pickup.
2

3

Q.

So, did you use both to make the deliveries or

4 do you -A. Yes.
5

6

Q. Okay. Anybody else that you can identity that

7 you worked with in the shipping and receiving
8 department?
A. Not that I can identify. There were several
9
1O people who came and went.
Q. One of those was Clint Davis, rlght?
11
A. He was here when I started and only for a
: 12
· 13 couple months after I came.
Q. And he told us yesterday that he resigned
14
15 because he didn't like the working conditions.
A Did he?
16
Q. Did you have an understanding that he had
17
18 issues with the way the company was asking him and the
19 shipping receiving department to work?
A He didn't share hls feelings with me.
20
Q, Okay. Was it a surprise to you when he
21
22 announced his resignation?
A I didn't~- I didn t hear him announce
23
24 anything. One day he was just gone.
Q. Okay. So, he didn't give you any heads-up
25
1

Hender, John
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A You know, they forgot to tell me.
Q. You weren't promoted to become the foreman of ,
the shipping and receiving department?
A No, no.
Q, All right. Did Bo get promoted?
A I don 1t know. I don't know what
administration did. Not my department.
Q. You continued to do your job as you had prior
to Mr. Davis' resignation?
A Yes! sir.
Q. And who would determine whether you were
working at TRC 1s facility or out on the road driving
truck? How did you receive those assignments?
A I would get notified that they needed
something somewhere by a certain time, and we would -and l would -- we'd make arrangements to load it, secure
it, and get it there.
Q, Okay. And who wou Id typically make those
notifications to you?
A Pretty much my supeivisor -Q. Okay.
A -- out in the -Q. And who was your supervisor?
A. It was Clint Davis.
Q. Who was your supervisor after he resigned?
A They -- they got a guy named Will Rodriguez.

'

2
3
4

5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
, 14

'15
16

17
18

I 19
20

I 21

22
23
24
25

Q. Was he new to the company?
A Yes.
Q. Was he hired to become the foreman of the
shipping and receiving department?
A Yes.
Q. And how long did you work under
Mr. Rodriguez's supervision?
A Until 1was done at TRC.
Q. So, that was about three months ago, you told
us?
A Correct
Q. So Mr, Rodriguez at that time was still the
foreman of shipping and receiving?
A, Yes.
Q. And do you recall when Mr. Rodriguez started
with TRC in relationship to Mr. Davis' resignation?
A I can 1t -- I can 1t be sure. I think that
somebody filled in who had been a yard supervisor
before, came and helped out in that area.
Q. Let's do it this way: Who was your supervisor
the day of the incident?
A It was probably Clint.
Q. He said he resigned a few days before the
incident Assume that to be true.
Pages 38, 39, 41, 42
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1 argumentative.
Q. (BY MR. ROCHE) We've talked a minute or -2
a
3 for moment) anyway, about Brian Nordstrom.
Do you understand that he was the safety
4
5 director at TRC?
A I wasn't aware of his capacity as far as that
6
7 being his capacity here at the time that I was hired,
Q. What was your understanding of his position at
8
9 the time?
A. Well, he was out in the field with
10
1
i 11 lntermountain Erectors. I'm not sure, l m not sure
12 about what his function was when I got hired.
Q. Okay.
13
A. I had seen him at job sites. He might have
14
15 been doing safety stuff.
Q. Okay. lntermountain Erectors is a related
16
17 company to TRC?
A Yes.
18
Q. And I guess the division of labor is TRC
19
20 fabricates the steel items, and then they sell those to
21 customers who are involved In building new buildings.
22 And lntermountain Erector sounds like they're involved
23 1n putting up the steel members to build the buildings;
24 is that right?
A. That's probably fair to say.
25
- - - -------•---

-----r~-

2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21

MR, BAILEY: Objection. Vague,
THE WITNESS: I was -- 1 was surprised how
busy we were, l was on the road all the time.
Q, (BY MR. ROCHE) All right. So does that
suggest you were not here at the yard unloading trucks
much during those first month and a halt?
MR. BAILEY: Objection. Asked and answered.
THE WITNESS: I probably loaded -- I probably
loaded more than unloaded through that period because
we'd load me, I'd go after l secured my !oad.
Q. (BY MR. ROCHE) Okay. And do you have any
sense as to how frequently loads of steel members would
be delivered to TRC during that time frame?
A. During that time frame -- the steel that was
going out of the yard? Sure. Somebody had to unload it
when it came. So, it had to be fairly frequently that
it came for it to go out like it was.
Q. Was the unloading process typically done by
one operator using one telehandler or forklift?
A. I -- I could only speculate.
Q. If you don't know, you don't know.
A. I was on the road most of the time. I can't
really answer that.
Q. Let's talk about the ones you were actually
ved with and limit it to that.

.
F
22
23
24

~
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Q. So, when you made deliveries using the TRC
2 trucks and flatbed trailer, were you typically making
3 deliveries to job sites where lntermountain Erectors was
4 the primary contractor?
MR BAILEY: Objection. Vague.
5
Q. (BY MR. ROCHE) Were you typically making
6
7 deliveries to job sites where lntermountain Erectors
8 were involved in the construction activitles?
A. Often, yeah,
9
Q. And that's when you would see Brian Nordstrom?
1O
A. Yeah, periodically.
11
Q. All right When you were hired at TRC, do you
12
13 know whether it had a safety manager, safety director?
A. I can 1t speculate what they had, I came to
14
15 peliorm the function they hired me for.
Q. Okay. And it sounds like Brian Nordstrom had
· 16
17 no involvement in training you on how to properly
18 operate a forklift or telehandler.
Is that accurate?
19
A. Not prior to my employment -- or not right at
20
21 the beginning of my employment.
Q. Okay. So, we've talked about the training
22
23 session or the video sessions here in the conference
24 room. He wasn't involved in that process.
A. 1don 1t know what involvement he may have had.
25

Were the instances when you were involved with
1
2 unloading trucks making deliveries 1 was that typically
3 done by just you or did you have co-workers also
4 involved in it?
MR BAILEY: Object as vague.
5
But certainly go ahead and try to answer.
6
WITNESS: Letts just -- let's just say
THE
7
8 that mostly I was involved with loading a truck that I
9 was taklng and setting it up so it was loaded safely to
1O where l could strap it down and take it where I was
11 taking it. So I was more responsible for loading and
12 moving than unloading,
Q. (BY MR. ROCHE) Okay. Was Dale Kelly's truck
13
14 the first one that you were involved in unloading?
A. No.
15
Q. Okay. And on those earlier instances, did you
16
17 work alone or did you work in conjunction with a
18 co-worker?
A Mostly -· mostly myself.
19
Q. And did you receive that ass!gnment by the
20
21 foreman on a given day?
A. Not necessarily.
22
Q. Sometimes you would just -23
A. l would just take initiative,
24
Q, That was encouraged here at TRC?
25

Hender, John
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Filed: 12/03/2019 13:24:33
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Whitmill, Cassie

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
DALE KELLY and NANCY KELLY,
Husband and Wife,
Case No. CVI0-18-7400
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
TRC FABRICATION, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,
Defendant.

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After delivering an order of metal tubing to TRC Fabrication, LLC (TRC) in Idaho Falls,
Dale Kelly was injured during the unloading process. Dale received worker's compensation
benefits through his direct employer Dale Kelly Trucking. Dale and Nancy Kelly brought this
case against TRC, seeking to recover damages for negligence and loss of consortium.
TRC moves this court for summary judgment, dismissing the Kellys' claim on the basis
that Idaho's worker's compensation law extends immunity to TRC.
TRC's motion for summary judgment is granted.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

TRC contracted with Brown Strauss Steel (Brown Strauss) to purchase metal tubing. The
contract designated the order as "F.O.B. DELIVERED." Roche Aff., Ex. 2.
Brown Strauss then contracted with Jay Transport to transport the tubing from California
to TRC's Idaho Falls facility. Jay Transport in turn contracted with Dale Kelly Trucking to
transport the tubing. Dale Kelly Trucking is a d/b/a of Dale Kelly.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT -
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Dale Kelly transported the metal tubing from California to TRC's Idaho Falls facility.
Upon the tubing's arrival in Idaho Falls, a TRC employee began to unload it from the truck.
While the truck was being unloaded, one of the metal tubes fell to the ground and struck Kelly in
the leg, injuring him.
Dale Kelly Trucking had worker's compensation insurance. Kelly applied for and
received workers compensation benefits as a result of his injuries.
The Kellys initiated this lawsuit against TRC, alleging causes of action for negligence
and loss of consortium.
TRC filed a motion for summary judgment on October 16, 2019.
The Kellys filed Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment on October 30, 2019.
This Court heard argument on TRC's motion for summary judgment on November 13,
2019.
TRC filed a Reply Memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on
November 14, 2019.

III.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v.

Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times, on the moving party to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 13 5 Idaho 586, 21
P.3d 908 (2001).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2
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When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services. Co.,
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a
court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v.
Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the nonmoving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 Idaho 237, 999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000).
The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Celotex, which stated:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc.,
137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488
(2002).
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his pleadings
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material
issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth,
136 Idaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -
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non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle,

Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P .3d 220 (2001 ).
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307
(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial. Id.

IV.

DISCUSSION

TRC seeks summary judgment, dismissing the Kellys' Complaint on the basis that TRC
is both a category 1 and a category 2 statutory employer under Idaho's worker's compensation
law and, therefore, immune from the Kellys' claims.
Under Idaho's worker's compensation law, parties injured in workplace accidents, with
few exceptions, are limited to recovering from their direct and upstream employers. LC. §§ 72101, et seq. "The exclusive nature of the worker's compensation remedy is referred to as the
exclusive remedy rule." Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207,209, 76 P.3d 951, 953
(2003).
With the worker's compensation law, the Legislature removed-with few
exceptions-all workplace injuries from "private controversy." LC. § 72-201. To
that end, the Legislature crafted a system whereby "sure and certain relief' would
be provided to injured workers regardless of fault. Id. This "sure and certain
relief" is provided "to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding, or
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 4
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compensation, except as is otherwise provided in the worker's compensation
scheme. Id.; see also LC. § 72-209(1); J.C. § 72-211. The exception is found at
LC. § 72-223, which allows an injured worker to sue a so-called "third party"
who may be liable for damages stemming from the injury. LC.§ 72-223(1), (2).
As noted above, LC. § 72-223(1) identifies two categories of employers who are
not third parties: (1) "those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code,
having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with
the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code" (which will be referred to herein as
a category one employer); and (2) "the owner or lessee of premises, or other
person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on,
but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other
reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed" (a category
two employer). Thus, if the respondents meet either of these categories, they were
... statutory employers and cannot be sued.
Kolar v. Cassia Cty. Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 351-52, 127 P.3d 962, 967-68 (2005).

Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a) defines employer as:
any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the services of
another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It includes the owner or lessee
of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the
business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent
contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workers there
employed.
(Emphasis added). "[T]he term 'employer' is more broadly defined under the Idaho
Worker's Compensation Laws than under the common law." Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho
847, 849, 203 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2009). "[A] statutory employer [is] anyone who, by
contracting or subcontracting out services, is liable to pay worker's compensation
benefits if the direct employer does not pay those benefits." Id. at 850, 203 P.3d at 1249.
The law extends an employer's liability to its contractors' or subcontractors' employees
''in any case where such employer would have been liable for compensation if such
employee had been working directly for such employer." I.C. 72-216. "Essentially, 'an
employer who makes use of a contractor's or subcontractor's employees qualifies as a
category one statutory employer and is immune from suits in tort."' Ewing v. State, Dep 't
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 5
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ofTransp., 147 Idaho 305, 307, 208 P.3d 287, 289 (2009) (quoting Krinitt v. Idaho Dep 't
ofFish & Game, 162 Idaho 425,431, 398 P.3d 158, 164 (2017)).

IfTRC is Dale Kelly's statutory employer, the Kellys' case must be dismissed "since
under Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law [Dale Kelly's] exclusive remedy is recovery through
worker's compensation." Cordova v. Bonneville Cty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637,
640, 167 P.3d 774, 777 (2007).
Category 1 statutory employers

The Kellys argue that statutory employer immunity under Idaho's worker's compensation
law only applies when the plaintiff and defendant's relationship arose out of a contract for
services and does not apply to relationships arising out of contracts for the sale of goods. They
contend that at its core, the contract between TRC and Brown Strauss involved the sale of
goods-the metal tubing. The Kellys urge this Court to use a predominant factor test-identical
to that used under the Uniform Commercial Code-to determine whether the contract between
TRC and Brown Strauss is one for services or one for the sale of goods. The Kellys cite a recent
opinion by the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Schuler v. Battelle Energy
Alliance, LLC, Case 4:18-cv-00234-CWD, Dkt. 56, in support of their argument. The Kellys

also cite numerous out-of-state decisions in support of their position that a transaction involving
the sale of goods does not fall within the scope of statutory employer immunity.
In a recent June 2019, decision in Schuler. the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho
considered the issue of statutory employment. In Schuler, a long-haul semi-truck driver was
severely injured while making a delivery to INL's Advanced Test Reactor Complex. Schuler
alleged Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA) and its employee negligently caused his injuries. BEA
moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was a statutory employer under the Act.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6
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Schuler opposed BEA' s motion on the basis that it was not his statutory employer because "one
of the underlying contracts was for goods and not services." Schuler, Dkt. 56 at 11. BEA
conceded that "if the contract was a contract for goods, the statutory employer defense would not
apply." Id (emphasis in original). BEA countered, however, that "although the contract
involved the purchase of a good," that purchase "was part and parcel of a larger services
contract." Id.
The Schuler court engaged in a thorough analysis of whether the underlying contract was
one for goods or services. In determining the contract was one for services, the Court cited to
and relied on the "predominant factor" test utilized by Idaho courts in determining whether the
Uniform Commercial Code governs contract enforcement. While engaging in its analysis, the

Schuler court did not cite any Idaho authority using a predominant factor test in the context of
worker's compensation. This Court has not found any instance when an Idaho appellate court
has applied a predominant factor test in the context of worker's compensation. Additionally,
Idaho's worker's compensation law, Idaho Code§§ 72-101, et seq, does not reference any type
of test to determine that a contract is either one for the sale of goods or one for services. Instead,
the Act defines "employer" as "any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted

the services ofanother. It includes contractors and subcontractors." I.C. § 72-102(13)(a)
(emphasis added). The Act does not confine its definition of employer to those who hired or
contracted predominantly (or exclusively) for services.
Without compelling authority from the Idaho appellate courts, this Court is unpersuaded
that it should rely on the UCC's predominant factor test to classify the contract between TRC
and Brown Strauss. To the contrary, in Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11
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P.3d 475 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that a contract implicating worker's
compensation may be one that is both for goods and for services.
In ,pencer, Weyerhaeuser, a timber mill, contracted with Steven Schilling for the
purchase of unharvested Ponderosa pine located on Schilling's real property. The terms of the
contract for purchase required Schilling to harvest and deliver the timber to Weyerhaeuser.
Schilling contracted with Allpress Logging to cut and deliver the timber to Weyerhaeuser. One
of Allpress Logging's employees, Justin Spencer, was severely injured while logging timber
designated for delivery to Weyerhaeuser. Spencer filed a worker's compensation claim against
Schilling, Allpress and Weyerhaeuser. The Industrial Commission ordered that Schilling and
Allpress were statutory employers and liable for worker's compensation benefits but held that
Weyerhaeuser was not a statutory employer and was not liable for worker's compensation
benefits.
On appeal, Weyerhaeuser argued its relationship with Schilling and Spencer was
distinguishable from Findley v. Flanigan, 84 Idaho 4 73, 373 P .2d 5 51 ( 1962), in which the
Supreme Court found a timber mill was the statutory employer of a claimant who was the direct
employee of a contractor hired to harvest the timber. Weyerhaeuser attempted to distinguish its
case "on the basis that in Findley the mill purchased standing trees and then hired the logger to
harvest them, whereas here, Weyerhaeuser bought the trees from Schilling who was responsible
for the harvesting of the timber." Id. at 861, 11 P.3d at 480. Weyerhaeuser argued that it was
only contracting with Schilling for the purchase of the timber and not for any services rendered
by Schilling. The Supreme Court rejected Weyerhaeuser's argument, explaining:
While there may be a difference in these cases, it is not as critical as
Weyerhaeuser maintains. In the present case, Weyerhaeuser contracted with
Schilling for the purchase of the timber and Weyerhaeuser contracted to pay
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Schilling for the price of harvesting. In their agreement, part of the value of each
load delivered was paid against Schilling's $100,000 advance, but part of the

price was also included as part of the cost for delivery. While Weyerhaeuser did
not care who did the harvesting, it paid the costs of logging the pine. Thus,
Weyerhaeuser was contracting with Schilling for logging the pine on the property.
Thus, we hold in keeping with the objectives of the Worker's Compensation Act,
that Weyerhaeuser is liable to Spencer because Weyerhaeuser hired a contractor
who hired a subcontractor who had not complied with the worker's compensation
prov1s10ns.

Id. (emphasis added). The Court in Spencer recognized that the contract between Weyerhaeuser
and Schilling was one that involved both the sale of goods and the provision of services.
Importantly, the Court did not utilize the predominant factor test but recognized that a contract
may be both for goods and services. If such a hybrid contract exists, Idaho's worker's
compensation law applies.
The Kellys' argwnent is similar to that made by Weyerhaeuser in Spencer. The Kellys
argue that TRC only contracted with Brown Strauss for the purchase of the metal tubing and not
for any services rendered by Brown Strauss. The parties do not dispute, however, that the
contract between TRC and Brown Strauss included the term "F.O.B. DELIVERED." TRC was
contracting with Brown Strauss both for the purchase of the metal tubing (a contract for the sale
of goods) and for delivery of the tubing (a contract for services). As noted by the Kellys, Brown
Strauss' s costs associated with delivery of the tubing accounted for 7% of the total contract price
between it and TRC. TRC did not request input regarding the means of delivery, but it
ultimately paid the costs of delivery.
The Kellys argue that a determination that the Brown Strauss-TRC contract was a
contract for services would set an unfavorable precedent, requiring businesses to provide
workers compensation insurance for every delivery person. The facts of this case, however, are
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markedly different from the hypothetical set forth by the Kellys. Unlike the hypothetical
purchase of a stapler, to be shipped from Amazon.com to the business purchaser, TRC
contracted with Brown Strauss for the purchase and delivery of over 43,000 pounds of metal
tubing. The services required to deliver the tubing are not directly comparable to that of small
consumer goods, easily assimilated into stream-of-commerce delivery systems (such as UPS and
other like providers). The delivery of the metal tubing required specialized arrangements.
Brown Strauss contracted with Jay Transport, who in tum contracted with Dale Kelly Trucking,
to load the metal tubing at Brown Strauss's facility in California and transport the tubing to
TRC's Idaho Falls facility. These shipping arrangements were specific to TRC's purchased
tubing and constituted a service for purposes of worker's compensation-a service for which
TRC contracted.
Because the contract between TRC and Brown Strauss involved the provision of services,
TRC is a statutory employer as defined by Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a). See also Fuhriman v.

State, Dep 't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 805, 153 P.3d 480,485 (2007) (quoting Venters v.
Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245,251, 108 P.3d 392,398 (2005)) ("The Court has
summarized the J.C. § 72-223 category one protection for employers as including 'employers
who make use of a contractor's or subcontractor's employees.'").
Although the Kellys cite numerous out-of-state cases, wherein various state courts held
that a transaction involving the sale of goods does not invoke worker's compensation coverage,
each of these cases are distinguishable based on the underlying facts, differences in statutory
language, and the evolution of the respective state's case law, interpreting the statutory language.
Because pertinent Idaho case law exists which allows this Court to resolve the issue before it,
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this Court does not look to other jurisdictions to interpret the meaning of statutory employer
under Idaho law.
TRC is a category 1 statutory employer. Because Dale Kelly received worker's
compensation benefits through his direct employer Dale Kelly Trucking, it cannot seek recovery
from TRC, its statutory employer. TRC's motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Category 2 statutory employers
TRC also argues that it is a category 2 statutory employer. It argues that Dale Kelly was
carrying out the work of unloading the steel he delivered to TRC and that TRC's business
involved the handling, loading and unloading of large steel components.
A category 2 statutory employer includes ''the owner or lessee of premises, or other

person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by
reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct
employer of the workmen there employed." I.C. § 72-223(1).
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained:
To determine who is a virtual proprietor or operator, the Court must consider
whether the work being done pertains to the business, trade, or occupation of the
owner or proprietor and whether such business, trade, or occupation is being
carried on by it for pecuniary gain. Id. "Generally, to find a business or person to
be a statutory employer, the work being carried out by the independent contractor
on the owner or proprietor 's premises must have been the type that could have
been carried out by employees of the owner or proprietor in the course of its
usual trade or business." Id. In short, "if a person is normally equipped with
manpower and tools to do a job and nevertheless contracts it to another employer,
he is the statutory employer of the second employer's employees." Id. (quotations
omitted.)

Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212, 76 P.3d 951, 956 (2003) (emphasis added).
TRC argues that Dale Kelly was engaging in the activity of unloading the metal tubing
when injured.
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The Kellys respond that the pertinent question in a category 2 analysis is what work Dale
Kelly was engaged to perform. The Kellys contend that Dale Kelly was contracted to deliver the
metal tubing to TRC's Idaho Falls facility, and that Dale was not responsible for unloading the
tubing as part of his delivery services.
The undisputed evidence indicates Dale Kelly's required services involved the delivery
of the metal tubing. At best, whether those delivery services included unloading the cargo
presents a question of fact. At the time TRC moved for summary judgment, it did not present
any facts that would support the conclusion that TRC's usual course of business involved the
delivery of metal tubing, similar to the work for which Dale Kelly was engaged. TRC did
submit evidence in support of that conclusion after the hearing in this matter. However, this
submission of evidence did not comply with I.R.C.P. 56(b)(2) and the Kellys did not have an
opportunity to respond. This Court does not, therefore, decide whether TRC was a category 2
statutory employer and TRC's motion for summary judgment on this basis should be denied.

Loss of consortium
The Kellys acknowledge that Nancy Kelly's claim for loss of consortium is derivative of
Dale Kelly's claims. Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242,249,953 P.2d 992,
999 (1998) (quoting Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 107 Idaho 389,394,690 P.2d
324, 329 (1984)) ("The claim for loss of consortium is a wholly derivative cause of action
contingent upon a third party's tortious injury to a spouse.").
The Kellys concede that if this Court determines TRC was Dale Kelly's statutory
employer, Nancy Kelly's claim for loss of consortium should be dismissed. See also Coddington

v. City of Lewiston, 96 Idaho 135, 137, 525 P.2d 330,332 (1974) (holding that a claim for loss of
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consortium is barred when it arises out of injuries compensated under the worker's
compensation).
Because TRC, as Dale Kelly's statutory employer, is immune from Dale Kelly's
negligence claim against it, Nancy Kelly cannot maintain her claim for loss of consortium.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
TRC's motion for summary judgment is granted. The Kellys' Complaint is dismissed.
- . ~
IT IS so ORDERED.
DATED this
-~ day of_~.......-..._2::::::::1.,
__________ 2019.
.,.___l

(],,

)"

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13

Page 210

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 12/3/2019 01:25 PM

I hereby certify that on this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ 2019, I did send a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon, or by electronic delivery.
John A. Bailey, Jr.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
PO Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83204
ibailey@hawleytroxell.com

Brent 0. Roche
Rachel A. Miller
RACINE OLSON, PLLP
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204
brent@racineolson.com

PENNYMANNING
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

By~
Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14

Page 211

